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PREM

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EAST MIDDLE 1967

1618

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet Documents

Reference	Date
JIC(67)(SA)46	24.5.67
CC(67)32nd conclusions, minute 1	25.5.67
MISC 150(67) 1st. meeting	25.5.67
MISC 150(67) 2nd meeting	26.5.67
MISC 150(67) 3rd. meeting	26.5.67

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PRIORITY MARKINGS
~~Top Secret~~ ~~Secret~~ Confidential Restricted Unclassified	~~Flash~~ Immediate } * ~~Priority~~ ~~Routine~~

PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence

En Clair.
Code
Cypher

Draft Telegram to:—
Paris

No.

(Date)

And to:—

Repeat to:—
Moscow
Washington

Saving to:—

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[*Privacy marking —if any*] .....

[Codeword—if any] .....

Addressed to Paris

telegram No. ..... *(date)* .....

And to .....

repeated for information to Moscow (for Sy S)
Washington

Saving to .....

Please deliver the following personal message from the Prime Minister to Preside de Gaulle.

Begins. I am sure that you will be as concerned as we are about the development of the situation in the Middle East. My colleagues and I have given much thought to the steps which it seems necessary to take. As you know, the Foreign Secretary has now left for Moscow where I hope he wi be able to probe the Soviet Government's intentions and do what he can to urge the need for them to exercise a restraining influence.

2. An aspect of the matter that, of course, particularly concerns us is ~~a~~ / maritime

and equally will, I am sure concern you, since France and Britain are both

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

maritime powers, is President Nasser's threat to interfere with the movement of shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba. It seems to us important to consider ways and means of concerting effective international action to counter this threat. We are therefore consulting the Governments of the principal maritime nations to see how we can together make such action as effective as possible on a broad international basis. I should of course particularly welcome your views on this aspect of the problem. We are sending Mr. George Thomson, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, to Washington in order to gain a first hand impression of American thinking and in particular to find out at what practical steps they may have in mind. As you know, our Ambassador in Washington has been in close touch with his French colleague from the outset of the crisis and they have both been in continuous consultation with the U.S. Govt. We shall, of course, keep your Govt. fully informed of the progress of Mr. Thomson's exchanges.

3. Our main purpose has throughout been to ensure if possible effective action that, action should be taken through the United Nations, We and have been taking an active part in discussions in New York with a view to the calling of an early meeting of the Security Council. We have been in close consultation with Russian Govt.

4. My colleagues and I will again be considering the whole question on 25 May. In the present anxious situation we naturally wish to maintain the closest

I believe that the sooner this can be done, the better. Mr Thomson will also be visiting New York to pursue his discussions there.

(B430 D.03246 600m 9/66 G.W.H.Ltd. Gp.863

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Registry No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
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DRAFT telegram.

Type 1 +

To:—

From

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

closest consultation with France and
with
our other European allies. It would
accordingly be of the greatest value to
me to know how you see the situation
and to have your advice on how the peace
of the Middle East ~~and the common~~
in which
the nations of (have a common interest,
~~interests of~~ Europe might best be
safeguarded. Ends.

S
2315

In this connection, I am asking H.M. Ambassador to convey to you the text of a statement of HMG's policy in this matter which I should be making in a speech tomorrow.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

5749 2.2

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No. T 129/67
COPY NO.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO. 1397 24 MAY, 1967 (PS)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED PARIS TELEGRAM NUMBER 1397 OF 24 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION MOSCOW (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE) WASHINGTON.

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DE GAULLE.

BEGINS

I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL BE AS CONCERNED AS WE ARE ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO THE STEPS WHICH IT SEEMS NECESSARY TO TAKE. AS YOU KNOW, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAS NOW LEFT FOR MOSCOW WHERE I HOPE HE WILL BE ABLE TO PROBE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS AND DO WHAT HE CAN TO URGE THE NEED FOR THEM TO EXERCISE A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE.

2. AN ASPECT OF THE MATTER THAT, OF COURSE, PARTICULARLY CONCERNS US AND EQUALLY WILL, I AM SURE CONCERN YOU, SINCE FRANCE AND BRITAIN ARE BOTH MARITIME POWERS, IS PRESIDENT NASSER'S THREAT TO INTERFERE WITH THE MOVEMENT OF SHIPPING THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA. IT SEEMS TO US IMPORTANT TO CONSIDER WAYS AND MEANS OF CONCERTING EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO COUNTER THIS THREAT. WE ARE THEREFORE CONSULTING WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE OTHER PRINCIPAL MARITIME NATIONS TO SEE HOW WE CAN TOGETHER MAKE SUCH ACTION AS EFFECTIVE AS POSSIBLE ON A BROAD INTERNATIONAL BASIS. I SHOULD OF COURSE PARTICULARLY WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM. WE HAVE SENT MR GEORGE THOMSON THE MINISTER OF STATE AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON IN ORDER TO GAIN A FIRST HAND IMPRESSION OF AMERICAN THINKING AND IN PARTICULAR TO FIND OUT WHAT PRACTICAL STEPS THEY MAY HAVE IN MIND. AS YOU KNOW, OUR AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON HAS BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH

/WITH HIS

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1397 TO PARIS

WITH HIS FRENCH COLLEAGUE FROM THE OUTSET OF THE CRISIS AND THEY HAVE BOTH BEEN IN CONTINUOUS CONSULTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. WE SHALL, OF COURSE, KEEP YOUR GOVERNMENT FULLY INFORMED OF THE PROGRESS OF MR THOMSON'S EXCHANGES.

3. OUR MAIN PURPOSE THROUGHOUT HAS BEEN TO ENSURE THAT, IF POSSIBLE, EFFECTIVE ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS. WE HAVE BEEN TAKING AN ACTIVE PART - HERE AGAIN IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH MONSIEUR SEYDOUX - IN DISCUSSIONS IN NEW YORK WITH A VIEW TO THE CALLING OF AN EARLY MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOONER THIS CAN BE DONE, THE BETTER. MR THOMSON WILL ALSO BE VISITING NEW YORK TO PURSUE HIS DISCUSSIONS THERE.

4. MY COLLEAGUES AND I WILL AGAIN BE CONSIDERING THE WHOLE QUESTION ON MAY 25. IN THE PRESENT ANXIOUS SITUATION WE NATURALLY WISH TO MAINTAIN THE CLOSEST CONSULTATION WITH FRANCE AND WITH OUR OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES. IT WOULD ACCORDINGLY BE OF THE GREATEST VALUE TO ME TO KNOW HOW YOU SEE THE SITUATION AND TO HAVE YOUR ADVICE ON HOW THE PEACE OF THE MIDDLE EAST, IN WHICH THE NATIONS OF EUROPE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST, MIGHT BEST BE SAFEGUARDED. IN THIS CONNEXION, I AM ASKING H M AMBASSADOR TO CONVEY TO YOU THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S POLICY IN THIS MATTER WHICH I SHALL BE MAKING IN A SPEECH TODAY.

ENDS

SOSFA SENT 0725Z 24 MAY

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC (F.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL &
CONFIDENTIAL

May 24, 1967

I enclose the text of the personal message to President de Gaulle from the Prime Minister which was delivered in Paris this morning by Patrick Riley. I also enclose the relevant passage from the Prime Minister's speech today, to which you will see that there is a reference in the last sentence of the Prime Minister's message.

Michael Palliser.

M. Gerard Andre, C.V.O.

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
F L A S H WASHINGTON TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1746 DATED 24 MAY 1967
SECRET
ADDRESSED TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1746 OF 24 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

FOLLOWING FROM MINISTER OF STATE: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

MY TALKS WITH RUSK AND ROSTOW THIS MORNING WENT WELL AND IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT WE SHOULD SPEND THE REST OF THE DAY STUDYING POSSIBLE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR A DECLARATION AND ENFORCEMENT ACTION. RUSK EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WOULD BE AD REFERENDUM ON THE AMERICAN SIDE, AS ON OURS, AND THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD TO BE SURE THAT THE CONGRESS WERE BEHIND THEM IN ANY DECISIONS THEY TOOK. THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO MR. RUSK YESTERDAY THAT ANY ACTION MUST BE MULTILATERAL AND THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO ACT THROUGH THE U.N.

2. ROSTOW TOLD ME THAT YESTERDAY (23 MAY) THE U.S. HAD DISSUADED THE ISRAELIS FROM AN IMMEDIATE AIR STRIKE AND THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD AGREED NOT TO SEND ANY SHIPS INTO THE GULF OF AQABA TO TEST U.A.R. INTENTIONS.

3. I ASKED ROSTOW THAT THE U.S. SHOULD FOLLOW UP THE ACTION WHICH WE HAVE TAKEN WITH THE MARITIME POWERS AND I WILL RAISE THIS AGAIN WITH HIM THIS AFTERNOON.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT 24/1709Z
RECD AT 24/1709Z

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Copy No: 3

Cypher/Cat A

FLASH MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 870 24 May 1967

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No T 130/67

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 870 of 24 May
Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Baghdad, Kuwait.

Following from Secretary of State to the Prime Minister.

Middle East Crisis.

At the end of my talk with Mr. Kosygin this morning he said to me very earnestly "Tell Mr. Wilson that we have no interest in a flare up and shall do all in our power to prevent conflict in the area".

2. Kosygin would be very embarrassed if this message became public knowledge, but you may find it useful to tell Ebau in the strictest confidence. Her Majesty's Ambassador should also tell Mr. Rusk on the same basis.

Foreign Office pass Flash UKMIS New York 18, Immediate Washington 132, Tel Aviv 10, Cairo 15, Damascus 12, Routine Beirut 2, Amman CQ Baghdad 7, Kuwait T1.

Sir G. Harrison

Sent 1448Z/24 May
Received 1510Z/24 May

[Repetition to Beirut, Amman, Baghdad, Kuwait, referred for Departmental decision. Repeated as requested to other posts]

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street]

PRISEC (F.O.)

PPPPP

SECRET

4

S E C R E T

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel. No. 874 24 May, 1967

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 874 of 24 May. Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Baghdad and Kuwait.

Following from Secretary of State.

Middle East crisis.

I had an hour and more on this subject with Kosygin before lunch today. Gromyko was present and a few advisers, including Soviet Ambassador in London.

2. I began by stressing the danger inherent in the situation, particularly since there was no one anywhere who could be in full control of future developments. I mentioned the four aims we would have in mind in the Security Council (your telegram 2118 to UKMIS New York). I added that we attached particular importance to the Gulf of Aqaba problem as this seemed a certain flashpoint unless the blockade announced by Egypt was lifted. On this point we had a direct interest as a major trading country and we were in touch with other maritime Powers: as part of this process, Mr. Thomson was going to Washington. I added that the Prime Minister would today be making a speech re-affirming our 1957 statement, of which I read the text (your telegram No. 507 to Tel Aviv). I ended by appealing to the Soviet Union to cooperate in efforts to reduce tension, both in the Security Council and through their influence in capitals.

3. Kosygin referred me to the statement on the Soviet Government's position released last night (my telegram No. 1248). He questioned the wisdom of reaffirming the 1957 statement, arguing that it was premature to make any unilateral declarations while U Thant and others (he mentioned the Syrian Prime Minister) were in Cairo discussing the problem. He should know what conclusions U Thant's discussions reached before making statements. Ill-considered statements, even if intended to reduce tension, might have the effect of heightening it. In particular, statements about the Gulf of Aqaba on the lines I had mentioned were bound to provoke adverse reactions from the Arabs against those who made them.

4. He went on to give a one-sided account of events leading up to the crisis, emphasizing the following points: /(a)

(a) It was Israel that had taken the first step towards the crisis by her "aggression" on 7 May:

(b) No one had then hastened to make statements or call the Security Council, but, as soon as the Arabs responded, there was at once a sharp reaction from us. Why did we take a different attitude to different countries?

(c) Israel was too weak to act alone in this provocative way. Her aggression was only possible with the permission of those who armed and financed her. It was for those who had prompted Israel to take steps now to lower the tension.

5. I made a suitable reply, reminding Kosygin that they had already published their own unilateral statement, which seemed to me a biased document. I briefly corrected his misrepresentations of the history of events and strongly denied that we had prompted Israel to be provocative: on the contrary we had urged restraint upon her despite persistent Syrian guerrilla action across the frontiers, and had been very critical when Israel attacked Jordan at Samua.

6. I tried to draw the Russian side on their intentions for the Security Council meeting, but had no success. I may have a further opportunity to question Gromyko on this and will report if anything interesting emerges. At no time did Kosygin criticize the plan for an early Security Council nor did he comment on our four aims.

7. I then made a further and even more urgent plea for the Russians to use their influence before it was too late to defuse this explosive situation. This led him to deny that he was in favour of inaction and he then made the positive response quoted in my telegram under reference.

8. Two other points in the discussion deserve mention:

(a) He told me, in confidence, of the letter from President Johnson which he had not found very satisfactory.

(b) He was very insistent that Soviet Government's statement released yesterday was the considered view of the Soviet Government and that he could not in any way vary it or add to it. I had the impression that, as well as external considerations, he probably had some internal political reason for being so insistent - perhaps it had been difficult to get an agreed text.

9. Because of this last point he urged me to say nothing to the Press about our Middle East talks. I promised to say the

minimum possible, but if asked I would have to say that the Middle East was one of the subjects discussed (in fact it was the only one discussed with Kosygin). He agreed that I could say that the talks had been friendly and leave it at that.

10. Finally he questioned me anxiously about the current Israeli attitude and asked me if we were in touch with the Israeli Government. I told him that we believed they were behaving responsibly and we were urging them not to provoke or allow themselves to be provoked.

11. My conclusion is that the Russians are genuinely worried by the situation and alert to the dangers, they are clearly working on the Arabs. This does not mean necessarily that we will find them cooperative in the Security Council or ready to join us constructively on the question of the Straits. I hope I convinced them of the especial danger there. The main point, however, seems to me to be that they have accepted a responsibility to try to keep events under control.

Foreign Office pass Immediate UKMIS New York 19, Priority Washington 133, Tel Aviv 11, Cairo 16, Routine Damascus 13, Beirut 3, Amman 2, Baghdad 8 and Kuwait 2.

Sir G. Harrison

Sent 0002Z/25 May
Recd. 0340Z/25 May

[Repeated as requested]

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CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 31 24 May, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 36 [to Rome No. 1453 of 23 May].

Gulf of Aqaba.

I spoke to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternnon [grp. undec.] said that the Panamanain representative at the United Nations had been instructed to exert any influence he had with the Israel and the Egyptian representatives in favour of restraint. Speaking personally and before he had time to consider the subject he thought they would probably approve fully the line taken in the Prime Minister's statement of today at Margate. In general Panama was concerned to ensure freedom of navigation. In so far as the present crisis had an East-West flavour Panama's weight would be with the West.

Such as it is!

Mr. Hankey

Sent 0025Z 25 May

Recd 0027Z 25 May

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R24

SOUTH WESTERN DISTRICT 24 MAY 67 OFFICE

At_____m
From_____
By_____

At 3.44 3.8 PM BARNSTAPLE EX PRIORITY 104

PRIORITY PRIME MINISTER 10 DOWNING ST LDN SW1 =
FROM JEREMY THORPE BARNSTAPLE 3430 MAY I STRONGLY URGE HER MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY INTEND TO HONOUR THE TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF 1950 STOP THE DECLARED THREAT TO THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL MUST BE RESISTED BY BRITAIN UNLESS WE ARE TO REPEAT THE PRE WAR BETRAYAL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA STOP THE EGYPTIAN ATTEMPT TO arm ape. B or C

51-5695 J.,P.Ltd. 11/66

SW1 ~~3430~~ ~~3430~~ ~~1950~~ 1950 TRIPARTITE

EGYPTIAN AQABA + WB 434

No.

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TELEGRAM

Prefix. Time handed in. Office of Origin and Service Instructions. Words.

SOUTH WESTERN DISTRICT 24 MAY 67

At 6 m

From

By

At m

To

By

INTERFERE WITH SHIPPING IN THE GULF OF AQABA CANNOT BE TOLERATED STOP URGE THAT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN IF POSSIBLE THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS BUT THAT IN ANY CASE NO DOUBT SHOULD EXIST ABOUT BRITAINS DETERMINATION TO PREVENT AGGRESSION =

JEREMY THORPE +

For the repetition of doubtful words telephone "TELEGRAMS ENQUIRY" or call, with this form at office of delivery. Other enquiries should be accompanied by this form, and, if possible, the envelope. B or C

51-5695 J.P.Ltd. 11/66

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 347 24 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 347 of 24 May
Repeated for information to MOD (DI4) Moscow, Washington, U.K.Mission New York, Damascus, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Jerusalem and J.I.G. Cyprus.

My telegram No. 341: Middle East situation report 0600 hours G.M.T. 24 May.

New mobilisation (my telegram No. 343) continued briskly throughout night. Several new reporting centres have opened. But there are again several cases of individuals being sent home once they have been embodied (cf. my telegram No. 332, paragraph 2). Some military transport movement has been observed during night, but all going north - this includes some medium artillery. I was wrong in my estimate that Israelis would try and run a ship through Tiran at first light and assume that they will not try this now that Nasser has announced mining of the channel.

2. Israel Radio refused to carry our warning to British subjects. Protests to Foreign Ministry elicited that some six or seven other countries had all asked for same facility. This had been refused since it was felt numerous radio warnings would be bad for morale and start war scare. Israel Government wish to avoid this. Press this morning, however, carry our notices. I am satisfied by means open to us plus foreign broadcasts that our message is getting across to most of those concerned.

3. There are no civilian buses running this morning and there appear to be few taxis available.

Foreign Office pass Moscow 5, Washington 59, U.K.Mission New York 55, Damascus 54, Cairo 35, Amman 67, Beirut 66, Jerusalem 31 and MOD pass J.I.G. Cyprus 45.

Mr. Hadow Sent 0706Z 24 May 1967
Recd 0816Z 24 May 1967

[Repetition to Jerusalem, Damascus, Cairo, Amman, Beirut referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts.]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION [Sent to D.C.C.]
Eastern Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

:::::

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COPY NO: 8

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

TELNO. 1286 24 MAY 1967 (PS)

CONFIDENTIAL.
FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY.
MIDDLE EAST ROUND-UP.
THE MAIN NEW DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN QUOTE AL AHRAM'S UNQUOTE
ANNOUNCEMENT THAT:
A) THE STRAITS OF TIRAN HAVE BEEN MINED:
B) ALL ISRAELI SHIPS WILL BE INTERCEPTED AND IF NECESSARY FIRED ON:
AND
C) OTHER SHIPPING WILL BE ASKED TO STOP FOR INSPECTION.
2. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN, SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN CALLED BY CANADA AND DENMARK FOR THIS MORNING. WE ARE REPEATING TO YOU CORRESPONDENCE WITH NEW YORK ABOUT THE LINE LORD CARADON SHOULD TAKE AT THE MEETING.
3. MEANWHILE OUR REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN HAVE RECEIVED A MILDLY ENCOURAGING RESPONSE IN STOCKHOLM AND ROME. THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WAS DISCOURAGING AND TOTALLY NON-COMMITTAL. FREEMAN HAS WARNED US THAT IN THE EYES OF THE PRESENT INDIAN GOVERNMENT EGYPT IS RATED QUOTE ABOUT THE CLOSEST FRIEND OF ALL UNQUOTE AND THE BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR IS THAT INDIAN INFLUENCE MAY BE USED AT SOME STAGE BEHIND THE SCENES TO COUNSEL MODERATION ON NASSER.
4. EBAN WAS DUE THIS MORNING IN PARIS ON HIS WAY TO THE UNITED STATES. HE WAS HOPING TO HAVE A MEETING WITH DE GAULLE. HE IS COMING ON TO LONDON AND WILL BE SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON.
5. JORDAN HAS BROKEN OFF RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AS A RESULT OF A BOMB INCIDENT ON THE FRONTIER.

/6. THERE

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1286 TO MOSCOW

6. THERE IS A TENDENCY IN THIS MORNING'S PRESS TO PRESENT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AS A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES SUPPORTING THE ISRAELIS VERSUS THE RUSSIANS AND OTHERS SUPPORTING THE ARABS. AS THIS IS CLEARLY A DANGEROUS MISREPRESENTATION WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO CORRECT IT IN OUR PRESS BRIEFING, WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY NAMING THE RUSSIANS, AND TO EMPHASISE THE EFFORTS WHICH WE AND THE AMERICANS ARE TAKING TO AVOID A CONFLAGRATION BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL. WE ARE ALSO COVERING THE POINT IN OUR GUIDANCE TO ARAB POSTS.

SOSFA SENT 1357/24 MAY

PRISEC (F.O.)

PPPPP

(A)

T131/67

FLASH

Telegram to MOSCOW

WASHINGTON

UKMIS NEW YORK

PARIS

PARIS TELEGRAM NO. 490

MIDDLE EAST

DE GAULLE PROPOSAL

FOLLOWING FOR THE FOREIGN SECRETARY FROM PRIME MINISTER

I have been discussing with Fred Mulley and officials whether we should respond and if so how to de Gaulle's idea of a four power consultation on Middle East, and will wish to discuss the question in Cabinet tomorrow, Thursday morning May 25, at 11.0 a.m. British summer time.

For obvious European reasons I would like to give a prompt and favourable response if possible subject to preserving the primacy of the United Nations in the handling of this matter so long as progress there is possible. I understand in any case that Goldberg has commented favourably on the proposal in the Security Council.

Would you agree that, subject to any comment I may get from the Americans ~~I~~ we should respond publicly to the effect that we welcome this French idea adding that while we hope for progress in the Security Council we think that what is being done there may well be reinforced by contact whether through diplomatic channels or by

means of a meeting between the four great powers.

You may in any case like to sound the Russians at your next meeting, but I think that in any case I ought to respond tomorrow May 25.

Could you let me have any comments to arrive here without fail by 08.00 hours British summer time?

May 24, 1967

Sent to President Clerk for despatch

24/5.

(B)

FLASH

Telegram to WASHINGTON

MOSCOW

UKMIS NEW YORK

PARIS

MY TELEGRAM NO. A

MIDDLE EAST

FOLLOWING FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PATRICK DEAN

Please tell United States Government that we are urgently considering de Gaulle's proposal on the lines indicated on my telegram under reference and ask whether they have any comment. I assume that Goldberg's remarks in Security Council were made with Washington's agreement.

As you will see from my telegram under reference I am anxious to respond quickly and favourably. This does not of course alter the view that we should make all progress possible in the Security Council. But it is clear that we may well run into ~~the~~ Russian ~~xxxxxxxx~~ difficulties there and I think therefore that we ought to welcome de Gaulle's idea as a reinforcement ~~May 24, 1967~~ for what we are trying to do in the United Nations.

May 24, 1967.

Sent to Resident Clerk for despatch 24/5

Israel

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AT 5.0 p.m. ON WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 1967

PRESENT:

Prime Minister

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Mulley)

Mr. A. M. Palliser

Mr. Eban (The Israeli Ambassador)

Mr. Eban's Private Secretary

Top copy on Israel Jan'66

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Eban's impressions of his short visit to Paris. Mr. Eban dismissed his talk with General de Gaulle with a fairly curt reference to the impracticibility of the General's proposals for four power intervention. The Prime Minister said that the Foreign Secretary was working hard on the Soviet Government to persuade them to act with sense and restraint. Mr. Eban said that the Soviet Government appeared to have decided that their policy must be to support the so-called revolutionary regimes in the Middle East; and, no doubt because of Vietnam, to intensify their anti-American attitude. The Prime Minister suggested that they might also be motivated by their desire to compete with Chinese competition and to strengthen anti-Chinese and pro-Soviet influences in the area. They also perhaps felt obliged to twist the Americans' tail in the Middle East to compensate for their inability to influence events in Vietnam to the advantage of Hanoi. But he questioned whether the Soviet Government

would go to the limit of such a policy.

Mr. Eban agreed. Israel had the choice of three courses: to surrender; to fight; or to work for an international solution under which the Strait of Tiran could be re-opened through the power and influence of the World Maritime Community. Surrender was out of the question. Israel could not now live without the Port of Elath. The situation had changed radically in ten years and the whole economic complex had been build up based on the use of the Port. Moreover, Nasser's blockade meant that Jordan was also at his mercy; and no doubt a part of his purpose was to bring pressure to bear on Jordan. In making a stand on the issue of free passage through the Strait Israel would be choosing by far the best legal and moral issue on which to stand. If to fight were the only choice, so be it. In such a war, if Israel were left to fight it alone, he thought they could win. But the weapons of war were now infinitely more destructive than in 1948 and the human consequences would be tragic. Israel certainly did not want a war. This was why they sought the third solution he had mentioned and believed that they would not be alone in pursuing it. In 1957 the representatives of seventeen countries had strongly supported at the United Nations the principle of free passage into the Gulf of Aqaba; and he noted that the Prime Minister had that day re-affirmed this. The United States had taken and continued to take a firm line. France had in 1957

spoken perhaps in the strongest language of all and had related her position to Article 51 of the Charter. In his talk that morning with General de Gaulle the latter had expressed support for the principle of free passage but had dismissed the reference to Article 51 as made under a different regime and in a different situation. The Israeli position in this respect was firm and would not be changed. They relied on continuing support from the seventeen nations, all of them with important maritime interests. Israel had addressed communications to all of them and all of them, in varying degrees, were reiterating their support for the principle of free passage. But the Israeli Government doubted whether anything effective would emerge from the United Nations. The problem had indeed been created with U Thant's action the previous week in yielding to the Egyptians - " an error that will reverberate in history". - and the Secretary General had given the Israeli Government no chance and in ten minutes had undone the labours of ten years. His behaviour was in marked contrast to the attitude of Mr. Hammarskjold who had always made it clear that if a request of this nature were made he would delay the response and look for advice to the Assembly. Mr. Eban said that he could understand that other Governments would wish to await proceedings in the Security Council. But if they confined themselves to such action as could be taken within the United Nations, given the inevitability of

a Soviet veto, no progress clearly would be made. They, therefore, attached importance to the positions taken in the past by the United States and Britain that they would think in terms of action whether inside or outside the United Nations. The Prime Minister drew Mr. Eban's attention to the text of his own speech and particularly to his re-confirmation of the principle of freedom of passage. Mr. Eban said that general recognition of this principle had been established through the practice of the past ten years. But some concern had been caused in Israel by the publication at a crucial psychological moment of a statement by a Foreign Office spokesman to the effect that the tri-partite declaration had been superseded by the position adopted by the then British Government in 1963. The implication had been that the United Nations now had exclusive jurisdiction in the matter and that the British Government thought the statements made ten years ago in the United Nations had greater validity than the tri-partite declaration. The Prime Minister said that he was not sure whether any such statement had been made nor did he think Mr. Eban was necessarily drawing the right conclusion about the British attitude. The fact remained, however, that the tri-partite declaration was not as relevant to the present situation as the principle of free passage.

Mr. Eban said that the present mood in Israel was of calm resolution; ~~but~~ there had ~~also~~ been in ~~very short~~ the early stages a fatalistic sense that war could not be avoided.

But the attitude adopted by the United States had opened up the possibility of Israel being integrated into some concert of powers dedicated to the principles in the 1957 United Nations statements. This had been the conclusion drawn from President Johnson's statement of the previous day; and he had made a further statement that day. They had been under strong pressure from the United States' Government not to take any drastic action until this possibility had been fully examined. The balloon could have gone up the previous day when an Israeli ship had been due to pass through the Straits. But they had deferred any passage by Israeli ships for 48 hours; and had agreed that while him himself was on his present mission no attempt would be made to test the Egyptian blockade. He hoped he could reach agreement on how the maritime powers would react. The United States Government had expressed willingness to discuss how and when they should react so as to ensure free passage.

The Prime Minister raised the question of the Egyptian mining of the Gulf. Mr. Eban said that if this had been done - and this was still not certain - Nasser was in effect totally blockading Jordan and helping to strengthen the Israeli case. The Israeli Ambassador said that he thought the purpose would be to leave a narrow channel through the mines and to insist that ships passing through it should have an Egyptian pilot. Mr. Eban said that it would be desirable for all the maritime powers to refuse to recognise the illegal

Egyptian blockade, to continue to send their ships into the Straits and to placeon Nasser the onus of using force to prevent this. The question of how Israeli ships were dealt with was a different matter. The Prime Minister suggested that the Egyptians might discriminate in their treatment of ships of different nationalities. Mr. Eban said this was possible. But most of Israel's oil coming from Iran, was carried in tankers of the major maritime powers. It was interesting that the Shah remained studiously unconcerned at the destination of this oil despite constant pressure from the Arab states and indeed Israel maintained excellent working relations with Iran.

Mr. Eban asked if there was any truth in press reports (e.g. in the Daily Telegraph) of disagreement between Britain and the United States. The Prime Minister said there was no justification for this. The Government's position had been clearly established at the previous day's Cabinet Meeting and Mr. George Thompson had gone to discuss the whole position with the United States' Government and to see what steps could most effectively be taken. There were no differences of views between ourselves and the Americans. Mr. Eban asked whether the British position was to seek if possible to get effective action at the United Nations but not to regard this as necessarily exclusive. The Prime Minister assented. Mr. Eban said he would be in touch with Mr. Thompson in Washington. Many of the smaller states had a considerable interest

in restoring the situation and the more of those who could be associated with a British and American effort the better. General de Gaulle believed as a matter of general policy that the question should be handled by the four great Powers. He had expressed pessimism at the prospect of this. But the General had insisted on the need to make the attempt and had advised him against Israel becoming too closely involved with an exclusively Western group of nations. Effective action must be on a four Power not a three Power basis. Mr. Eban said that he remained completely sceptical. General de Gaulle had achieved nothing by his policy of friendship with the Soviet Union apart from the journeys he and Mr. Couve de Murville had paid to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. France had no influence whatever on Soviet policy.

The Prime Minister enquired about the present atmosphere in Israel. Mr. Eban said it was somewhat easier. And life on the whole continued normally, with a slight run on food supplies. He thought Mr. Eshkol's formula of a "parallel and reciprocal de-escalation" was apposite and represented the direction in which they should seek to work; and in due course the United Nations might be able to give further help. His hope was that he would be able to return and report that in London and Washington he had found the major maritime powers giving serious thought to the need to preserve freedom of passage. The Prime Minister said that this was precisely the purpose of Mr. Thompson's Washington talks. When these were concluded the British Government might

have something further to say to Mr. Eban on the subject. Mr. Eban said that it was important psychologically that Egypt should not have a monopoly of naval forces in the Red Sea. Israel's navy was temporarily rather weak. But they were expecting shortly delivery of some very sophisticated and fast small French craft. The submarine Leviathan had left Britain but would have to travel round the Cape. The Israeli Government had been very grateful for the British Government's willingness to release the tank ammunition they needed. As regards France, they could not agree with the General's political approach, slanted towards the Soviet Union. But in practical terms, the French were giving them substantial assistance and in particular were supplying some fast modern planes on credit terms. Since the crisis began they had had a moment of concern about an apparently threatening movement of Soviet ships, but these had now turned northwards into the Black Sea. Most of the Egyptian army was now in the Red Sea area and they had withdrawn substantial forces from the Yemen. But Israel was less concerned about a possible land battle than about the vulnerability of their country to air attack.

Mr. Eban said that Israel would not intervene at an early stage in the Security Council debate but would hope to let other countries make the running. The Prime Minister said that the Canadian Government had been very critical of U Thant's behaviour; and indeed he himself had implied criticism in his speech. Mr. Eban agreed.

He again contrasted U Thant's action with that of Mr. Hammarskjold's in 1961. The Egyptians had asked for no more this time than then, namely that the United Nations should allow them to pass troops through their own positions. Hammarskjold had allowed this, but the Egyptians had soon tired and when they withdrew the United Nations force was able to return. This would have been the right course for U Thant to have taken this time.

Mr. Eban left at 5.45 p.m.

Distribution:
Foreign Secretary.
Defence Secretary.
Sir B. Trend.

SH 25/5

May 24, 1967

Copy No. 1 of 46 copies

3

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W.1

TELEPHONE WHITEHALL 7022

MO/3/7/4

SECRET

Discussed by Ministers today. 23/5

PRIME MINISTER

HW

NEAR EAST CRISIS

Action has been taken as agreed at yesterday's Cabinet meeting: I attach an annex which sets out the current dispositions of HM Ships and those of the US Navy and the implications, in broad terms, of possible further moves.

2. I have discussed the crisis with my military advisers. They have reinforced the view, which I expressed in Cabinet, that there would be strong military objection to any plan for concentrating our ships near the Straits of Tiran, in order to counter the UAR threat to the Straits, so long as Egyptian air forces are in a position to dominate that area. I hope that, as a result of Mr. Thomson's visit to Washington, we shall have a clearer picture of the military thinking of the US Government. Subject to that, our appreciation is that the soundest military course would be to concentrate US and HM Ships, including aircraft carriers, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean in a position from which they could pose a deterrent threat to military action by the UAR. We are continuing

/ to

SECRET

to study the problem, including in particular the question of what might be done to deal with the mining threat at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

3. There is also the potential role which our air strike forces, based in Malta and Cyprus, might play - depending on how the situation develops. This is also being studied.

4. I am copying this minute, and its enclosure, to our Cabinet and DOPC colleagues, and to Sir Burke Trend. I hope that you will agree that the military implications of the situation should be discussed at tomorrow's DOPC meeting (with the Chiefs of Staff present).

DWH.

R 24th May 1967.

NEAR EAST CRISIS: NAVAL FORCES

H.M. Ships held in readiness

The aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS, who was on her way to the United Kingdom, has been detained in the vicinity of Malta, where there are already two frigates, the WHITBY and the DUNCAN, as well as six minesweepers. HMS RHYL, who had just left Gibraltar for the UK, has also been turned back to Malta, as has a support ship, the RFA LYNESS. The retention of the VICTORIOUS and the RHYL in the Mediterranean affects the return home of their ships' companies after their tour of foreign service.

2. East of Suez, the aircraft carrier HERMES and her supporting ships, which were on the way to Singapore, have been detained at Gan.

Possible Task Groups

3. It would be possible to form a Task Group in the Mediterranean comprising the VICTORIOUS, three frigates and a replenishment group. This could be held south of Cyprus as a contribution to a US or UN Task Force if required. The carrier, two frigates and an oiler are available in the Malta area now and are topping up with certain stores: they could be available in the Eastern Mediterranean for operations within 48 hours. The third frigate and an additional stores ship can join this group three days from now. Thus the Task Group could be concentrated, if required, in the Eastern Mediterranean at the weekend.

4. Within seven or eight days it would be possible to form a similar Task Group - for deployment in the north of the Red Sea - from the HERMES, two frigates and replenishment ships. But it is considered that it would be militarily unacceptable to operate an aircraft carrier in such confined waters without first destroying the enemy air forces. The HERMES is also well overdue for maintenance at Singapore.

5. Some 10 ships transit the Tiran Straits weekly, of which about two are British. Two frigates could be deployed in the Red Sea within four or five days as a deterrent to interference with British shipping; but there is a serious risk

.....that these

that these would prove to be a hostage to fortune. To maintain such a patrol for more than about two weeks would involve relief ships from the Far East Fleet and would impose considerable strain on our frigate/destroyer resources East of Suez.

6. There is a small RN minesweeping force in the Middle East which could be deployed as part of an international force to clear the Tiran Straits. To mount a minesweeping operation with appropriate support would take two to three weeks.

USN Moves

7. Our information about US intentions is that they are making as few as possible alterations to their planned movements. USS AMERICA - a very large carrier - is continuing to exercise with the Spaniards in the Western Mediterranean. Another, somewhat smaller, the SARATOGA, is off Crete. The comparatively elderly carrier INTREPID, due to transit the Canal on 26th May on her way to the Far East, has been held in the Eastern Mediterranean on orders from Washington. There is a small US headquarters ship at Jedda and a destroyer at Massawa. The Naval Staff is remaining in close touch with CINCUSNAVEUR.

8. Attached are an Appendix showing the disposition of RN forces available for NEAR and MIDDLE EAST operations; and a map showing the disposition of RN and USN ships.

APPENDIX

DISPOSITION OF R. N. FORCES AVAILABLE
FOR NEAR AND ME OPERATIONS AT 241200Z MAY 1967

AT MALTA

	Days to operating position 50 miles from Egyptian coast
CVA VICTORIOUS (on completion of storing)	1½
FF WHITBY	1½
FF DUNCAN	1½
SM AENEAS	2
CMS 5 in No.	3

to be supplemented by:-

FF RHYL arrives off Malta 27 May.

FF ESKIMO arrives off Malta 28 May.

URG for VICTORIOUS Group

Fleet Tanker WAVE RULER with FFO and Dieso only. (VICTORIOUS will top up with Avcat in Malta).

To be supplemented by:-

Fleet Tanker TIDESPRING (all fuels) sailing UK 25 May arrives Malta 31 May.

Air, Naval and Victualling Store Ship LYNESS arrives Malta 26 May.

ADEN AREA

	Days to Suez
FF NUBIAN	2½
CMS 1 in No.	4½

BAHRAIN AREA

FF ASHANTI	6½
CMS 4 in No.	10½

GAN

CVA HERMES	7
FF BRIGHTON	7
Full URG	10½

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AS AT 241200Z

Dispositions of RN and USN ships

FRANCE

SPAIN

GIBRALTAR
DUNCAS, KEPPEL
2CMS

Exercising with Spaniards

AMERICA
LSS
LPD
LCC

ITALY

HMAS
Fribgtes
(Ldr. embarked)

GREECE

TURKEY

GULF/BAHRAIN AREA
ASHANTI
BAYLEAF
4 CMS

(BAHRAIN TO ADEN 3000 MILES)

SARATOGA
CVA
ETR NAPLES

VICTORIOUS

MITREAD (CLS)
LPD
ETR. P.SAID
26.05.80

SYRIA
(ADEN TO ADABA 1200 M)

ADEN AREA
NUBIAN
1 CMS
PEARLEAF
PLUMLEAF
FORT SANDUSKY

GAN AREA
HERMES, BRIGHTON
OLNA, RETAINER
OLYNTHUS
RELIANT
(GAN TO ADABA 300 M)

Fuelling
Gib
Kuwait
Malta

DYLL
LYNESS
Malta
26.21.89

TUNISIA

MALTA
WHITBY
DUNCAN
6 CMS
WAVE BARON
AENEAS

LIBYA

MALTA to P.SAID - 936
MALTA to GIB. - 991

MOMBASA/BEIRA.
TRUMPH, LEOPARD
CLEOPATRA, CHICHESTER
LLANDAFF, RELENTLESS
FORT DUNVEGAN
(MOMBASA TO ADABA 2900 M)

C.B.(W) 36.

50° 10° 0° 10° 20° 30° 40° 50°

40° 30°

10°W. 0° 10°E. 20° 30° 40°

CONFIDENTIAL

Note of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition at No. 10 Downing Street at 6.30 p.m. on Wednesday, May 24, 1967.

Present: The Prime Minister
Mr. Mulley
Mr. Halls
Mr. Palliser
Mr. Edward Heath
Sir Alec Douglas-Home

The Middle East Situation

Mr. Heath thanked the Prime Minister for receiving them. They had noted what the Prime Minister had said in his speech that day. They would be glad to know what line the British Government were taking in the Security Council; how they were thinking of implementing their declaration of support for freedom of passage in the Tiran Straits; was it intended that this should be done by some joint action by the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy; and what was the Government's attitude towards a possible recall of Parliament.

After Mr. Mulley had described the proceedings that day in the Security Council, the Prime Minister described in general terms the diplomatic discussions the Government had been having, in Washington and New York; and the difficulties they had had in achieving a meeting of the Security Council. He explained that for various historical reasons Britain had wished to avoid giving

the impression of taking too much of a lead in co-ordinating enforcement action. Memories of Suez were still alive. The Prime Minister briefly explained the attitude of the French, the Canadians and the Scandinavians and expressed his regret at the somewhat precipitated decisions taken by U Thant. He gave a brief summary of his talk that day with the Israeli Foreign Minister and explained the danger of some decisive Israeli action if Mr. Eban did not feel satisfied by his present visits to Western capitals. The Government were taking their position more on the principle of freedom of passage through an international waterway than on the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, on which their position was (as he himself had made clear) broadly the same as that of Mr. Harold Macmillan, as expressed in the latter's ~~somewhat~~ judiciously ambiguous statement of 1963. In this the Government's position was analogous to that of the French Government; whereas on the whole the United States Government would have liked to keep the 1950 Declaration alive; but there was general agreement between the three Governments that the principle of free passage should somehow be maintained and that, if freedom of passage in the Straits was denied to Israel war was probably inevitable. Sir Alec Douglas-Home enquired about U.N. enforcement action. He assumed that a U.N. escort for shipping through the Straits would require a positive resolution in the Security Council, ~~which~~ in which was bound to be vetoed. In these circumstances presumably ships of the R.N. could only escort British ships; and Mr. Heath enquired what indication there was of the likely U.S. attitude if the Egyptians took action against shipping in the Straits.

The Prime Minister said that we were considering the matter in terms of the common interest of the maritime powers. But our talks with friendly Governments were against the background either of a U.N. settlement or of some alternative joint action if the U.N. proved unable to reach decisions. The U.S. Government had confined themselves at present to declaratory statements designed to deter warlike action. The Israeli Foreign Minister had implied that Israel would exercise restraint at least for the next few days.

Some discussion ensued of the balance of military strength between Israel and the Arab states and it was agreed that there was a real risk of Israeli action if, after a few days' interval, they sought to bring e.g. an oil tanker through the Straits. The Prime Minister agreed with Sir Alec Douglas-Home that the situation was more dangerous than at the time of the Suez Crisis; but he added that, to judge from the Foreign Secretary's preliminary reports, there was some sign that the Soviet Government were taking a more relaxed and sensible attitude. He thought that the views expressed the previous evening on television by Sir Alec Douglas-Home were very sound. None of the Great Powers involved sought a conflict but the smallest incident could cause it to break out. No British tankers, so far as he knew, were due to pass through the Straits at present but a Liberian tanker was due shortly; the question of whether it should be escorted would not arise until after the Government's current exchanges with the U.S. Government.

Their main preoccupation at present was to achieve at the U.N. agreement on the freedom of passage. Only if that proved clearly impossible would the question arise of some other form of collective action being taken.

There was then a brief exchange about the legal aspects of the question, including whether it could be argued that the Gulf of Aqaba comprised Egyptian territorial waters; the implications of the statements made at the U.N. in 1957 by representatives of numerous Governments (freedom of passage); and the Egyptian argument about belligerent rights.

The Prime Minister then referred to the French Government's proposal for a Four Power approach. This seemed promising in principle; but it was uncertain whether the Russians would agree. Pending a decision on this, it was clearly necessary to make contingency planning for some kind of international arrangements. Meanwhile American and British naval units were moving discreetly nearer the scene.

Mr. Heath raised the question of a possible recall of Parliament. At present the Opposition would not ask for this. If war broke out the position would clearly change. The Prime Minister explained that the document that would require the Speaker's signature if Parliament were to be recalled was already available in Ireland (where the Speaker was at present). As soon as he had signed it, printing could go ahead. Clearly, if a decision committing British ships in a posture likely to result in fighting had to be taken, there would be a

case for an early resumption of Parliament; this could, for example, be on Tuesday, May 30. Otherwise, he thought that no change in the present arrangements was required. Mr. Heath agreed; and said that discussion of this, if necessary, could take place through the usual channels. Mr. Heath and Sir Alec Douglas-Home left at 6.50 p.m.

D.

Copy to Sir B. Trend.
CF 26.5.67

May 26, 1967

Note for the Record

Mr. Jeremy Thorpe rang at 6.15 p.m. on Wednesday, May 24, and asked Mr. Halls whether it would be possible for him to have a few words on the telephone with the Prime Minister about the Middle East in the course of the evening. Mr. Halls said he would have a word with the Prime Minister and ring back.

At 6.50 p.m. Mr. Halls rang Mr. Thorpe to say that while it would probably be possible to arrange a call at some point in the evening the Prime Minister had suggested that Mr. Thorpe might wish to come and see him personally to discuss these important matters on the following day. The Prime Minister was not, of course, asking Mr. Thorpe to do this but would be very happy to see him on the following day. The decision was, however, purely for Mr. Thorpe to take. Mr. Thorpe agreed that he should come and see the Prime Minister because of the importance of the matter and he was most grateful for the Prime Minister's offer. Mr. Halls said he would speak to the Prime Minister and fix a time in the early afternoon.

I rang back to Mr. Thorpe at 7.10 p.m. and suggested that he should come and see the Prime Minister on Thursday, May 25 at 2.45 p.m. He said that the time was quite convenient and he would come to No. 10 at that time.

R.J.D.

May 24, 1967.

EN CLAIR
FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1080 24 MAY 1967
UNCLASSIFIED
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1080 OF 24 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW WASHINGTON PARIS OTTAWA TEL AVIV AND DAMASCUS.

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET THIS MORNING AT ABOUT NOON AFTER LENGTHY INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE AFRO-ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN MEMBERS ON WHETHER THE COUNCIL SHOULD ADJOURN IMMEDIATELY AFTER IT HAD CONVENED.

2...THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE RECORDED HIS OBJECTION TO THE REPRESENTATION OF CHINA BY THE EXISTING REPRESENTATIVE (AS DID THE BULGARIAN) BUT DID NOT PRESS THE ISSUE. OTHER MEMBERS ALSO REFERRED TO THEIR POSITIONS ON THIS ISSUE, PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES.

3...THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE CRITICISED THE HASTY CONVENING OF THE COUNCIL AND WAS SUPPORTED BY MALI AND BULGARIA. THEY WERE ANSWERED BY CANADA, WHO QUOTED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SHOW THE URGENCY AND DANGERS OF THE SITUATION. ETHIOPIA, INDIA, FRANCE, AND TO A LESSER DEGREE NIGERIA, ALSO QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF HOLDING A COUNCIL MEETING AT THIS TIME.

4...THERE WAS NO FORMAL MOVE FOR ADJOURNMENT AND AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U A R AND OF ISRAEL WERE SEATED, AFTER WHICH A STATEMENT WAS MADE BY DENMARK IN WHICH THEY ASKED WHETHER THE COUNCIL COULD NOT AT LEAST EXPRESS ITS SUPPORT FOR

/THE

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS AND CALL ON ALL TO AVOID ACTION WHICH MIGHT WORSEN THE SITUATION.
5...THE COUNCIL WILL MEET AGAIN AT 3.30 P.M. THIS AFTERNOON. SO FAR THE U S AND U K ARE INSCRIBED TO SPEAK.
6...FULLER RECORD WILL FOLLOW.

F O PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW 56, PARIS 62, TEL AVIV 72 AND DAMASCUS 72.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 24/1835Z
RECD AT 24/1835Z

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EN CLAIR

PRIORITY UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 1081 24 MAY 1967
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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1081 OF 24 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, PARIS, NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, LAGOS, COPENHAGEN AND ADDIS ABABA.

MY TELNO. 1080 (NOT TO ALL): MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.
THE COUNCIL MET THIS MORNING AND BEGAN ITS PROCEEDINGS WITH A SHORT DEBATE ON THE ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA.
2. FEDORENKO (USSR) SAID THAT THERE WERE NOT SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR THE HASTY CONVENING OF THE COUNCIL WHICH HAD BEEN REQUESTED BY TWO NATO MEMBERS WITH NO DIRECT CONCERN IN THE MATTER. THEIR ACTION CONCEALED A DESIRE TO INTERFERE RATHER THAN A CONCERN FOR PEACE IN THE AREA.
3. IGNATIEFF (CANADA) SAID THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 19 MAY MADE CLEAR THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION. THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE OF ITS BECOMING INCREASINGLY SERIOUS. RECENT STATEMENTS FACED THE COUNCIL WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONFRONTATION OVER AQABA. THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF HAD INCREASED THE DANGER. THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD REINFORCE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION AND URGE THAT NO-ONE TAKE ACTION TO PREJUDICE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION EFFORTS AND WORSEN THE SITUATION. THE AIM OF THE CANADIAN/DANISH INITIATIVE WAS TO SEEK TO BRING THE FULL INFLUENCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO BEAR. CANADA'S INTEREST IN THE MATTER AROSE FROM HER FRIENDSHIP WITH ALL COUNTRIES IN THE AREA.
4. KEITA (MALI) POINTED OUT THAT THE U.A.R.'S DEMAND FOR THE REMOVAL OF UNEF WAS ENTIRELY LEGAL. HE REGARDED THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AS UNTIMELY.
5. TARABANOV (BULGARIA) ALSO SAW NO NEED FOR THE HASTY CONVENING OF THE COUNCIL WHICH WAS ONLY INTENDED TO DRAMATISE ARTIFICIALLY

/ THE SITUATION

THE SITUATION. HE CONSIDERED IT AN ATTEMPT TO CAMOUFLAGE THE INTERFERENCE OF THE IMPERIALIST POWERS IN THE AREA. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD NOT HIMSELF ASKED FOR A MEETING AS IT WAS IN HIS POWER TO DO.

6. PARTHASARATHI (INDIA) REGRETTED THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN THE USUAL CONSULTATIONS BEFORE HOLDING THE MEETING. SUCH CONSULTATIONS WERE NOT MERELY A CONVENIENCE BUT WERE POLITICALLY DESIRABLE. INDIA UNDERSTOOD THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE U.A.R. IN SUPPORT OF ANOTHER ARAB COUNTRY. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, WISH TO GO INTO THE QUESTION IN DETAIL AT THE PRESENT TIME. HIS DELEGATION WOULD PREFER TO AWAIT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT. THE FACT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL DID NOT OPENLY DEBATE THE QUESTION DID NOT MEAN THAT IT WAS INACTIVE AS ITS MEMBERS WERE IN TOUCH WITH ONE ANOTHER. THE U.A.R. WAS KNOWN TO BE A FIRM BELIEVER IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND HAD ALREADY READILY AGREED TO RECEIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. NO SERIOUS INCIDENTS HAD YET BEEN REPORTED AND PUBLIC AIRING OF THE ISSUES AT THIS STAGE WAS ONLY LIKELY TO MAKE MATTERS WORSE.

7. SEYDOUX (FRANCE) EXPRESSED HIS DELEGATIONS DOUBTS OF THE USEFULNESS OF THE MEETING. THEY DID NOT CONTEST THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT FEARED THAT PUBLIC DISCUSSION MIGHT MAKE MORE DIFFICULT THE CONSULTATIONS WHICH WERE GOING ON BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES CONCERNED. HE WOULD NOT OPPOSE A REQUEST FOR ADJOURNMENT FOR 24 OR 48 HOURS IF THIS WERE PUT FORWARD.

8. GOLDBERG (US) SAID THAT THERE WAS A CLEAR THREAT TO THE PEACE IN THE DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD LEFT NEW YORK. IT WAS BECAUSE OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS THAT THE COUNCIL WAS MEETING. IT WAS A REFLECTION ON THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE COUNCIL TO SUGGEST THAT ANY MEMBER WOULD WISH TO SAY ANYTHING THAT WOULD MILITATE AGAINST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION AND THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO MAINTAIN PEACE IN THE AREA.

/9.

9. MAKONNEN (ETHIOPIA) SAID HE WAS NOT OPPOSED TO THE ITEM BEING TAKEN UP BUT WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TIME FOR CONSULTATION AND TO HAVE FIRST A REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. HE HOPED THAT THOSE DOWN TO SPEAK WOULD REFRAIN FROM MAKING STATEMENTS WHICH MIGHT EXACERBATE THE SITUATION.

10. ADEBO (NIGERIA) SUPPORTED MAKONNEN. THERE WAS GREAT NEED FOR CAUTION LEST ACTION INTENDED TO DO GOOD IN FACT DID HARM. SUBJECT TO THAT , NIGERIA WAS ANXIOUS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE SEIZED OF THE MATTER BUT ACTION DID NOT SEEM POSSIBLE UNTIL THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD REPORTED.

11. THE PRESIDENT THEN DECLARED THE AGENDA ADOPTED AND INVITED ISRAEL AND THE U.A.R., WHO HAD REQUESTED TO PARTICIPATE, TO TAKE THEIR SEATS .

12. TABOR (DENMARK) THEN SPOKE ON THE SUBSTANCE. HE SAID THAT THE MIDDLE EAST HAD FOR LONG BEEN TROUBLED BY CONFLICT. THE PRESENCE OF UNEF, WHILE NOT SOLVING THE PROBLEM, HAD AT LEAST HELPED TO CONTAIN INCIDENTS. UNEF'S DEPARTURE BROUGHT ABOUT ONCE MORE A DIRECT ARMED CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE U.A.R. THE SITUATION WAS CONSTANTLY DETERIORATING: THERE WAS A MILITARY BUILD-UP AND THE STAGE WAS SET FOR A MAJOR MILITARY CLASH WHICH COULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE SLIGHTEST MIS-CALCULATION. IT HAD BEEN HOPED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S VISIT WOULD ITSELF HAVE HAD A PACIFYING EFFECT. BUT SINCE HIS DEPARTURE FROM NEW YORK THE SITUATION HAD BECOME EVEN MORE SERIOUS. THERE HAD BEEN THE U.A.R. STATEMENT ON SHIPPING IN THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE ISRAELI REPLY THAT ANY U.A.R. ACTION AGAINST SHIPPING WOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ATTACK ON ISRAEL. DENMARK BELIEVED THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WOULD CARRY GREAT WEIGHT. THE COUNCIL'S FIRST TASK WAS THE PRESERVATION NOT THE RESTORATION OF PEACE. WHILE IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE TO DEFER ACTION UNTIL THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTED BACK THE FACT WAS THAT THERE HAD BEEN ALARMING DEVELOPMENTS EVEN SINCE HE HAD LEFT NEW YORK, AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION COULD NOT RELIEVE THE COUNCIL OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. IN ASKING FOR A

/COUNCIL

COUNCIL MEETING DENMARK HAD NOT SOUGHT TO PRE-JUDGE THE ISSUES: THEIR ONLY CONCERN WAS TO MAINTAIN PEACE. IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE FOR THE COUNCIL TO TACKLE THE UNDERLYING POLITICAL PROBLEMS BUT FOR THE MOMENT THE MOST IT COULD DO WAS LIMIT ITSELF TO THE MORE IMMEDIATE TASKS. DENMARK URGED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD EXPRESS ITS SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CALL UPON ALL STATES TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT MAKE THE SITUATION WORSE. THIS SEEMED TO BE THE MINIMUM WHICH THE COUNCIL COULD DO IN EXECUTION OF ITS DUTIES.

13. IN THE COURSE OF THEIR STATMENTS MOST REPRESENTATIVES REFERRED TO THEIR POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT NO FORMAL CHALLENGE WAS RAISED TO THE CHINESE PRESIDENCY.

14. THE COUNCIL ADJOURNED UNTIL 3.30 PM THIS AFTERNOON.

F.O. PASS PRIORITY TO MOSCOW 57 AND ROUTINE TO TEL AVIV 73, DAMASCUS 73, AMMAN 69, BEIRUT 54, PARIS 63, NEW DELHI 31, LAGOS 5, COPENHAGEN 24 AND ADDIS ABABA 20.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 2216Z/24
RECD AT 2216Z/24

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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CYPHER/CAT
PRIORITY UKDEL NATO
TELEGRAM NO.210
CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
24 MAY 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.210 OF 24 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO PARIS.

+MIDDLE EAST CRISIS+

AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS TOOK PLACE ON THIS IN THE COUNCIL TODAY.

2. THE UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT NASSER'S DECLARED INTENTION OF PREVENTING ISRAELI FLAG VESSELS AND OTHERS CARRYING STRATEGIC MATERIALS FROM PASSING THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WAS A +CAUSUS BELLI+ FOR ISRAEL AND RAN COUNTER TO THE UNITED STATES POSITION, FIRST STATED IN 1957 AND NOW REAFFIRMED BY THE PRESIDENT (MR CLEVELAND CIRCULATED THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF 23 MAY). NASSER'S STATEMENT REMOVED THE HOPES PLACED IN U THANT'S VISIT TO CAIRO. BUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DEPLORED THE RAPIDITY WITH WHICH U THANT HAD PULLED OUT UNEF. NASSER'S INTENTIONS WERE NOT CLEAR, BUT THE EGYPTIANS WERE PROBABLY SENDING NAVAL RE-INFORCEMENTS TO THE RED SEA. THE ISRAELIS WERE SHOWING RESTRAINT AND APPARENTLY DID NOT INTEND TO PROVOKE AN IMMEDIATE CONFRONTATION BY SENDING A VESSEL THROUGH THE STRAIT.

3. THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS NOT CLEAR, BUT FROM RECENT CONTACTS, THERE SEEMED NO REASON TO CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN STIMULATING A CONFLICT. THEY MIGHT WELL ABSTAIN ON AN ''ACTIVE'' RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD EXPLORE IN THE UNITED NATIONS

/WAYS OF

WAYS OF REASSERTING AN AFFECTIVE U.N. PRESENCE. A CHANGE IN THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE ON THIS COULD NOT BE RULED OUT.

5. I GAVE THE COUNCIL THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR MESSAGE TO U THANT CONTAINED IN YOUR TELEGRAM TO NEW YORK NO.2072, TOGETHER WITH AN ACCOUNT OF SOME OF THE POINTS MADE BY HIM IN CONVERSATION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT NEW YORK (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO.1056). I MENTIONED OUR VIEWS AS TO THE ACTION WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT TAKE (YOUR TELEGRAM TO NEW YORK NO.2118). I ALSO GAVE THE COUNCIL OUR VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF NAVIGATION THROUGH THE TIRAN STRAITS (YOUR TELEGRAM TO NEW YORK NO.2137) AND DESCRIBED IN GENERAL TERMS THE DIPLOMATIC ACTION WHICH WE HAD TAKEN. I SAID THAT NO DOUBT YOU WOULD BE DISCUSSING THE SITUATION IN MOSCOW. FINALLY, I INFORMED THE COUNCIL OF THE ADVICE GIVEN TO BRITISH SUBJECTS IN THE AREA (YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 5165 TO WASHINGTON).

6. THE CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE MADE AN INTERESTING CONTRIBUTION. HE DESCRIBED THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CANADIAN-DANISH INITIATIVE IN CALLING FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AS BEING LIMITED AT PRESENT TO INVITING MEMBERS TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL AND TO REFRAIN FROM ACTION TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION. THE CANADIANS HOPED THAT A RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO ABSTAIN. CANADIAN CONTACTS WITH THE UAR GAVE NO REASON TO THINK THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REINTRODUCE THE UNEF INTO THE AREA. THEY HAD, HOWEVER, DETECTED SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE UAR ATTITUDE TOWARDS UNTSO. THE EGYPTIANS WERE NOT WHOLLY NEGATIVE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF REVIVING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AS WELL AS THE DEMILITARISED ZONES. THEY HAD AT ONE TIME TALKED OF A RETURN TO THE PALESTINE PARTITION PLAN OF 1947, BUT HAD DROPPED THIS CONDITION. CANADIAN INFORMATION TENDED TO CONFIRM THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN PROMOTING A CONFLICT, THOUGH THEY WOULD BE PLEASED TO SEE UNEF DISSOLVED.

7. THE GERMAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE CONTRIBUTED REPORTS FROM TEL AVIV AND AMMAN DATED 22 MAY. HE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD

/DISPLAYED

DISPLAYED MODERATION BOTH ON THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FRONTS. HE DESCRIBED THE ISRAELIS AS SEEKING GUARANTEES, EITHER FROM THE TRIPARTITE POWERS OR THE U.N., COVERING FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA, AN END TO RAIDS AND SABOTAGE, AND DEMOBILISATION. IN EXCHANGE FOR THIS, THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN A REVIVED MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION. THEY WOULD REACT TO AN INTERRUPTION OF TRAFFIC TO EILATH, PROBABLY BY MILITARY ACTION AT OTHER PLACES, IN VIEW OF THE WEAKNESS OF ISRAELI NAVAL FORCES IN THE GULF OF AQABA. GREWE ALSO REFERRED TO ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATIONS THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE IN ESSENTIALLY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, AND THAT LOGISTIC PROBLEMS WOULD PUT THEM IN DIFFICULTIES AFTER TODAY. HE DESCRIBED THE JORDANIANS AS ALARMED THAT RECENT MOVES BY SYRIA AND THE UAR MIGHT BE DIRECTED AS MUCH AGAINST THEM AS AGAINST ISRAEL.

8. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT NATO SHOULD CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE SITUATION CLOSELY. NO MENTION OF NATO DISCUSSION SHOULD BE MADE TO THE PRESS.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS UKMIS NEW YORK 8 AND WASHINGTON 132.

SIR B. BURROWS.

SENT AT 24/2038Z
RECD AT 24/2038Z

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

TELNO. 1285 24 MAY, 1967 (PS)

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO MOSCOW TELEGRAM NUMBER 1285 OF 24 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO OTTAWA, WASHINGTON (FOR MR. GEORGE THOMSON), UKMIS NEW YORK.

M.I.P.T.

MESSAGE TO THE RT. HON. GEORGE BROWN FROM THE HON. PAUL MARTIN.

QUOTE I AGREE WITH THE IMPLICATION IN YOUR MESSAGE OF MAY 23 THAT NASSER'S DECISION TO CLOSE THE STRAITS OF TIRAN TO ISRAELI SHIPPING HAS MADE THIS ASPECT THE MOST SENSITIVE AND CENTRAL POINT IN THE CURRENT CRISIS. IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL EXERCISE FORBEARANCE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND NOT TEST NASSER'S WORD BY ATTEMPTING TO RUN SHIPS THROUGH THE STRAITS. WE HAVE WORKED WITH YOU IN THE UN TO BRING ABOUT AN EARLY MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL. WE BELIEVE THE AIM SHOULD BE TO INDUCE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION BY AS WIDELY REPRESENTATIVE A GROUP AS POSSIBLE BEARING IN MIND THE NEED TO AVOID ACTION WHICH WOULD IN ANY WAY BE UNHELPFUL TO THE IMPORTANT AND DELICATE MISSION BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THIS TIME.

AT THIS STAGE, THE ESSENTIAL STEP IN MY VIEW IS TO IMPRESS STRONGLY UPON THE ISRAELIS THE WISDOM OF WAITING FOR SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF THE SITUATION AND OF NOT TAKING CONCRETE STEPS TO CHALLENGE IMMEDIATELY NASSER'S DECISION TO BLOCK THE STRAITS. ALTHOUGH I ADMIT THE OVERALL SITUATION IS VERY EXPLOSIVE, I AM STILL INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT NASSER IS NOT IRRETRIEVABLY COMMITTED TO OR READY FOR A FULL ARMED OFFENSIVE AGAINST ISRAEL.

I REGRET THAT I CANNOT BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN RESPONSE TO THE HOPE EXPRESSED IN THE CONCLUDING SENTENCE OF YOUR MESSAGE. WHATEVER CONSIDERATIONS THAT MAY IMPEL YOU OR THE USA TO CONTEMPLATE POSSIBLE

/ACTION

SECRET

ACTION INDEPENDENTLY OF UN - AND I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE SHARE YOUR CONCERN FOR FREEDOM OF STRAITS - I FEEL THAT OUR POSITION HAS SOME SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS WHICH DIFFERENTIATE IT FROM YOU OWN. I AM PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT THIS TIME BY THE FACT THAT CANADIAN UNITS ARE STILL STATIONED ON UAR TERRITORY UNDER UNEF. I AM SURE YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT THEIR SAFETY MUST BE A PRIMARY CONSIDERATION FOR US UNQUOTE.

SOSFA

SENT 1540Z 24 MAY

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GL

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 1087 24 MAY 1967
UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO. 1087 OF 24 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, OTTAWA, TEL AVIV, COPENHAGEN, NEW DELHI, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA AND TOKYO.

MY TELNO. 1086: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF CANADIAN AND DANISH JOINT DRAFT RESOLUTION S/7905:
''THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HAVING BEEN SEIZED OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
(1) EXPRESSES FULL SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PACIFY THE SITUATION:
(2) REQUESTS ALL MEMBER STATES TO REFRAIN FROM ANY STEPS WHICH MIGHT WORSEN THE SITUATION, AND
(3) INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL UPON HIS RETURN TO ENABLE THE COUNCIL TO CONTINUE ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER.''

F.O. PASS TO MOSCOW 62, PARIS 68, TEL AVIV 78, AMMAN 72, ADDIS ABABA 22, TOKYO 26, BEIRUT 57, COPENHAGEN 13 AND LAGOS 7, NEW DELHI 34, DAMASCUS 76..
LORD CARADON

SENT AT 25/0204Z
RECD AT 25/0216Z

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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PRIORITY U K MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO. 1088 24 MAY 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1088 OF 24 MAY, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, OTTAWA, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, NEW DELHI, COPENHAGEN, LAGOS ADDIS ABABA AND TOKYO.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1086: (NOT TO ALL).

MIDDLE EAST SITUATION: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

THE COUNCIL RESUMED THIS AFTERNOON AND A DRAFT RESOLUTION, SPONSORED BY CANADA AND DENMARK (S/7905 - SEE MY TELEGRAM NO. 1087) WAS TABLED.

2. GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES) REAFFIRMED HIS SUPPORT FOR THE CANADIAN/DANISH INITIATIVE IN CALLING AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BECAUSE OF THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH HAD SERIOUSLY INCREASED SINCE U THANT'S DEPARTURE FOR CAIRO LARGELY AS A RESULT OF THE THREAT TO THE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IN THE GULF OF AQABA. HE REFERRED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THIS MATTER. HE DID NOT EXPECT THAT THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION WERE GOING TO BE SOLVED IMMEDIATELY AND THE OBJECT OF TODAY'S MEETING SHOULD BE LIMITED TO EXPRESSING FULL SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO WORKING OUT A PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATION. HE FELT THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN THE AGREEMENT OF ALL MEMBERS TO A CALL ON ALL PARTIES CONCERNED TO REFRAIN FROM ACTS WHICH WOULD EXACERBATE THE SITUATION. THE UNITED STATES WAS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE SUPPORT OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA AND OPPOSED AGGRESSION BY ANYONE, AS WAS DEMONSTRATED WHEN IT OPPOSED ITS OLD ALLIES IN 1956. IT WAS WRONG TO SUPPOSE THAT THE SMALLER POWERS WERE THE ONLY REAL BENEFICIARIES OF PEACE-

/KEEPING:

KEEPING: PEACE SERVED THE BASIC INTERESTS OF GREAT POWERS AS WELL. HE ENDED BY SAYING THAT HE WAS AUTHORISED TO ANNOUNCE THAT THE UNITED STATES BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS PREPARED TO JOIN WITH THE USSR, UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE IN TRYING TO ESTABLISH PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. MATSUI (JAPAN) EMPHASISED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO DEAL WITH THE PRESENT UNREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS IT DID NOT CONCERN ONLY THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA BUT THE ENTIRE WORLD. HE PLEDGED THE FULLEST COOPERATION OF HIS GOVERNMENT IN TRYING TO BRING ABOUT PEACE IN THE AREA.

4. IGNATIEFF (CANADA) INTRODUCED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION S/7905 AND STATED THAT IT WAS MEANT TO BE LIMITED IN SCOPE AND NON-CONTROVERSIAL: ITS OBJECT WAS TO SUPPORT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS PRESENT MISSION. HE SUGGESTED THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS MEETING MEMBERS SHOULD CONSULT TOGETHER IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE UNANIMITY OF VIEW WITH REGARD TO THE RESOLUTION.

5. SEYDOUX (FRANCE) STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAD URGED MODERATION ON ALL PARTIES, BUT SO FAR THIS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE. HE REFERRED PARTICULARLY TO THE MEASURES REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY THE UAR TO PREVENT FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IN THE GULF OF AQABA, BUT EMPHASISED THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD BE POWERLESS TO TAKE ANY REAL ACTION UNTIL THE MAIN POWERS HAD REACHED AGREEMENT AMONGST THEMSELVES. THEREFORE AT THE MOMENT HE COULD ONLY URGE MODERATION.

6. I THEN SPOKE (FULL TEXT SENT SEPARATELY).

7. FEDORENKO (USSR), REFERRING TO HIS EARLIER STATEMENT, REITERATED THAT THERE WERE INSUFFICIENT REASONS FOR THE HASTY

/CONVENING

CONVENING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AFTER LISTENING TO MEMBERS' SPEECHES, HE STATED THAT HE WAS EVEN MORE CONVINCED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS BEING ARTIFICIALLY HEATED BY CERTAIN POWERS WHO WERE NOT REALLY INTERESTED IN PEACE AND SECURITY. HE STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM DID NOT REALLY WANT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OTHERWISE THEY WOULD WITHDRAW THEIR FLEETS FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN. HE THEN QUOTED EXTENSIVELY FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT ON THE SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST OF 23 MAY WHICH CONCLUDED::

''IT IS THE FIRM BELIEF OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THAT THE PEOPLES HAVE NO INTEREST IN KINDLING A MILITARY CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT IS ONLY A HANDFUL OF COLONIAL OIL MONOPOLIES AND THEIR HANGERS-ON WHO CAN BE INTERESTED IN SUCH A CONFLICT. IT IS ONLY THE FORCES OF IMPERIALISM WITH ISRAEL FOLLOWING IN THE WAKE OF THEIR POLICY THAT CAN BE INTERESTED IN IT.

''THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT KEEPS A CLOSE WATCH ON THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEAR EAST. IT PROCEEDS FROM THE FACT THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA DIRECTLY ADJACENT TO THE SOVIET BORDERS, MEETS THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET PEOPLES. WITH DUE ACCOUNT TAKEN OF THE SITUATION THE SOVIET UNION IS DOING AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO PREVENT A VIOLATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE NEAR EAST AND SAFEGUARD THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLES.''

8. EL KONY (UAR) EXPRESSED INDIGNATION AT THE WAY IN WHICH HIS COUNTRY WAS BEING PILLORIED FOR WHAT WAS NOTHING MORE THAN MERE SAFEGUARDING OF ITS FRONTIERS AND SHOWING ITS POSITION AS THE LEADER OF THE ARAB STATES IN THE FACE OF WARLIKE STATEMENTS

* He is under no illusions anyway, whatever some of your colleagues may think! - 4 -

* BY ISRAEL. HE STATED THAT IT WAS REGRETTABLE THAT CANADA AND DENMARK SAW FIT TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM IN CONTRAST TO THEIR BEHAVIOUR OVER THE RECENT QUESTION OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA. THEY HAD NOT OBJECTED TO THE ISRAELI INFLAMMATORY STATEMENTS, NOR THE DEMOLISHING OF ES SAMU IN JORDAN. THE ISRAELI ATTACKS ON NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES WERE ONLY POSSIBLE BECAUSE SHE WAS SUPPORTED FROM OUTSIDE. FOR THE UAR TO RISE IN SELF DEFENCE IN THE FACE OF SUCH PROVOCATION WAS SIMPLY THEIR RIGHT. THE DRAMATISING OF THE SITUATION WAS NO MORE THAN TO PRODUCE A COVER FOR FUTURE INTERVENTION, AND THE DRAFT RESOLUTION PUT FORWARD BY CANADA WAS AN ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE THE MISSION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

9. RAFAEL (ISRAEL) STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD REPEATEDLY DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE ACTS OF HOSTILITY ORGANISED, SUPPORTED AND FINANCED BY NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES WHICH THREATENED THE VERY EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL. HE REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT WHICH SHOWED THAT THERE WERE NO UNDUE TROOP MOVEMENTS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OF THE BORDER, WHEREAS THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOW BUILT UP MASSIVE TROOP CONCENTRATIONS IN SINAI. HE THEN REFERRED TO THE THREAT TO INTERFERE WITH THE RIGHTS OF PASSAGE IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND STATED THAT IN HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THIS WOULD BE AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AND A GROSS VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WHICH, UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER, ISRAEL HAD A RIGHT TO OPPOSE. HE STATED THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WAS NOW ON HIS WAY TO NEW YORK AND WOULD MOST LIKELY ACQUAINT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH THE FULL GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION. HE ENDED BY STATING THAT ISRAEL'S QUEST FOR PEACE IS AS ARDENT AS ITS DETERMINATION TO PROTECT ITS PEOPLE.

/10.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1088 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

10. I SPOKE AGAIN WITH REFERENCE TO EL KONY'S STATEMENT URGING THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT AND POINTING OUT THAT MY SPEECH HAD BEEN CAREFULLY PHRASED SO THAT IT CONTAINED NO WORD OF ACCUSATION. THERE FOLLOWED SEVERAL RIGHTS OF REPLY FROM THE UNITED STATES TO THE USSR, AND FROM CANADA AND DENMARK TO THE UAR IN WHICH THEY BOTH STATED THEY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND EL KONY'S INTEMPERATE REMARKS.

11. THE PRESIDENT THEN PROPOSED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD ADJOURN FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AND HOLD THEMSELVES AVAILABLE FOR A FURTHER MEETING TO BE CALLED AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME. AFTER INDIA AND THE USSR STATED THAT THEY COULD NOT TAKE PART IN THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS, THERE WAS A BRIEF RECESS AT THE REQUEST OF GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES).

12. FOLLOWING THE RECESS, BULGARIA, USSR AND MALI REPEATED THAT THEY WERE UNWILLING TO TAKE PART IN CONSULTATIONS AS PROPOSED. MAKONNEN (ETHIOPIA) SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO CONSIDER SPECIFIC PROPOSALS UNTIL THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD MADE HIS REPORT. IYALLA (NIGERIA) SPOKE ON SIMILAR LINES. GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES) AND IGNATIEFF (CANADA) EXPRESSED THEIR STRONG OBJECTION TO THE ATTITUDE OF THOSE WHO WERE UNWILLING EVEN TO TAKE PART IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS.

13. THE DEBATE WAS THEN ADJOURNED TO AN INDEFINITE DATE.

FO PASS MOSCOW 63 PARIS 69 TEL AVIV 79 AND SAVING DAMASCUS 9 AMMAN 2 BEIRUT 36 DELHI 9 COPENHAGEN 27 LAGOS 4 ADDIS ABABA 17 TOKYO 7

LORD CARADON

SENT 250256Z MAY
RECD 250333Z

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EN CLAIR
F L A S H PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 487
UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
24 MAY 1967

ADDRESSED TO FO TELEGRAM NO. 487 OF 24 MAY AND RFI IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE) WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND PRIORITY TO TEL AVIV AND ROUTINE TO AMMAN ANKARA NEW DELHI AND OTTAWA AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

MIDDLE EAST.

THE FRENCH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MET ON 24 MAY AND CONSIDERED 'INTER ALIA' DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. THE FOLLOWING SUMMARISES THE POINTS MADE TO THE PRESS FOLLOWING THE MEETING BY M. GORSE, MINISTER OF INFORMATION. FULL TEXT OF M. GORSE'S REMARKS WILL BE TELEGRAPHED LATER (NOT TO ALL):-
A) THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE THE ''FOUR POWERS BEARING SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE'' TO CONSULT TOGETHER ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION:
B) THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO DISSUADE ALL THE POWERS CONCERNED FROM TAKING ANY ACTION WHICH COULD THREATEN PEACE IN THE AREA:
C) THE EXACT PROCEDURE FOR THE QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATION DESIRED BY FRANCE HAS NOT YET BEEN DECIDED, BUT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CAN BE EXPECTED TO APPROACH THE THREE OTHER
POWERS (THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE SOVIET UNION) WITH A VIEW TO CONVENING A CONFERENCE AT A LEVEL YET TO BE DETERMINED:

/ D) FRANCE

D) FRANCE IS NOT HOSTILE TO PROCEEDINGS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT A DECISION WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE THERE UNLESS THE FOUR GREAT POWERS WERE TO REACH AGREEMENT BEFOREHAND:
E) FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THERE SHOULD BE FREE NAVIGATION FOR SHIPS OF COMMERCE IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, BUT THE SITUATION IS COMPLICATED. THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC DID NOT UNDERTAKE TO ASSURE THIS FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AT THE TIME OF THE SETTING UP OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE:
F) U THANT ACTED LEGALLY WITH REGARD TO THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE, BUT IT IS OPEN TO QUESTION WHETHER, FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, THERE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSULTATION WITH THE GREAT POWERS:
G) THE TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF 1950 DOES NOT SEEM TO RESPOND TO THE SITUATION OF TODAY. IF PEACE IS TO BE PRESERVED, SUCH QUESTIONS CANNOT BE DEALT WITH ''A TROIS''.

FO PSE PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW 22 WASHINGTON 137 UKMIS NEW YORK 18 AND PRIORITY TO TEL AVIV 6 AND ROUTINE TO AMMAN 5 ANKARA 3 NEW DELHI 4 AND OTTAWA 11.

SIR P REILLY

SENT AT 24/1739Z
RECD AT 24/1739Z

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EN CLAIR

F L A S H PARIS — TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 490 — 24 MAY 1967
UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 490 OF 24 MAY AND RFI IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE) WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 487: MIDDLE EAST.

THE FRENCH MINISTER OF INFORMATION IS REPORTED AS MAKING THE FOLLOWING PRESS STATEMENT ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AFTER THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN PARIS ON 24 MAY.

BEGINS:

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS BEEN KEPT INFORMED OF THE CRISIS WHICH IS DEVELOPING IN THE NEAR EAST. THE COUNCIL HAS BEEN MUCH PRE-OCCUPIED IN FOLLOWING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, NOTABLY WITH REGARD TO THE PROBLEM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA.

THE GOVERNMENT WILL PURSUE THEIR EFFORTS TO DISSUADE THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED FROM TAKING ANY ACTION OF A KIND WHICH COULD UNDERMINE PEACE IN THIS AREA.

FURTHERMORE, THE GOVERNMENT ARE BENDING THEIR EFFORTS TOWARDS ENSURING THAT THE FOUR GREAT POWERS WHICH BEAR SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE SHOULD WORK TOGETHER (QUOTE SE CONCERT-ENT UNQUOTE).

ENDS.

2. THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION REPLIED AS FOLLOWS TO A SERIES OF QUESTIONS WHICH WERE THEN PUT TO HIM. BEGINS:

WHAT SEEMS TO ME TO BE IMPORTANT IN THE PRESENTATION OF THE FRENCH POSITION IS THE VERY CLEAR DESIRE ON THE PART OF OUR DIPLOMACY THAT THE POWERS WHICH HAVE, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR MEANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEACE, SHOULD WORK TOGETHER IN THIS MATTER. THIS THEY CLEARLY HAVE NOT DONE UP TO THE PRESENT. CERTAINLY THERE HAVE BEEN CONTACTS. BUT IT IS A FACT THAT CERTAIN OF OUR PARTNERS HAVE DISPLAYED GREAT RESERVE. YET IT IS IN PART UPON THEIR ATTITUDE THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION MAY PERHAPS DEPEND.

THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION MAY PERHAPS DEPEND.

(IN ANSWER TO WHETHER A HIGH-LEVEL QUADRIPARTITE CONFERENCE IN PARIS WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION).

THE WAY IN WHICH THIS CONSULTATION COULD WORK HAS NOT YET BEEN SPECIFIED. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE FORMULATED ONLY THE GENERAL DIRECTION ALONG WHICH ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN. THE DECLARATION OF INTENTION TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT AMOUNTS SHOULD THEREFORE BE THE PRELUDE EITHER OF MORE INTENSE DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATION OR OF AN INITIATIVE FOR THE CONVENING OF A CONFERENCE, NEITHER THE MODALITIES NOR THE LEVEL OF WHICH HAVE BEEN DECIDED.

FRANCE IS NOT REFUSING TO ASSOCIATE HERSELF WITH THE PROCEEDINGS INITIATED IN THE UNITED NATIONS CONTEXT, BUT IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL NOT REACH AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE PROPOSALS UNLESS THE FOUR POWERS ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH EACH OTHER. OTHERWISE, THERE IS, ON THE CONTRARY, THE RISK OF COMPLICATING THINGS. THIS IS THE ONLY REASON WHY FRENCH DIPLOMACY HAS PERHAPS SHOWN LESS ENTHUSIASM THAN OTHERS ABOUT INITIATING PROCEEDINGS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. TO SUM UP, IT WILL BE WHEN THE FOUR POWERS HAVE CONCERTED TOGETHER THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATION OR BY MEANS OF A CONFERENCE THAT PROCEEDINGS INITIATED IN THE UNITED NATIONS CONTEXT WILL BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH SOME CHANCES OF SUCCESS.

(IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION WHETHER FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WAS INCONFORMITY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW).

FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, NAVIGATION OUGHT TO BE FREE FOR SHIPS OF COMMERCE AS IN THE CASE OF THE STRAITS OF THE AEGEAN AND OF THE BLACK SEA. HOWEVER, THE EGYPTIANS CONTEST THIS THESIS BY POINTING TO THE FACT THAT THE STATE OF WAR HAS NOT ENDED. THE BAN ON SHIPPING WAS THE 'DE FACTO' SITUATION EXISTING BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES UNDER THE TERMS OF THE 1957 AGREEMENT. THE PRESENCE OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES WAS PURELY THE RESULT OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE EGYPTIANS WERE NOT COMMITTED TO ANYTHING OTHER THAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES WITH THE RESERVATION THAT THESE FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW WHEN THEY WERE REQUESTED TO DO SO. THERE WAS NO ENGAGEMENT ON THE PART OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.

IT IS THEREFORE CERTAIN THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES HAS POSED A PROBLEM. MR. THANT HAS ACTED IN A PERFECTLY LEGAL MANNER BECAUSE HE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO DO OTHER THAN WHAT HE DID, I.E. TO CONSULT THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE WHICH HAS OVERSIGHT OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THIS AREA. ALL THE SAME, IT IS PERMISSABLE TO WONDER WHETHER POLITICAL REALITIES DID NOT CALL FOR WIDER CONSULTATION, BECAUSE THE GREAT POWERS ARE NOT REPRESENTED ON THIS CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE. PERHAPS MR. THANT WAS UNABLE TO DO BETTER, BUT THE WITHDRAWL OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE AGGRAVATION OF THE SITUATION.

(IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 1950).

SOME OF OUR PARTNERS HAVE TRIED TO BRING THIS FORMULA AGAIN INTO THE FOREFRONT. IT IS EVIDENT HOWEVER THAT IT COULD NOT RESPOND TO THE SITUATION OF TODAY. IT IS NOT ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS ALONE THAT PROBLEMS OF THIS KIND OUGHT TO BE EXAMINED IF ONE IS SEEKING TO PRESERVE PEACE. ENDS.

FO PSE PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE)23 AND TO WASHINGTON 138 AND UKMIS NEW YORK 19.

SIR P REILLY GRPS 830A SENT AT 2056Z/24 PNM

CNN UNDER THE PARA THAT BEGINS
''FRANCE IS NOT REFUSING ''TETC
PSE AMEND THE LAST LINE TO READ AS
''BE ABLE TO MOVE '' ETC

RECD AT 2100Z/24 IMS

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat.A.

IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 430 24 May, 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 430 of 24 May. Repeated for information to Washington, UKMis New York, Cairo, Tel Aviv and Damascus.

My immediately preceding telegram: Arab/Israel Crisis: The Jordan situation.

I am inclined to believe that responsible Jordanian opinion is right to fear the consequences for Jordan of the present Arab/Israel crisis. King Hussein yesterday gave me the impression of a lonely man and I should like to know how far you would wish me to offer him comfort or support.

2. I realise that we may not wish to become any further involved in supporting Jordan than we are at present, but we should at least be aware of the dangers in the present situation for the Hashemite regime and the consequences to Western interests if we seem to be allowing our one outspoken friend and self-proclaimed opponent of Communism in this area to be eliminated by a combination of Nasserite/Communist pressures.

Foreign Office pass Immediate to Washington 53, UKMis New York 18, Tel Aviv 48 and Damascus 57.

Mr. Adams Sent 1645Z 24 May.
Recd.1920Z 24 May.

[Repeated as requested]

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44444

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

TELNO 1313 24 MAY, 1967 (EASTERN)

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO MOSCOW (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE) TELEGRAM NO. 1313
OF 24 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
AND TEL AVIV.

ARAB/ISRAEL.

THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER CALLED ON THE PRIME MINISTER TODAY
EN ROUTE FROM ISRAEL TO WASHINGTON. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS
HE MADE.

2. ISRAEL HAD A CHOICE OF THREE COURSES:
(A) SURRENDER:
(B) RESISTENCE:
(C) THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SOME INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR FREE
PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS.

(A) WAS IMPOSSIBLE: THEY WOULD LIKE TO AVOID (B) THOUGH THEY STILL
THOUGHT THEY COULD WIN: AND THEY HOPED THAT (C) SHOULD SUCCESS-
FULLY BE PURSUED.

3. THEY HAD ARRANGED TO DEFER THE ARRIVAL OF ANY ISRAEL SHIPS FOR
ELATH FOR 48 HOURS SO THAT THEY SHOULD NOT PUT THE U.A.R. TO THE
TEST IMMEDIATELY. MEANWHILE, HE WAS GOING TO WASHINGTON TO SEE
WHAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT COULD DO TO MAKE POSSIBLE COURSE (C). HE
WAS VERY SCEPTICAL OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ANYTHING BEING ACHIEVED
AT THE U.N. AND EXPECTED THE RUSSIANS TO USE THE VETO.

4. HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT TODAY. HE
WAS CRITICAL OF THE FRENCH INITIATIVE (PARIS TELEGRAM NO.487)
AND DISCOUNTED ANY POSSIBILITY OF ITS GETTING ANYWHERE. HOWEVER,
THE FRENCH HAD "OPENED EVERYTHING UP" IN THE MATTER OF MATERIAL HELP.

SOSFA SENT 2250Z/24 MAY

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SECRET

With the compliments of

SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH

29/5

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

R 25/5.

8

24 May, 1967.

In the sudden hurry of the last few days' events there has not been time to write a paper estimating the motives of the various Governments most closely involved in the present Middle Eastern crisis. However, at a Foreign Office meeting on Saturday, 20 May, I attempted an analysis and it found general acceptance, subject to one major correction which I accepted at once. I have now tried to codify it in the attached paper and, while it has no status other than that described above, I thought you might find it helpful to have at least this amount of analysis available.

....

2. I have copied this letter to Sir Burke Trend and Michael Palliser.

(P.H. Gore-Booth)

Sir Saville Garner, G.C.M.G.

Motives of Governments involved in the present Middle East Crisis

It is perhaps easiest to attempt an understanding of the present crisis by a quick look at the probable motivations and positions of the individual countries. I estimate them as follows:

Israel

Principal motive, self-preservation. But the Israelis are suffering from two major disadvantages:

(a) Their foolish attack on Jordan a short time ago has put them at a grave diplomatic disadvantage (and their lack of restraint in their natural jubilation over a local success against Syrian attack has not helped either).

(b) They seem to have been caught militarily a bit napping by the sudden U.A.R. moves.

Syria

A brash, pro-Communist, angry young men Government in addition to its political disposition is trying to cover up economic failure by aggressive policies vis-à-vis Israel. In doing so it has Soviet support but not military support.

U.A.R.

In addition to the general Arab determination to eliminate Israel, the U.A.R. has a particular purpose to reverse military and political decisions of the past, including the internationalisation of the Gulf of Aqaba. Given the assured military support from the

Soviet/

Soviet Union and, given the necessity for all Arab States willingly or unwillingly to join in measures against Israel, and given the difficult position for Britain and France since 1956, the occasion may seem a good one for further pressure; but in any case Egypt could hardly fail to respond to a Syrian plea for assistance at this moment, and the Syrians may in a degree have bounced the U.A.R. into early action. On the other hand it is clear that the U.A.R. has armed itself with Russian help to a degree which few people have believed, or still find it hard to believe, possible.

Soviet Union

Unlike the United States and Britain, the Soviet Union have taken a highly partisan line recently in the Arab/Israel dispute and have endorsed Syrian accusations of an American plot, etc. We know that the Russians have not been willing to offer direct military aid, but politically, propaganda-wise and in arms supplies they have been very active, and there must have been a degree of collusion in Mr. Gromyko's recent visit to Cairo.

United States

The Americans clearly do not want yet another shooting involvement (and this no doubt entered into Egyptian calculations). On the other hand it is, I think, wise to proceed on the assumption that the United States cannot allow Israel to be driven into the sea.

General Comment

We are evidently confronted with a major piece of brinkmanship in a rather frightening tradition. It is tempting to read a story of total collusion into U.A.R./Syrian/Soviet relations, but this probably goes too far; it is safer to assume that each of these

parties/

parties is concealing something from the other and this would be characteristic of their methods. The extreme danger lies in the fact that the imponderables might take control, e.g. excited Egyptian public opinion or, more immediately dangerous still, pressure by Israeli public opinion supporting those who feel that Israel's only chance of self-preservation is early military action.

British Policy

It cannot be the purpose of this note, nor has it the status, to contain policy recommendations. Clearly the primary object must be to act with all the means in our power to encourage the U.N. to retrieve in some way the panic retreat of the U.N.E.F. from the U.A.R./Israel border. But Ministers will have to continue the urgent consideration of our limited part in helping to preserve international law and good order, while bearing in mind that if this involves us in action which in its immediate effect is "pro-Israeli" we have a strong stake in the Arab world and we do not want to get dislodged from what is essentially a "peace-keeping" position into partisanship as between Israel and the Arabs. This is a tightrope of very great difficulty indeed, since we shall undoubtedly have to disagree with individual States on individual actions.

Finally the dispute is, as of today rapidly reaching the dimensions in which the Washington/Moscow hot-line is going to be very badly needed.

S E C R E T

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE OSLO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 148 24 May 1967

SECRET

My telegram No. 145: Gulf of Aqaba.

Norwegian Cabinet passed following resolution this afternoon:

Begins.

Norwegian Government have discussed the situation which has arisen as a result of the threat by the Government of the UAR to interfere with the freedom of passage of shipping through the Strait of Tiran. It is hoped that the debate in the Security Council and the talks which the Secretary-General of the United Nations is conducting in Cairo will lead to a constructive solution. The Norwegian Government have been informed that Her Majesty's Government are considering, in consultation with other Governments, to take "the necessary action" if United Nations action is considered insufficient. We are ready to take part in consultations which may contribute to peaceful solutions of the problems, but are afraid that any use of force would have unforeseeable consequences.

Ends.

2. The gloss on the last sentence, which was given to me by Secretary-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was that if consultations were for a solution of force, Norway could not take part in them. If they began as a search for a peaceful solution, however, and developments in the Middle East forced a change, he was unwilling to try and predict Norwegian Government's reaction.

3. Foreign Office please pass as necessary.

Sir I Scott

Sent 1748Z 24 May

Recd 1700Z 24 May

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S E C R E T

NNNNN

En Clair

IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 238 24 May, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 238 of 24 May
Repeated for information to:- U.K.Mis New York

My telegram No. 233, paragraph 2.

Following is text of statement by Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Begins.

I have earlier expressed the deep concern which we feel in Sweden over the situation which has resulted from the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.

If President Nasser puts into effect the drastic decision to stop all Israeli shipping through the Strait of Tiran, a situation evidently has arisen involving an imminent risk of war.

In connection with the withdrawal of the Israeli Forces from Sharm-El-Shaik at the Strait of Tiran in March 1957 after the Suez crisis, the Swedish Government stressed in the General Assembly - like many other States - the great importance it attaches to the principle of free navigation and to the respect for the principle. The Government further expressed the opinion that accordingly the right of innocent passage through the Strait between the Red Sea and the International Waters in The Gulf of Aqaba must be recognised. Our opinion in this regard remains unchanged.

We must now in the first place await the discussions in Cairo between Secretary-General U Thant and President Nasser and we hope that they will lead to results which may bring about a détente in the extremely threatening situation that now exists.

Ends.

Sir A. Ross

Sent Untimed 24 May, 1967
Recd 1550Z 24 May, 1967

[Repeated to U.K.Mis New York]

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Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 239 24 May 1967

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 239 of 24 May
Repeated for information to:

U.K. Mission New York, Oslo, Copenhagen

Your telegram No 1453 to Rome: Gulf of Aqaba.

Action taken. The views of the Swedish Government remain as stated in Foreign Minister's statement of yesterday, text in my telegram No. 238 (not to all) having reaffirmed Sweden's support for the [?gp omitted] of innocent passage between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba, the statement goes on "we must now await the discussion in Cairo betweem U Thant and President Nasser".

2. In general the Swedish Government is unlikely to take, or to take part in, any action which does not enjoy specific United Nations cover. They would however probably be disposed to do anything in their power to help if (repeat if) an agreed plan of action emerged from the Security Council.

Foreign Office pass U.K. Mission New York 4, Oslo 19, and Copenhagen 21.

Sir A. Ross Sent 1942A 24 May
Recd 1912Z 24 May

[Repeated as requested]

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Document No. 5

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW, AT 12 NOON ON WEDNESDAY, 24 MAY, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P	Mr. A. N. Kosygin
H E Sir Geoffrey Harrison	Mr. A. A. Gromyko
Mr. D. A. Greenhill	Mr. M. N. Smirnovsky
Mr. T. F. Brenchley	Mr. S. P. Kozyrev
Mr. H. F. T. Smith	Mr. V. M. Falin
Mr. D. F. Murray	

I. Middle East

After an exchange of courtesies in which Mr. Kosygin asked after the Prime Minister, *Mr. Brown* said that he had been discussing Viet-Nam with Mr. Gromyko, and would like to take up with Mr. Kosygin the urgent question of the Middle East. Mr. Wilson wanted him to give the Russians the British thinking and to seek Mr. Kosygin's views.

2. Mr. Brown said that the situation was exceedingly grave. He did not wish to go into the merits as between the Egyptians and the Syrians on the one hand and the Israelis on the other, but the build-up of forces on the frontier and the ejection of the United Nations Emergency Force had produced a situation which, as the result of either deliberate action or the behaviour of some hot-head, could lead to a very dangerous war. The situation was one which was not within the control of any one person or group. There were many who were in a position to interfere, and a wrong action by any one of them could set the area ablaze. It must surely be in the interests of everyone to try to defuse the situation. For this reason the British Government had been encouraging the calling of the Security Council and there was to be a meeting that day. The meeting should call on both sides to avoid war-like acts; to reduce the level of the forces confronting each other; to get some United Nations presence reconstituted (Mr. Brown knew that the Russians had not liked the United Nations Emergency Force but there were various ways in which there could be a United Nations presence); and finally to reaffirm the freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba.

3. Mr. Brown said that the presence of units of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army in the neighbourhood of the Gaza end of the frontier and of the heavily reinforced Egyptian forces in Sinai introduced grave risks. But probably the most important point of danger lay in the possibility of a blockade by the Egyptians of the Gulf of Aqaba. There was also the danger that the Syrians, or some hot-head, might start something, but Aqaba was the real danger point and it was essential to see that it was kept open. As a trading nation Britain had a direct interest in this, and we were discussing the issue with other maritime Powers. As part of this process Mr. George Thomson had gone to Washington. He would urge the Americans to use their influence, ask them to urge restraint and emphasise to them the importance of seeing that no one was provoked into unwise actions. The British Government were making representations wherever they could usefully make their voice heard, and he hoped that the Soviet Government would be doing the same.

4. Mr. Brown said that the Prime Minister would be making a speech that day in which he would reaffirm the British position in the terms of a declaration made by a previous Government in 1957. This declaration read as follows:

> "It is the view of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the Straits of Tiran must be regarded as an international waterway, through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage. Her Majesty's Government will assert this right on behalf of all British shipping, and they are prepared to join with others to secure general recognition of this right."

5. *Mr. Kosygin* said that the Soviet Government had just set out their position in a Government statement. He could not add anything to that statement, which had been drafted with the greatest care. It was necessary to display the utmost caution in approaching the problem. Ill-considered or ill-co-ordinated statements might increase the tension. He had in mind in the first place the attitude of the Arab countries and the effect on them. U Thant was in Cairo and so apparently was the Syrian Prime Minister. It would be better to wait for their conclusions before making one-sided declarations. Statements devoted to the Gulf of Aqaba could only provoke adverse actions in the Arab countries.

6. Mr. Kosygin said that on the 7th of May Israel took the first step against the Arabs. When that happened no one called on the Security Council or warned the world of the dangers. But when the Arab countries, including even Morocco and Kuwait and also to some extent Jordan, united in response to the Israeli move, there was condemnation and expressions of concern. It was clear that Israel standing by herself represented no great force. She could have ventured upon aggressive acts against Syria only with the sanction of those who financed her and provided her with arms. Those who were behind Israel should take measures to stop her from a policy of aggression and from heightening tension. Some of them were perhaps now realising the dangers of prompting Israel; if so, they should now exercise restraint.

7. Mr. Kosygin said that of course he agreed with Mr. Brown that the area had become one of great danger. But the main cause was Israel's policy. It was very hard for the Arab countries to live with a frontier always under tension. Two days before, Mr. Kosygin had received a letter from President Johnson. This dealt with a number of subjects, including Viet-Nam and the Middle East. It contained nothing constructive; the President had described the situation as being dangerous and had asked the Soviet Union to use their influence to bring about a *détente* in the area. On this, too, Mr. Kosygin's comment was to refer to the Soviet Government statement. He wished to emphasise once again that this had been most carefully worked out after full discussion and represented the considered and collective view of the Soviet Government.

8. *Mr. Brown* said that he had taken a close interest in the Middle East since 1950. He had been a member of the minority group in his own Party which had been against the establishment of the State of Israel. The only time he had been voted off the Executive Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party was when he had supported the Arab countries at a time when he thought Israel was behaving aggressively towards them. He wanted Mr. Kosygin to know this because it showed that he was not partisan in these matters. He was bound to say that Mr. Kosygin's description of events during the past few months was unconvincing. Israel had been foolish and wrong to attack Jordan. But there could be no doubt that she had been subjected to continuous and unacceptable provocation from Syria over a long period. He had no reason at all to think that anyone had egged Israel on to respond as she had responded to Syrian provocation. He had certainly not done so; indeed, he had urged Mr. Eban at the Security Council, and subsequently in a letter, not to allow himself to be provoked. He had every reason to believe that the United States had been giving the same advice. The fact that in the end the Israelis had responded to provocation (and incidentally that their response had been directed to the wrong quarter) was certainly their own decision. But whatever one might say about the events leading up to the present situation, Mr. Kosygin was right in regarding that situation as exceedingly tense and dangerous; what mattered was what to do about it now. Mr. Brown fully accepted the wisdom of what Mr Kosygin had said about the need for caution in making pronouncements. But refraining from all action might in itself create the danger that one party would feel obliged to act on its own. The Gulf of Aqaba was such a case. It was vital to Israel, and no less to Jordan, and Israel had on many occasions said that its closing would be a *casus belli*.

9. Mr. Brown said that it was not necessary for the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to seem to be taking different sides. When he was in Moscow in 1966 he had met Field Marshal Amer and as a result he had since been in continuing friendly contact with President Nasser. He himself therefore was not on one side or the other in the Arab-Israel dispute. The United Kingdom was

urging restraint in those countries where it was in a position to do so. He hoped that the Soviet Union would do the same and would co-operate in the Security Council in trying to get a solution which would defuse the situation.

10. *Mr. Kosygin* said that he was not asking that people should do nothing. But if there were now a series of public statements by leaders and Governments, this might not help. If the British Government protested about the Gulf of Aqaba this would " objectively " reflect the Israeli position and would make a solution more difficult. The Soviet Union had no intention of standing aloof from the problem. They were paying the closest possible attention to it.

11. Mr. Kosygin said that the Press would no doubt want to know what had passed between him and Mr. Brown. If Mr. Brown felt it necessary to say anything at all, he would ask that there should be no suggestion that he had said anything which differed in any way from the Soviet Government's statement. This was very important. There was a great deal of speculation about the attitude of one country or another, and the Soviet attitude was clearly defined in the statement.

12. *Mr. Brown* said that in answering Press enquiries the British side would say only that the subject of the Middle East naturally came up. As regards Mr. Kosygin's reference to the danger of a series of statements, Mr. Brown thought that it was ironic that the Soviet Prime Minister should argue this at the very moment when the Soviet Union had just issued a statement themselves, and one which, moreover, did not correspond to his view of the situation. But in any case there was a real need for the Security Council to pronounce on the subject. He had noted the passage at the end of the Soviet Government's statement which affirmed that the Soviet Union had been doing and was continuing to do everything in its powers to help. As regards Mr. Kosygin's reference to the Gulf of Aqaba, an expression of concern for freedom of navigation was not the same thing as taking up an Israeli position. The United Kingdom and other countries had maritime interests of their own to protect there. Mr. Brown wanted to urge on Mr. Kosygin to take whatever initiatives he could. Mr. Kosygin himself had taken initiatives in the past, in other connections, with great success. The Security Council was not the only place where helpful action could be taken.

13. In answer to Mr. Kosygin's question as to whether Her Majesty's Government were in contact with Israel, Mr. Brown said that he was strongly urging restraint there. *Mr. Kosygin* commented that the Israelis were the first to concentrate their forces on the border and wanted to know whether they wanted to precipitate a conflict.

14. *Mr. Brown* said that this did not correspond to the facts. In the course of 10 days Egypt had trebled her forces in Sinai, and that was the first act of concentration. He did not think that the Israelis had fully mobilised even yet, and they were being surprisingly restrained. But the strain on them was very great. 95 per cent of their oil went through the Gulf of Aqaba and Israel must be freed from the fear of being strangled there.

15. *Mr. Kosygin* asked Mr. Brown to tell Mr. Wilson from him that the Soviet Union had no interest in a flare-up and that they would do all they could to prevent a conflict in the area.

II. Treaty of Friendship

16. In answer to a question from Mr. Brown, *Mr. Kosygin* said that it might be possible to let him have Soviet views, or a draft, on the treaty before he left for London.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office
S.W.1

25 May, 1967

Dear Michael,

With reference to your letter of 15 May to Murray MacLehose about the Prime Minister's enquiry on the possibility of moving the Middle East Development Division to the Gulf, the Foreign Office agrees generally with the views of the Minister of Overseas Development in Mr. Thom's letter to you of 19 May.

If the present crisis were to lead to a general flare up in the Middle East we might be forced to move the Development Division. But leaving that eventuality aside, we agree that a move to the Gulf would restrict the Development Division's usefulness, both on practical and on political grounds. If the Development Division became identified with our Gulf interests it would find more difficulty in operating, as it has been able to do up to now, in almost all the Arab countries irrespective of their politics. We attach value to that. We also doubt whether it would be practicable to have King Faisal associated with its operations even if he were willing to co-operate.

We would, however, warmly welcome other action that would enable the Development Division to take an even closer and more sustained interest in the Gulf. The Gulf states are more directly our responsibility more important to our national interests, and most of them have a considerably greater need for assistance than the other countries in the Dvisions's parish.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Thom in the Ministry of Overseas Development.

Yours sincerely,

P. M. Kelly

A. M. Palliser, Esq., CMG.
10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 492

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
25 MAY 1967

S E C R E T

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 492 OF 25 MAY AND RFI IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE) WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK OTTAWA AND NEW DELHI.

FRENCH ATTITUDE TO THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

FRENCH POLICY IS CLEARER FOLLOWING YESTERDAY'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, AND FRENCH INTENTIONS WILL NO DOUBT BE FURTHER DEFINED WHEN PRESIDENT DE GAULLE REPLIES TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE (WHICH I HAVE BEEN TOLD HIS REPLY IS LIKELY TO BE SENT BEFORE THE WEEKEND). BUT OFFICIALS HERE REMAIN VERY CAUTIOUS AND ARE EVIDENTLY WAITING FOR THEIR CUE FROM THE ELYSEE.

2. MEANWHILE, THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF THE UNDERLYING FRENCH ATTITUDE MAY BE USEFUL FOR BACKGROUND.

3. FRANCE IS LIKELY TO DO ALL SHE CAN TO AVOID TAKING SIDES IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE AND TO DECLINE PARTICIPATION IN ANY JOINT PHYSICAL INTERVENTION IN THE AREA WHICH MIGHT BECOME NECESSARY. THE TRADITIONAL LINKS OF FRANCE WITH ISRAEL, AND THE INFLUENCE OF ZIONISM IN PARIS, ARE RELATIVELY STRONG. BUT THE FRENCH CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE MADE IMPORTANT PROGRESS, SINCE THE END OF THE ALGERIAN AFFAIR, IN RESTORING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. GENERAL DE GAULLE WILL BE MOST UNWILLING TO SACRIFICE THIS NEW POSITION, NOT ONLY BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD PUT FRENCH ECONOMIC INTERESTS AMONG THE ARABS (PRINCIPALLY OIL) AT RISK, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF HIS GENERAL POLICY TOWARDS THE THIRD WORLD, WHERE

/HE WISHES

S E C R E T

HE WISHES FRANCE TO PLAY AN ''INDEPENDENT'' ROLE DISTINCT FROM THAT OF THE ''ANGLO-SAXONS''. THE GENERAL WILL NO DOUBT FIND IT AS DIFFICULT AS EVERYONE TO REMAIN ON TERMS WITH BOTH ISRAELIS AND ARABS. BUT HE WILL TRY TO DO SO, EVEN IF HE HAS TO SACRIFICE SOMETHING OF FRANCE'S SPECIAL POSITION IN TEL AVIV.

4. THE NEED TO AVOID COMMITMENT TO EITHER SIDE WILL IN FRENCH EYES BE RE-INFORCED BY WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE THE PRACTICAL AND JURIDICAL UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. THEY WOULD BE PROFOUNDLY SCEPTICAL AT THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING A PERMANENT POLICING PRESENCE IN OR AROUND THE GULF OF AQABA WITHOUT THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE U.A.R. JURIDICALLY, AS THE FRENCH MINISTER OF INFORMATION MADE CLEAR YESTERDAY, THE FRENCH CONSIDER THAT THERE SHOULD BE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, BUT ARE DOUBTFUL WHETHER IT RESTS ON AN AGREED LEGAL BASIS. THEY WILL POINT TO U.A.R. DISSENT AND TO UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE EXTENT OF TERRITORIAL WATERS.

5. AT NEW YORK, THE FRENCH WILL BE MORE CONCERNED TO ASSERT THEIR RIGHTS AS A GREAT POWER IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAN TO SUPPORT UNITED NATIONS ACTION AS SUCH. SUCH ACTION COULD ONLY MEET WITH FRENCH APPROVAL IF IT RESTED ON THE PRIOR AGREEMENT OF THE GREAT POWERS.

6. MOVING TO THE WORLD SCENE, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR DECLARED POLICY POLICY OF SEEKING EAST/WEST 'DETENTE', WILL ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE U.S.S.R. THE FRENCH WILL NOT RELISH AN OPEN RIFT WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THIS QUESTION. EQUALLY, WE MUST EXPECT THEM TO REFUSE TO CO-OPERATE IN ANY JOINT ACTION WHICH WAS, OR COULD BE REPRESENTED AS, PREDOM-INANTLY AN AMERICAN OPERATION. THEIR ATTITUDE IN THIS RESPECT WILL BE STIFFENED BY THE BELIEF OF SOME PEOPLE IN PARIS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS GIVEN DELIBERATE ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE ARABS, IN ORDER BOTH TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN

/VIETNAM

S E C R E T

PARIS TELEGRAM NO. 492 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

VIETNAM, AND TO ANSWER CHINESE CRITICISMS THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS UNWILLING TO OPEN A SECOND FRONT IN RESPONSE TO AMERICAN ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM.

7. THE FRENCH ATTITUDE WILL THEREFORE BE DETERMINED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE FRENCH INTEREST, WHETHER IN TERMS OF MIDDLE EAST ASSETS OR WORLD-WIDE POLITICAL AIMS. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WILL BE OPPOSED, AT LEAST AS LONG AS THE SITUATION FALLS SHORT OF ALL-OUT WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER NEIGHBOURS, TO FOREIGN INTERVENTION, AND MOST OF ALL, OPPOSED TO AMERICAN OR UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION AGAINST ARAB WISHES. THEY WILL THEREFORE MOVE CAUTIOUSLY, KEEPING THEIR OPTIONS OPEN. THEY WILL HOPE FOR A NEW +MODUS VIVENDI+ TO EMERGE IN THE REGION WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE, BUT FOR WHICH FRANCE COULD GAIN SOME OF THE CREDIT BY VIRTUE OF HER MODERATING INFLUENCE AND IF POSSIBLE HER ''BRIDGE'' ROLE BETWEEN THE U.S.A. AND THE U.S.S.R.

8. IT FOLLOWS FROM THE ABOVE THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WILL WATCH CLOSELY THE DEVELOPMENT OF H.M.G.'S POLICY AND ACTIONS IN RELATION TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. IF WE WERE TO BE COMMITTED TO A JOINT PHYSICAL INTERVENTION IN DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH THE AMERICANS BUT WITHOUT THE FRENCH, THIS WOULD INEVITABLY BE TURNED AGAINST US AS EVIDENCE OF THE DANGERS FOR EUROPE IN ACCEPTING A ''TRANSATLANTIC'' POWER INTO THE EEC.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 25 WASHINGTON 140 UKMIS NEW YORK 21 OTTAWA 12 NEW DELHI 5.

SIR P. REILLY.

SENT 1448Z/25
RECD 1448Z/25

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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EN CLAIR
PRIORITY PARIS
TELEGRAM NO.499
UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
25 MAY 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.499 OF 25 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE) WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: FRENCH PRESS REACTIONS.

THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS DOMINATES ALL SECTIONS OF THE FRENCH PRESS.

2. PRIDE OF PLACE IS GIVEN TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL THAT THE FOUR GREAT POWERS SHOULD CONSULT TOGETHER. ATTEMPTS TO SECURE EFFECTIVE ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ARE CONSIDERED TO HAVE FAILED PREDICTABLY. DOUBTS ARE EXPRESSED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF SECURING POSITIVE SOVIET CO-OPERATION, BUT THE FRENCH INITIATIVE IS SEEN AS OFFERING THE PRINCIPAL MEANS OF AVERTING WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. THE FRENCH POSITION IS DEFINED AS FOLLOWS IN AN AUTHORITATIVE FRONT PAGE ARTICLE OF THIS AFTERNOON'S 'LE MONDE' (SIMILAR POINTS ARE MADE BY ROGER MASSIP IN 'LE FIGARO') :
A) THE PREFERENCE OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS FOR DISCREET DIPLOMACY. FOR THE PRESENT, ANY IDEA OF A SUMMIT CONFERENCE IS EXCLUDED:

/B)

B) GENERAL DE GAULLE HAS RESISTED ISRAELI PRESSURE TO REAFFIRM THE STATEMENT MADE TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN MARCH 1957 BY M. GEORGES-PICOT CONCERNING FREEDOM OF SHIPPING IN THE GULF OF AQABA, BECAUSE THE GENERAL QUOTE HAS JUDGED IT INOPPORTUNE TO ADOPT A PUBLIC POSITION WHICH WOULD ONLY MAKE SENSE IF IT MEANT THAT FRANCE WAS DECIDED TO SUPPORT THE HEBREW STATE IF NECESSARY BY MILITARY FORCE IN THIS MATTER UNQUOTE:
C) AS REGARDS THE COMMENTS OF AN EGYPTIAN SPOKESMAN IN NEW YORK TO THE EFFECT THAT THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC COULD NOT AGREE TO SUBMIT TO THE TUTELAGE OF THE GREAT POWERS, QUOTE IT IS MADE QUITE CLEAR IN PARIS THAT FRANCE IS NOT AIMING AT ESTABLISHING A TUTELAGE, BUT ON THE CONTRARY IS ACTING TO DISENGAGE GREAT POWER INTERFERENCE FROM THIS REGION UNQUOTE.

4. 'LE MONDE' CARRIES A REPORT FROM MOSCOW THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS DO NOT SHARE H.M.G.'S OPINION OF THE USEFULNESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE LIES EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE GREAT POWERS. THE SOVIET ATTITUDE IN TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN NEGATIVE. 'LE MONDE' CONSIDERS THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE IN A DELICATE POSITION VIS A VIS THE AMERICANS AND THAT QUOTE ACTIVE CO-OPERATION WITH LONDON AND WASHINGTON AT THIS STAGE WOULD SERIOUSLY COMPROMISE THE ENTIRE SOVIET POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE ARAB WORLD UNQUOTE.

5. THE FRENCH PRESS HAS FULLY REPORTED THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON 24 MAY ABOUT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. PROMINENCE IS GIVEN TO REPORTS THAT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN HAVE BEEN PLACED IN A STATE OF ALERT, AND 'LE MONDE'S' CORRESPONDENT IN LONDON CLAIMS THAT QUOTE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DO NOT AT ALL EXCLUDE MILITARY ACTION WITH ONE OR SEVERAL MARITIME POWERS TO GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA UNQUOTE.

/6. ROGER

6. ROGER MASSIP IN 'LE FIGARO' SEES H.M.G.'S POSITION AS CLOSE TO THAT OF THE UNITED STATES. BUT SOME COMMENTATORS SUGGEST THAT THE BRITISH ARE DIVIDED BETWEEN COUNSELS OF PRUDENCE AND THE CLAIMS OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE AMERICANS. MME. TABOUIS (PARIS-JOUR) CONSIDERS THAT THE BRITISH ARE COMING ROUND TO THE FRENCH POINT OF VIEW BECAUSE THEY FEAR UNILATERAL AMERICAN INTERVENTION. 'FRANCE-SOIR' SUGGESTS THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WISH TO AVOID BEING THE ONLY POWER IN ARAB EYES TO FOLLOW IN THE AMERICANS' FOOTSTEPS IN THE WAY THAT, IN ASIAN EYES, THEY HAVE GIVEN THE IMPRESSION OF FOLLOWING AMERICAN DECISIONS IN VIETNAM. THE LONDON CORRESPONDENT OF 'L'INFORMATION' STATES THAT QUOTE THE LABOUR CABINET IS FACED WITH AN EMBARRASSING DILEMMA UNQUOTE BEING TEMPTED TO LEAVE THE INITIATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES EVEN TO THE LATTER'S ANNOYANCE, BUT RECOGNISING THAT, IF THE UNITED KINGDOM DOES NOTHING, THIS WILL BE THE DEATH KNELL TO THE BRITISH PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. A SPECIAL ARTICLE IN 'COMBAT' HEADED QUOTE LONDON FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO ACT UNQUOTE DWELLS ON THE PROGRESSIVE DIMINUTION OF BRITISH INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE AND IN PARTICULAR THE REDUCTION OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS OF OUR ABILITY TO ACT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS PRIORITY MOSCOW 27 ROUTINE WASHINGTON 142 AND UKMIS NEW YORK 23.

SIR P. REILLY.

SENT 25/1901Z
RECD 25/1901

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO. 1440 25 MAY, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 490.
FOLLOWING FROM P.U.S.
THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING ON INSTRUCTIONS. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WERE VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND CONSIDERED THAT THE POSITION OF THE FOUR MAIN POWERS IN RELATION TO IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT THOUGHT THAT NOTHING CONSTRUCTIVE COULD COME OUT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNLESS SOME WAY SHOULD BE FOUND OF CONCERTING ACTION BETWEEN THESE FOUR POWERS.
2. THE FOUR POWERS COULD MEET AND START FIRST ON A CALL TO ALL MIDDLE EAST POWERS NOT TO BREAK THE PEACE.
3. THEY COULD GO ON TO CONSIDER HOW TO DISCUSS THE ACTUAL TOPICS IN THE CONFLICT, NOTABLY THE GULF OF AQABA.
4. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST CONFIDENTIALLY THAT THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOUR POWERS IN NEW YORK SHOULD MEET TO DISCUSS AS ABOVE AND THAT SUCH A MEETING SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED.
5. THE AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT HIS APPROACH DID NOT CONSTITUTE GENERAL DE GAULLE'S FORMAL REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S NOTE, WHICH WAS CURRENTLY IN PREPARATION.
6. I ASKED THE AMBASSADOR WHETHER THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD ANY INKLING OF THE SOVIET REACTION. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT, BUT THAT SIMULTANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS HAD GONE TO HIS COLLEAGUES IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. IN REPLY TO HIS QUESTION WHETHER THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAD ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE SOVIET REACTION I SIMPLY SAID THAT IN FIRST ENCOUNTERS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION THE ATTITUDE OF MR. GROMYKO HAD BEEN PREDICTABLY RIGID TO THE

/EFFECT

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EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD MADE ITS POSITION CLEAR.
7. I TOLD M. DE COURCEL THAT THE CABINET WAS MEETING AND THAT I WOULD IMMEDIATELY LET THE PRIME MINISTER KNOW WHAT HE HAD SAID. I ADDED THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS BUT THAT IF I MIGHT MAKE ONE PERSONAL COMMENT IT WAS THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CERTAINLY WELCOMED ANY INITIATIVE CALCULATED TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION, PARTICULARLY AS THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD FAILED TO MAKE PROGRESS. I THOUGHT WE WOULD ALSO WELCOME THE IDEA THAT THE PERMANENT REP-RESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK SHOULD ALSO MEET, SINCE SUCH A MEETING, WHILE NOT PRESUMABLY FORMALLY WITHIN U.N. MACHINERY, WOULD PRESERVE THE POSITION OF THE U.N. IN THIS CRISIS.

SOSFA

SENT 1152Z 25 MAY

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FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO 1441 25 MAY 1967 (PS)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO PARIS TELEGRAM NUMBER 1441 OF 25 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW (FOR FOREIGN SECRETARY) AND TO UK MISSION NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

MIDDLE EAST.

FRENCH AMBASSADOR CALLED ON INSTRUCTIONS OF SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH THIS MORNING AND FORMALLY BUT ORALLY COMMUNICATED TO H.M.G. FRENCH PROPOSAL THAT THE QUOTE FOUR GREAT POWERS UNQUOTE SHOULD MEET IN ORDER TO SEEK TO CONCERT THEIR VIEWS ON MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. TEXT OF RECORD IN MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1440 (NOT TO ALL). MEETING WOULD, FRENCH SUGGEST, BE BETWEEN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK.

2. CABINET DECIDED TO ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER IS ANXIOUS NOT ONLY TO GIVE THIS PROPOSAL OUR FULL SUPPORT BUT ALSO TO SHOW THAT WE ARE DOING SO. WITH THIS IN MIND HE WOULD LIKE MR. MULLEY TO FLY TO PARIS THIS AFTERNOON AND TALK OVER THE POSITION AND POSSIBLE FUTURE MOVES WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. HE WOULD OF COURSE BE AT PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S DISPOSAL IF THE LATTER WISHED.

4. PLEASE ENQUIRE URGENTLY OF THE QUAI D'ORSAY WHETHER SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE CONVENIENT AND LET US KNOW BY TELEPHONE.

5. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, PRIME MINISTER WISHES TO BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE VISIT EARLY THIS AFTERNOON.

SOSFA SENT 1220Z 25 MAY 1967

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO 1449 25 MAY 1967 (PS)

SECRET
ADDRESSED TO PARIS TELEGRAM NO 1449 OF 25 MAY REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO MOSCOW (FOR S OF S) WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

FOLLOWING FOR AMBASSADOR FROM PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY.

M.I.P.T. MIDDLE EAST.

IF MR. MULLEY HAD VISITED PARIS TODAY HE WOULD HAVE RAISED AMONG OTHER THINGS THE FOLLOWING POINTS WITH THE FRENCH GOVT:

(A) HE WOULD HAVE EMPHASISED THE VERY WARM WELCOME WHICH H.M.G. GAVE TO PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S INITIATIVE, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE FAILURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS.

(B) H.M.G. FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT IT IS NOT ONLY VERY IMPORTANT BUT EXTREMELY URGENT TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE EFFORT TO RESTORE THE SITUATION. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH THE FEELING OF URGENCY ON THE OCCASION OF ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO LONDON, FROM WHICH IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT IF NO PROGRESS COULD BE MADE SOON THE DANGER OF THE USE OF FORCE WOULD AGAIN ARISE. IT SEEMED TO THEM TO BE A MATTER OF DAYS AND HOURS AND NOT OF WEEKS AND MONTHS.

(C) MR. MULLEY WOULD HAVE ENQUIRED WHETHER THE FRENCH HAD DEVELOPED ANY IDEAS ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED NEXT IF RUSSIANS

(I) ACCEPT: OR

(II) DECLINE (IN THE LATTER CASE IT WOULD BE OUR HOPE THAT WE COULD REACH CLOSER CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE AMERICANS, THE FRENCH AND OURSELVES BUT THIS IS A POINT WHICH SHOULD ON NO, REPEAT NO, ACCOUNT BE MENTIONED TO THE FRENCH YET).

/ (D)

(D) HAD THE FRENCH ANY IDEAS ON WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MADE ANY COUNTER PROPOSALS ABOUT MEETINGS ELSEWHERE THAN IN NEW YORK ?

2. IN GENERAL MINISTERS ARE ANXIOUS THAT IN THIS PARTICULAR EXERCISE WE SHOULD LAY GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE DESIRE FOR THE CLOSEST PERSONAL CONTACT AND CO-OPERATION WITH THE FRENCH .

3. WE SUGGEST THAT YOU MIGHT USE THESE POINTS AS A GUIDE TO WHAT YOU COULD SAY TO THE QUAI D'ORSAY TOMORROW BY WAY OF FOLLOWING UP TODAY'S ACCEPTANCE OF PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S PROPOSAL.

SOSFA SENT 0817Z 26 MAY 1967

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EN CLAIR

ROUTINE OTTAWA TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 684 DATED 25 MAY

ADDRESSED COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELNO 684 OF 25 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION WASHINGTON.

M I F T : FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATES.

ON THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION, MR PEARSON APPEALED TO THE GREAT POWERS TO SAY AND DO NOTHING WHICH MIGHT PREJUDICE ATTEMPTS BY THE U N SECRETARY GENERAL AND OTHERS TO AVERT A WAR WHICH MIGHT START IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THEN ENGULF THE REST OF THE WORLD. QUOTE WHAT WE IN ALL THE PEACE-LOVING GOVERNMENTS MUST DO TODAY IS TO TRY TO KEEP THAT BLUE UN FLAG FLYING BETWEEN POSSIBLE COMBATANTS UNQUOTE.

SIR H LINTOTT

SENT 2522 IZ

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IMMEDIATE TOKYO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 273 25 May, 1967

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.273 of 25 May, Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, UKDel NATO and Washington.

My telegram No.278 [sic] : Gulf of Aqaba.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs have informed us that instructions have now been sent to their representative on the Security Council and that the following are the main points:

(a) The Japanese Government understand the position of the United Kingdom about freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba.

(b) They find difficulty however in establishing clear and solid legal grounds for claiming the unconditional freedom of navigation in the area. However setting legal questions aside they recognize that freedom of navigation has been established over the past ten years and that this has contributed to peace in the Middle East.

(c) There is no convincing reason why the status quo must be changed in that area.

(d) It is essential that the blockade of the Gulf and of the Strait should be removed and that the situation prior to the removal of UNEF should be restored.

(e) Freedom of navigation must be allowed in the interests of keeping the peace.

(f) Israel claims that the blockade of the Gulf and Straits is an act entitling her to exercise the right of self defence. The Japanese Government think this claim may go beyond the limit of legitimate self defence and that the consequences would not be justifiable either in terms of the latter and spirit of the United Nations charter or the effect upon the peace of the Middle East.

(g) The Japanese delegate at the Security Council is therefore instructed to support the position that free and innocent passage should be ensured in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate UKMIS New York 8 and routine UKDel NATO 2 and Washington 13.

Sir F.Rundall

Sent 0510Z/25 May
Recd 0635Z/25 May

[Repeated as requested]

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CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY UKDEL NATO TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 213 25 MAY 1967
SECRET
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.213 OF 25 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON RONE UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO PARIS AND MOSCOW.

NATO AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL ASKED U.S. REPRESEN ATIVE AND MYSELF TO AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION THIS MORNING ABOUT WHETHER NATO SHOULD OR COULD BE DOING ANYTHING FURTHER. DISCUSSION WAS IN TWO PARTS, FIRST WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE ANY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSULTATION, SECONDLY WHETHER FULLER INFORMATION COULD BE PROVIDED HERE AND EXCHANGED BETWEEN DELEGATIONS.

2. ON THE FRIST POINT BROSIO AND CLEVELAND BOTH SAID THAT THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE HAD APPROACHED THEM SEPARATELY TO ASK WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL LAST REFERRED TO IN MY TELEGRAN NO.209 FOR THE MEETING OF A SPECIAL GROUP OF SENIOR OFFICIALS CONCERNED WITH THE MIDDLE EAST. ALLESSANDRINI HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT ITALIAN AUTHORITIES WERE SHOWING INTEREST IN THIS PROPOSAL BECAUSE THEY DID NOT LIKE BEING LEFT OUT OF THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A QUADRIPARTITE DISCUSSION WITH U.S., U.K. AND RUSSIA. ON THIS IT WAS AGREED BETWEEN US THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIAL GROUP WAS NOT REALLY APPROPRIATE FOR DEALING WITH A CURRENT CRITICAL SITUATION AND THAT THE PRESENT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION SHOULD BE KEPT UNDER CONTINUOUS REVIEW BY THE POLITICAL ADVISERS AND, WHEN NECESSARY, BY THE COUNCIL AND THAT IF ANY DELEGATION WISHED TO NAKE A PROPROSAL FOR THE MEETING OF A SPECIAL GROUP THEY COULD OF COURSE DO SO IN THE COUNCIL. IF A SPECIAL GROUP WERE CONVENED IT WOULD BE CONSULTATIVE ONLY AND WOULD REPORT BACK TO THE COUNCIL.

[illegible] THE FURTHER QUESTION WHETHER, IF FOUR-POWER

WHEN NECESSARY, BY THE COUNCIL AND THAT IF ANY DELEGATION WISHED TO NAKE A PROPROSAL FOR THE MEETING OF A SPECIAL GROUP THEY COULD OF COURSE DO SO IN THE COUNCIL. IF A SPECIAL GROUP WERE CONVENED IT WOULD BE CONSULTATIVE ONLY AND WOULD REPORT BACK TO THE COUNCIL.

3. BROSIO RAISED THE FURTHER QUESTION WHETHER, IF FOUR-POWER NEETINGS, AS PROPOSED BY FRANCE, TOOK PLACE, THE U.S. OR U.K. WOULD WISH TO HAVE CONSULTATION IN NATO ABOUT THE LINE TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE THREE NATO GOVERNMENTS IN SUCH TALKS. CLEVELAND WAS SCEPTICAL WHETHER FOUR-POWER TALKS WOULD BE HELD BUT SAID HE WOULD SEEK WASHINGTON VIEWS ON THIS HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. I SHALL ALSO BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS.

4. ON THE SECOND POINT ABOUT EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, BROSIO HAS CIRCULATED A PAPER, OF WHICH THE GIST IS GIVEN IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. THE REFERENCE IN THIS TO "DEVELOPING SITUATIONS" RELATES TO THE PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVED EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE IN SUCH SITUATIONS IN THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMNITTEE DPC/D(66)32 OF DECEMBER 7, 1966, WHICH WAS CONSIDERED BY MINISTERS AT THE DECEMBER MEETING AND WAS ITSELF BASED ON THE REPORT BY WORKING GROUP NO.1 OF MAY 10, 1966. REFERRING TO THIS AT OUR MEETING, BROSIO SAID THAT TWHEN WE HAD MOVED TO BRUSSELS AND HAD A PROPER SITUATION ROOM AND THE MILITARY CONMITTEE WERE NEXT DOOR, IT WOULD BE EASIER TO ARRANGE FOR THE PROVISION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BUT EVEN NOW HE THOUGHT THAT WE COULD AND SHOULD DO MORE THAN WE WERE NOW DOING. HE PROPOSED TO ACTIVATE THE SMALL SITUATION ROOM WHICH IS AVAILABLE HERE AND TO PUT IN IT SUCH INFORMATION AS HE COULD OBTAIN FROM THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES. HE HOPED ALSO THAT DELEGATIONS WHO WERE BEST EQUIPPED TO PROVIDE POLITICAL INFORMATION FRON THE MIDDLE EAST AREA AND RESULTING FROM DISCUSSIONS ABOUT IT IN OTHER PLACES WOULD ALSO BE WILLING TO PROVIDE SONE OF THIS INFORMATION FOR GENERAL USE. CLEVELAND SAID THAT HE COULD PROBABLY PROVIDE ORDER OF BATTLE FIGURES AND WAS HOPEFUL THAT HE COULD PROVIDE SOME POLITICAL INFORMATION AS WELL. I SAID THAT I WOULD REFER TO YOU TO SEE WHETHER WE COULD HELP.

5. I FULLY REALISE THE SECURITY DIFFICULTIES WHICH WE WOULD FACE IN PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE IN SUCH A FORM AS COULD SAFELY BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ALL OTHER DELEGATIONS AND THE SECRETARIAT. NEVERTHELESS WE ARE OF COURSE STILL BELIEVED TO HAVE PARTICULARLY GOOD INFORMATION ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND ON GENERAL NATO GROUNDS I THINK WE SHOULD MAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT TO MEET THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS. IN CASE WE MAY LATER WISH TO HAVE CONSULTATIONS ABOUT POLICY HERE IT WILL BE HELPFUL IF WE CAN START GENERALLY FROM THE SAME DATA BASE.

FO PLEASE PASS TO WASHINGTON 135 ROME 52 UKMIS NEWYORK 9 AND SAVING TO MOSCOW 6.

SENT AT
SIR B BURROWS SENT AT 25/1717Z JWP

Subject

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No T 139/67

CYPHER/CAT.A.

FLASH COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO OTTAWA

TELNO. 1543 25 MAY, 1967 (MEWUN)

SECRET

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR. PEARSON FROM PRIME MINISTER.

I AM SO LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU NEXT WEEK AND TO A FULL EXCHANGE WITH YOU ABOUT THE MAJOR PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONT US BOTH. BUT I THINK THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION IS SO CRITICAL THAT I OUGHT NOT TO WAIT UNTIL WE MEET BEFORE TELLING YOU HOW WE SEE THINGS HERE. CANADA SO CLEARLY HAS A KEY ROLE TO PLAY IN THIS CRISIS, AS YOU HAVE DONE IN SO MANY PREVIOUS ONES. WE SHALL ALL WISH TO DRAW ON YOUR WISDOM AND EXPERIENCE.

I KNOW, OF COURSE, HOW CLOSELY OUR PEOPLE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH FROM THE OUTSET. WE SHARED YOUR DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE HASTE WITH WHICH U THANT ALLOWED THE U.N. FORCE TO BE REMOVED: AND WE KNOW FROM HUGH CARADON OF ALL IGNATIEFF HAS DONE TO TRY TO GET SOME EFFECTIVE ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

WE HAVE BEEN TAKING STOCK TODAY IN THE CABINET. AS YOU KNOW, GEORGE BROWN MANAGED TO GET TO MOSCOW FOR THE OPERATIVE PART OF HIS OFFICIAL VISIT. WE HAVE NOT YET HAD A FULL ACCOUNT FROM HIM, BUT I AM AFRAID THAT WHAT HE HAS SENT US SO FAR ON THE MIDDLE EAST IS NOT PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING. GEORGE THOMSON HAS BEEN IN WASHINGTON FOR TALKS WITH DEAN RUSK.

THEY HAVE BEEN EXAMINING HOW WE AND THE OTHER MARITIME NATIONS OF THE WORLD CAN WORK TOGETHER TO PRESERVE THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE THAT IS AT STAKE HERE - NAMELY THE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE INTO THE

/GULF

GULF OF AQABA. OUR HOPE IS THAT THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS. BUT IF THAT PROVES IMPOSSIBLE, I AM CONVINCED THAT WE MUST FIND SOME OTHER ACCEPTABLE WAY OF ACHIEVING IT. AND THIS HAS BEEN THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THOMSON'S VISIT. THE URGENCY OF THE WHOLE SITUATION WAS HEIGHTENED BY MY OWN TALK WITH EBAN. HE MADE IT PRETTY CLEAR THAT NO IRRETRIEVABLE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN BY ISRAEL AT LEAST UNTIL HE HAS RETURNED FROM HIS PRESENT TRIP. HIS PURPOSE IS TO SEE WHETHER THE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IS GOING TO BE UPHELD. IF HE RETURNS WITHOUT BEING REASONABLY CONFIDENT OF THIS, I AM AFRAID THAT ISRAEL MAY FEEL OBLIGED TO STRIKE FIRST, HOWEVER RELUCTANT THEY ARE TO DO THIS.

FINALLY, WE HAVE DE GAULLE'S NEW PROPOSALS FOR FOUR POWER CONSULTATION AT NEW YORK - A PRELIMINARY, AS WE AT LEAST WOULD HOPE, TO GETTING A REASONABLY HOPEFUL DEBATE GOING AGAIN IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

THIS WAS THE BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH THE CABINET MET TODAY. WE HAVE NOW ANNOUNCED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE FRENCH PROPOSAL. IN DOING SO WE HAVE BEEN UNDER NO PARTICULAR ILLUSION ABOUT CERTAIN OF THE POLITICAL PURPOSES THAT UNDERLAY IT. BUT, AS WE SEE IT, IT HAS TWO POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES. FIRST, IF THE RUSSIANS CAN BE BROUGHT TO REALISE THE APPALLING DANGER OF ALLOWING THEMSELVES TO BE DRAWN INTO A GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION IN AN AREA WHERE NEITHER SIDE CAN HOPE TO CONTROL THE PASSIONS AND THE ACTIONS OF THE LOCAL PARTICIPANTS, THE FRENCH PROPOSAL COULD OFFER A PROSPECT OF SOME AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE WHICH COULD THEN BE HAMMERED OUT, WITH SOME HOPE OF SUCCESS, IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT SECONDLY,

IF THE RUSSIANS REJECT THE FRENCH APPROACH, THE FRENCH HAVING ONCE TAKEN SUCH A MAJOR INITIATIVE WILL SURELY FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT THEREAFTER TO WITHHOLD CO-OPERATION WITH THE REST OF US, WHETHER AT THE UNITED NATIONS ITSELF OR IN SOME MARITIME FRAMEWORK, SHOULD UNITED NATIONS ACTION PROVE IMPOSSIBLE. WE THEREFORE INTEND TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP ARRANGE AN EARLY FOUR POWER MEETING IN NEW

YORK AT PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE LEVEL - WHICH IS WHAT THE FRENCH TELL US THEY ARE PROPOSING IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. BUT EQUALLY IF IT EMERGES THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD ACCEPT SOME OTHER FOUR POWER FRAMEWORK - AND EVEN POSSIBLY A SUMMIT ITSELF - WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE PRESENT CRISIS IS SO URGENT AND SO DANGEROUS THAT WE MUST NOT MISS ANY CHANCE OF AVOIDING ANOTHER CUBAN-TYPE CONFRONTATION IN A SITUATION THAT IS POTENTIALLY EVEN MORE MENACING. BUT I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE CERTAINLY NOT TRYING TO BYPASS THE UNITED NATIONS - AND IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT FRANCE IS, AS WE ALL KNOW, FAR LESS KEEN A SUPPORTER OF THE U.N. THAN OURSELVES, THEY HAVE TAKEN THE SAME LINE. WE WANT TO WORK THROUGH THE U.N. IF WE CAN, AND WE THINK THE FOUR POWER APPROACH MIGHT HELP TOWARDS THIS. BUT IF THE U.N. PROVES POWERLESS OR THE FOUR POWER APPROACH FAILS I DO NOT THINK ANY OF US CAN AFFORD TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT ACTION OUTSIDE THE U.N, IT IS NOT AN OVER-STATEMENT TO SAY THAT THE PEACE OF THE WORLD MAY BE AT STAKE.

YOU WILL I AM SURE NOT HAVE BEEN SURPRISED TO LEARN FROM HARRY LINTOTT THAT, TO MY DEEP REGRET, I HAVE BEEN OBLIGED TO CONSIDER CURTAILING THE VISIT NEXT WEEK. MARY AND I HAVE BEEN LOOKING FORWARD TO THIS FOR MONTHS AND IF I HAVE TO DO THIS WE SHALL BOTH BE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED. BUT I KNOW YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT IN A CRISIS AS GRAVE AS THIS I MAY BE OBLIGED TO BE AT MY POST FOR AT LEAST PART OF NEXT WEEK, IN CABINET AND IN THE HOUSE. BUT EVEN IF I HAVE TO CURTAIL THE VISIT, I REGARD IT AS OF OVER-RIDING IMPORTANCE THAT YOU AND I SHOULD MEET AND THAT I SHOULD THEN BE ABLE ALSO TO SEE THE PRESIDENT. SO YOU CAN COUNT ON MY COMING, EVEN IF THE VISIT HAS TO BE FAR SHORTER THAN I WOULD HAVE WISHED.

SINCE I WROTE THIS, I HAVE HEARD OF YOUR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. I WARMLY WELCOME THIS: AND IT WILL HELP TO UNDERLINE TO THE WORLD THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION WE ARE ALL FACING.

CROSEC SENT 1854Z 25 MAY

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC (CO/FO)

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel. No. 358 25 May, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 358 of 25 May. Repeated for information to MOD (D.I.4), Moscow, Washington, UKMIS New York, Damascus, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Jerusalem, JIG Cyprus.

My telegram No. 347: Middle East Sitrep 0650 hours GMT 25 May.

A very quiet night. Indications that call-up has tapered off. It is impossible to estimate how many have been involved in this second phase, but we must assume that between 50 and 75 per cent of effectives have now been called up. Several lorry parks in Tel Aviv area established during first and second stages of call-up have been dispersed. This, with information in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 357, would indicate considerable use of available transport for possible redeployment of troops and logistic support, not necessarily all on Southern Front though we would assume most of it.

2. There has been a considerable run on food shops which has led Government to assure people there are ample stocks in warehouses and to exhort them to refrain from this sort of behaviour. Some shops are shut because of lack of staff.

This is a dangerous tendency.

3. We sense a decline in general morale. There is a widespread feeling that Israel has missed the boat. People are beginning to realize that the status quo in the Middle East has in fact been radically altered in the last week without anybody being prepared to do anything about it (including themselves) and that Nasser is getting away with it against Israel, the West and the West's Arab friends. I cannot, cut off as one is from Government circles (in Jerusalem) and military circles (operational) and with strict Press censorship, assess what truth there is in B.B.C. report yesterday that there is criticism of Eshkol. I would, however, have thought this likely as all concerned wake up to the fact that by delay the whole balance of power in this area has shifted radically to Israel's detriment and Nasser's advantage.

4. Yigal Allon, Minister of Labour, arrived back from the Soviet Union prematurely yesterday.

Foreign Office pass MOD (D.I.4) unnumbered, Moscow 7, Washington 62, UKMIS New York 57, Damascus 56, Cairo 37,

/Amman 71

Amman 71, Beirut 70, Jerusalem 33, JIG Cyprus 47. (All Immediate)

Mr. Hadow

Sent 0832Z/25 May
Recd. 1023Z/25 May

[Repeated as requested]

[Sent to D.C.C.]

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Eastern Dept.

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XXXXX

Middle East file

FILE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

May 25, 1967

The new Canadian High Commissioner, Mr. Ritchie, paid his first call on the Prime Minister yesterday evening. Little of substance passed, but you might like to know that he told the Prime Minister that he knew Mr. Pearson was greatly looking forward to the opportunity of discussing with him next week both the situation in Vietnam, which was causing increasing concern to the Canadian Government, and the Middle Eastern situation. As regards the latter, Ritchie said that, because the Canadians still had their troops in the U.N.E.F. on the ground in Egypt, they would certainly wish to take a fairly cautious line about the present situation. They would certainly co-operate in any constructive initiative that might be taken in the United Nations. But he implied that there would be little prospect of their co-operating in anything outside the United Nations, more particularly if this appeared to be directed against Egypt.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Forster (Commonwealth Office).

Copy on Canada (May, 1967)

A M. Palliser

D. Day, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

SECRET

25 May, 1967.

Many thanks for sending me in your letter of 24 May your paper about the motives of the various Governments concerned in the Middle Eastern crisis.

I find this very helpful and useful. Two further points which bother me and might be covered in any more detailed study are:-

(i) What are the real aims of the Secretary-General and what does he think he can achieve?

(ii) What are the prospects of unity of action by the Arabs, e.g. do Saudi Arabia and Jordan really want Nasser to have a victory?

I have copied this letter to Sir Burke Trend and Michael Palliser.

Sir Paul Gore-Booth, G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
S.W.1.

SECRET

SECRET

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

A. M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.

With the compliments of

Sir Saville Garner

SECRET

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

A. M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.

With the compliments of

Sir Saville Garner

PRIME MINISTER

The French Ambassador called this morning on instructions. He said that the French Government were very worried about the position in the Middle East and considered that the position of the Four main Powers in relation to it was very important. The French Government thought that nothing constructive could come out of the Security Council unless some way could be found of concerting action between these Four Powers.

2. ~~As such~~ The Four Powers could meet and start first on a call to all Middle East powers not to break the peace.

3. They could go on to consider how to discuss the actual topics in the conflict, notably the Gulf of Aqaba.

4. The French Government would like to suggest confidentially that the Permanent Representatives of the Four Powers in New York should meet to discuss as above and that such a meeting should be announced.

... ...

The Ambassador added that his approach did not constitute General de Gaulle's formal reply to the Prime Minister's Note, which was currently in preparation.

I asked the Ambassador whether the French Government had any inkling of the Soviet reaction. He said that they had not, but that simultaneous instructions had gone to his colleagues in Moscow and Washington/

Washington. In reply to his question whether the Foreign Secretary had any information about the Soviet reaction I thought it best not to give any indication of Mr. Brown's message this morning. I simply said that in first encounters on the Middle East situation the attitude of Mr. Gromyko had been predictably rigid to the effect that the Soviet Government had made its position clear.

I told M. de Courcel that the Cabinet was meeting and that I would immediately let you know what he had said. I added that I had no instructions but that if I might make one personal comment it was that the British Government certainly welcome any initiative calculated to improve the situation, particularly as the Security Council had failed to make progress. I thought we would also welcome the idea that the Permanent Representatives in New York should also meet, since such a meeting, while not presumably formally within U.N. machinery, would preserve the position of the U.N. in this crisis.

(P.H. Gore-Booth)

25 May, 1967.

No 10 Downing St

Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO.

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

TELNO 1317 25 MAY, 1967

SERIAL No T131/67

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO MOSCOW TELEGRAM NO. 1317 OF 25 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND PARIS.

PARIS TELEGRAM NUMBER 490.

MIDDLE EAST

DE GAULLE PROPOSAL

FOLLOWING FOR THE FOREIGN SECRETARY FROM PRIME MINISTER.

I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH FRED MULLEY, PAUL GORE BOOTH AND MICHAEL ROSE WHETHER WE SHOULD RESPOND AND IF SO HOW TO DE GAULLE'S IDEA OF A FOUR POWER CONSULTATION ON MIDDLE EAST, AND WILL WISH TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION IN CABINET TOMORROW, THURSDAY MORNING MAY 25 AT 11.0 A.M. BRITISH SUMMER TIME.

FOR OBVIOUS EUROPEAN REASONS I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE A PROMPT AND FAVOURABLE RESPONSE IF POSSIBLE SUBJECT TO PRESERVING THE PRIMACY OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE HANDLING OF THIS MATTER SO LONG AS PROGRESS THERE IS POSSIBLE. I UNDERSTAND IN ANY CASE THAT GOLDBERG HAS COMMENTED FAVOURABLY ON THE PROPOSAL IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

WE DO NOT WANT TO RUSH INTO ANYTHING WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT THE AMERICANS THINK: AND A TELEGRAM HAS GONE TO WASHINGTON NO 5303. BUT FIRST OF ALL I SHOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS. WOULD YOU AGREE THAT, SUBJECT TO ANY COMMENT I MAY GET FROM THE AMERICANS WE SHOULD RESPOND PUBLICLY TO THE EFFECT THAT WE WELCOME THIS FRENCH IDEA

/ADDING

ADDING THAT WHILE WE HOPE FOR PROGRESS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WE THINK THAT WHAT IS BEING DONE THERE MAY WELL BE REINFORCED BY CONTACT WHETHER THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS OR BY MEANS OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOUR GREAT POWERS.

YOU MAY LIKE TO SOUND THE RUSSIANS AT YOUR NEXT MEETING, BUT I THINK THAT IN ANY CASE I OUGHT TO RESPOND TOMORROW MAY 25. I HAVE JUST HEARD B.B.C. REPORT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS APPARENTLY ADJOURNED WITHOUT REACHING ANY CONCLUSIONS AFTER SERIES OF SPEECHES BY RUSSIA, EASTERN EUROPE AND SOME AFRICANS DESIGNED TO PREVENT ANY EFFECTIVE OUTCOME. IT IS NOT CLEAR IF OR WHEN COUNCIL WILL MEET AGAIN. THIS COULD STRENGTHEN CASE FOR ATTEMPT TO HANDLE SITUATION ON DE G PROPOSED FOUR POWER BASIS.

COULD YOU LET ME HAVE ANY COMMENTS TO ARRIVE HERE WITHOUT FAIL BY 08.00 HOURS BRITISH SUMMER TIME?

SOSFA SENT 0218Z 25 MAY

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC (F.O.)

Subject

No. 10 Downing St

COPY NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

FLASH MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 883 25 May 1967

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL TELEGRAM

SERIAL No T132/67

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 883 of 25 May
Repeated for information to:

Washington, U.K. Mission New York, Paris.

For Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram 1317.

I agree that Primacy of U.N. should be preserved if possible, and that we should welcome the French proposal and fit in with any practical arrangement for concerting action between 4 Powers. The logical place would be New York.

2. I will sound out Russians later in the day. In view of Kosygin's insistence yesterday that nothing could be added to or detracted from Soviet statement I do not think they will agree.

Foreign Office pass Washington 135, U.K. Mission New York 20, Paris 25.

Sir G. Harrison Sent 0714Z 25 May
Recd 0728Z 25 May

[Repeated as requested]

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street]

PRISEC (F.O.).

CONFIDENTIAL

77777

Subject

No. 10

COPY NO.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No. T133/67

En Clair

FLASH MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 884 25 May, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 884 of 25 May, Repeated for information Flash to Washington, U.K.Mis. New York, and Paris.

My telegram No. 883.

For Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.

French proposal.

Gromyko's reaction was as forecast in paragraph 2 of telegram under reference.

Foreign Office pass Flash to Washington 136, U.K.Mis. New York 21 and Paris 26.

Sir G. Harrison Sent 0748Z 25 May
Recd 0753Z 25 May

[Repeated as requested]

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street]

PRISEC (F.O.)

WWWWW

Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

PERSONAL TELEGRA

SERIAL No T133^A/67

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 885 25 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.885 of 25 May.
Repeated for information to Washington, U.K. Mission New York and Paris.

My immediately preceding telegram.

For Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.

Middle East crisis: French proposals.

I began this morning's meeting with Gromyko by asking him whether he had seen the French proposal for Four-Power consultations, and asked what their reaction was. I said that my understanding was that the French had left open the question of where and how meetings should take place.

2. Without waiting for interpretation, Gromyko answered at once that they had had no official approach from the French. The important issue at present was for every state to exercise its influence to prevent a military clash. This meant holding back those responsible, namely Israel and those who had encouraged her. It might be that those who had encouraged her were today taking a more reasonable attitude. The Soviet Government had set out their position in their public statement, as Mr. Kosygin had made clear to me yesterday.

3. I said that the British Cabinet would be discussing the French proposal today and it was probable that they might decide to welcome it. Perhaps the Soviet authorities could think the matter over during the day and let me have their views later.

4. Gromyko retorted that he had nothing to add.

5. I tried again, pointing out that an indication of the Soviet attitude would be helpful to us when making up our own minds. This was not our proposal and I was not urging it upon him to embarrass the Soviet Government. But it would really help us to know later in the day whether the Soviet Government were prepared to consider it seriously.

6. Gromyko replied that they had received no proposal and therefore had nothing to study.

F.O. pass Immediate Washington 137, U.K. Mission New York 22, and Paris 27.

Sir G. Harrison

Sent 1020Z 25 May
Recd. 1210Z 25 May

[Repeated as requested]

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N.E.A.D.

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Subject Cyprus Defence already done 10 DS 19

SECRET 26.5.67 COPY NO:

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL TELEGRAM SERIAL No T 134/67

Cypher/Cat A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

Telno. 1346 25 May 1967 (PS)
DEYOU
SECRET

To be decyphered personally by Foreign Secretary's Private Secretary.

Following strictly personal from Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

You will have seen from Foreign Office telegram No. 1441 to Paris repeated to you that Cabinet have welcomed the French proposal for four power consultation through permanent representatives in New York.

2. We all liked this proposal as setting up a diplomatic approach to the whole problem, while the method suggested should be helpful as a way of getting the question back into the United Nations; which is where all the colleagues would prefer to keep it, if we possibly can.

3. We have suggested that Mulley should go to Paris not only with the object of endorsing the French proposal and of exploring French views, but also because it seems important to get the French fully engaged in a process which, if the Russians refused to play, could lead to closer cooperation between the French, the Americans and ourselves. We also, of course, have very much in mind our European purposes, and I am concerned to ensure that, with George Thomson in Washington, de Gaulle should have no excuse for saying that we are once again falling back into the Anglo-American "special relationship" attitude.

4. You will be glad to know that the Cabinet discussion about possible future measures went a good deal better than last time. In particular there was a somewhat greater readiness to accept the necessity for the kind of contingency planning which George Thomson is discussing in Washington. But some Ministerial feet are still a little chilly and the support for the four power proposal derives in part from the hope that this puts off the evil day of having to opt for something more robust. But, of course, we would all prefer a diplomatic solution. Part of the more relaxed feeling in Cabinet resulted from the view expressed by some of our colleagues that the atmosphere was rather less tense than on Tuesday. I rubbed it in that this was illusory. What we have got from Eban's visit is a possible respite of 48 hours or so; and if he does not feel that he has got adequate

/satisfaction

satisfaction from his journey, we must expect drastic decisions from Israel as soon as he gets back. Obstinate and critical problems and decisions therefore still lie not very far ahead. I think the colleagues hoisted this aboard.

5. Since there is so much to be said for this four power approach, I hope that, despite Gromyko's discouraging first reactions you will be able to press him (and Kosygin too, if you can see the latter again) very hard to recognise that, given the exceptionally dangerous nature of the potential confrontation that lies ahead, they should at least agree to the proposed meeting of the four in New York, which we would hope could take place as soon as possible (we had indeed been thinking in terms possibly of this evening).

6. I should add that, as you will see from the telegram being sent to George Thomson, I think we managed to get this morning from the colleagues acceptance of the principles and basic purposes of the proposed declaration by maritime nations; though only at the price of holding up any attempt to canvass such a declaration amongst the Governments concerned, until we have given a fair run to de Gaulle's four power proposal.

SOSFA Sent 1555/25 May

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street]

PRISEC (F.O.)

Subject

CONFIDENTIAL COPY NO:

Cypher/Cat A

FLASH MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 890 25 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No. T135/67

Following for Prime Minister from Secretary of State.

I understand that at this morning's Cabinet it was proposed that Mr. Mulley should leave for Paris to explore the French proposal for four Power action. You will have seen Moscow telegram No. 885, but in any case I do not like this proposal. I will be back in London tomorrow afternoon, and I should be grateful if all action were suspended until we have had an opportunity to discuss what the next move should be.

Sir G. Harrison Sent 1310Z/25 May
Received 1320Z 25 May

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street]

PRISEC (F.O.)

PPPPP CONFIDENTIAL

No. 10. DS. (12)

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

Copy No. ...

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 893 25 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 893 of 25 May. Repeated for information to Paris, UKMIS New York, UKDEL NATO and Washington.

Your telegram to Paris No. 1441: French Proposal for Quadripartite Talks on the Middle East.

The French Embassy here told us that Mr. Wormser had approached Kosyrev (in the absence of Gromyko and Kuznetsov) on instructions. Similar approaches were to have been made in Washington and London.

2. Substance of approach was as follows:

French are worried by tension in the Middle East, especially by situation in Gulf of Aqaba. It was important to preserve the peace, and prevent the use of force. Even though the conflict was a local one, the attitudes of the major powers had contributed to the present situation (this applied in respect to both the U.A.R. and Israel). The Security Council could do nothing without agreement of the four major powers. It was urgent that they should sit down together and examine the question, in order (a) to prevent action likely to jeopardise the peace; and (b) to discuss the problems of substance and try to establish a modus vivendi. The French proposed that the Permanent Representatives of the Four Powers in New York should start discussions as soon as possible. The fact that discussions had started should be announced, as this would help to reduce tension.

3. Mr. Kosyrev said that he would report the approach, but made no reply of substance.

Foreign Office pass Paris 28, UKMIS New York 23, UKDEL NATO 22, Washington 120.

Sir G. Harrison Sent 2045 25 May
Recd 0600Z 26 May

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street]

[Repeated as requested]

P R I S E C (F.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

QQQQ

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1098

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
DATED 25 MAY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1098 OF 25 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW OTTAWA COPENHAGEN TEL AVIV.

MY TELNO 1083 : MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

I MET THIS AFTERNOON WITH GOLDBERG, IGNATIEFF (CANADA) AND TABOR (DENMARK) TO DISCUSS YESTERDAY'S SORRY EVENTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND TO CONSIDER WHAT FUTURE MOVES WE SHOULD TAKE IN THE U.N.

2. WE AGREED THAT OUR MAIN PURPOSE SHOULD BE TO TRY AND GET THE FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSULT. IT WAS EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO PERSUADE THE RELUCTANT NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO RETURN TO CONSULTATION. WE AGREED THAT TABOR AS THE INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN THIS.

3. WE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT OUR BEST HOPES LAY IN PINNING BOTH EXERCISES ON TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT WHICH AS YOU KNOW IS UNLIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE BEFORE SATURDAY. WE SHOULD NOT THEREFORE MOVE BEFORE BUT GO SWIFTLY INTO ACTION THEREAFTER.

4. OUR AIM REMAINED TO BE TO ATTEMPT TO GET A RESOLUTION THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA HOWEVER REMOTE THE CHANCES OF THIS MIGHT NOW APPEAR. WE AGREED TO ATTEMPT SECRETLY AMONG OURSELVES TO DRAFT A RESOLUTION. THIS MATTER WOULD ALSO HAVE TO AWAIT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT SINCE THE DRAFT WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO BE BALANCED BY SOME REFERENCES TO HIS RECOMMENDATIONS. WE WOULD NOT CIRCULATE THIS RESOLUTION AT THIS STAGE SINCE IN THE PRESENT MOOD OF THE COUNCIL IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR ANY DRAFT TO EMERGE AS A RESULT OF THE PARALLEL SETS OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE PERMANENT MEMBERS ON THE ONE HAND AND THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS ON THE OTHER, A PROCESS WHICH WE HOPED MIGHT RESULT IN A MERGING OF THE TWO GROUPS.

/5.

5. WE ALSO FELT IT IMPORTANT TO GO TO CERTAIN CAPITALS AT AN EARLY STAGE IN THE HOPE OF PERSUADING SOME OF THE RELUCTANT COUNCIL MEMBERS TO SUPPORT US. WE HAD ETHIOPIA PARTICULARLY IN MIND. (WHILE WE HAVE TO RECOGNISE THE RISK OF A SOVIET VETO THIS OUTCOME WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO THE FAILURE OF A RESOLUTION DUE TO LACK OF SUPPORT.)

6. THE ABOVE WERE OUR ROUGH IDEAS ON HOW TO PROCEED. THE FOUR OF US (WHO ARE ABLE TO TALK FRANKLY TOGETHER IN CONFIDENCE) WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP IN TOUCH EACH DAY.

FO PASS PARIS 73 MOSCOW 68 COPENHAGEN 15 TEL AVIV 82

LORD CARADON

SENT 260150Z
RECD 260253Z

[REPETITION TO TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION. REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. ...

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No. T 136/67

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

TELNO 1372 25 MAY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL FOR S OF S FROM PRIME MINISTER

AS YOU WILL KNOW BOTH HEATH AND THORPE HAVE NOW CALLED TO SEE ME ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HEATH CLEARLY EXPECTS AN EARLY DEBATE, THORPE HAS SPECIFICALLY AND PUBLICLY ASKED FOR ONE AND WE WOULD OURSELVES WISH IN ANY CASE TO GIVE AN EARLY REPORT TO THE HOUSE.

UNLESS DEVELOPMENTS WERE TO REQUIRE AN EARLIER RECALL OF THE HOUSE I TAKE IT YOU WOULD AGREE THAT THE BEST COURSE WOULD BE TO HAVE THE DEBATE ON THE FIRST DAY BACK I.E. WEDNESDAY NEXT.

YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT I AM CANCELLING MY VISIT TO EXPO. 67 AND PROPOSE TO CONFINE MY VISIT TO NORTH AMERICA TO DISCUSSIONS WITH PEARSON AND L.B.J. TOWARDS THE END OF NEXT WEEK.

SOSFA SENT 0030Z 26 MAY 1967

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

P R I S E C (F.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject

20

COPY NO. .....

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TEL. NO. 5382 25 MAY, 1967

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL TELEGRAM

SERIAL No T137/67

SECRET.
PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR.
FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SENT BY PRIVATE WIRE.

MESSAGE BEGINS.

I HAVE NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH YOU DIRECT SO FAR ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION BECAUSE OUR PEOPLE HAVE BEEN IN SUCH CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS TOUCH AND PARTICULARLY BECAUSE GEORGE THOMSON HAS HIMSELF BEEN IN WASHINGTON DISCUSSING ALL THIS WITH DEAN RUSK BUT WE HAVE TAKEN STOCK TODAY IN THE CABINET IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT WE HAVE HEARD FROM GEORGE BROWN IN MOSCOW - (WHICH I AM BOUND TO SAY, IS NOT SO FAR PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING ON THIS FRONT): OF GEORGE THOMSON'S REPORT: OF MY OWN TALK YESTERDAY WITH EBAN (YOU WILL HAVE HAD AN ACCOUNT OF THIS VIA GEORGE THOMSON): AND, FINALLY, IN THE LIGHT OF DE GAULLE'S PROPOSAL THAT THIS SHOULD BE HANDLED, AT LEAST INITIALLY, ON A FOUR POWER BASIS.

THE FRENCH HAVE TOLD US - AND NO DOUBT YOURSELVES - THAT THEY ARE THINKING IN THE FIRST INSTANCE OF A MEETING OF THE FOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK. THEIR APPROACH RESTS AS YOU KNOW ON THE BASIS PROPOSITION THAT, IF ANY GOOD IS TO COME OUT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IT CAN ONLY RESULT FROM SOME FOUR POWER UNDERSTANDING. IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR TO ME HOW FAR DE GAULLE HAS THOUGHT THROUGH THIS PROPOSITION. HIS POLITICAL PURPOSES ARE, OF COURSE, FAIRLY TRANSPARENT IN TERMS OF FRENCH INFLUENCE AND OF SEEKING TO AVOID FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN ANY EXCLUSIVELY WESTERN APPROACH. (EBAN TOLD ME THAT DE GAULLE ADVISED HIM STRONGLY NOT TO GET TOO CLOSELY INVOLVED IN ANY EXCLUSIVELY WESTERN TIE-UP).

BUT THE FACT THAT THIS APPROACH MAY BE DESIGNED TO ENHANCE FRENCH STANDING AND, PERHAPS, TO CUT DOWN TO SIZE SOME OF THE GENERAL'S WESTERN ALLIES, NEED NOT, IN MY VIEW, PREVENT OUR RECOGNISING ITS INTRINSIC MERITS. IT SEEMS TO US TO HAVE TWO

/POTENTIAL

POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES. FIRST, IF WE CAN GET THE RUSSIANS INTO A FOUR POWER DISCUSSION - AND AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED I WOULD BE GLAD FOR THIS TO HAPPEN EITHER AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL IN NEW YORK AS AT PRESENT SUGGESTED BY THE FRENCH, OR EVENTUALLY AT A MUCH HIGHER LEVEL SOMEWHERE ELSE (SUMMIT IF NECESSARY IN VIEW OF THE TERRIBLE DANGERS INVOLVED) - THIS COULD MEAN THAT THEY ARE CLEAR-HEADED ENOUGH TO SEE THE IMMENSE DANGERS OF A MAJOR CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST IN A PART OF THE WORLD WHERE NEITHER SIDE CAN CONFIDENTLY EXPECT TO CONTROL THE PASSIONS OR REACTIONS OF THE LOCAL PARTICIPANTS. IN THAT SITUATION, THERE MIGHT BE A PROSPECT OF REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THEM. SECONDLY, IF THE FRENCH INITIATIVE PETERS OUT BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS WILL HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT, THE FRENCH CAN HARDLY THEN JUST FOLD THEIR HANDS AND PLAY NO FURTHER PART. THE PROSPECT OF DRAWING THEM INTO A WIDER WESTERN OPERATION SHOULD BE SOMEWHAT ENHANCED. EITHER WAY, THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE SHOULD BE A LITTLE BRIGHTER.

THESE ARE THE REASONS WHY WE DECIDED TODAY TO ANNOUNCE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE FRENCH PROPOSAL - AND I DARE SAY THAT IN AUTHORISING ARTHER GOLDBERG'S STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA, WHICH I SAW LAST NIGHT, YOUR GOVERNMENT HAD THE SAME KIND OF CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND.

MEANWHILE, WE HAVE, AS YOU WILL HAVE HEARD, AGREED THAT GEORGE THOMSON SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK OUT WITH DEAN RUSK THE TERMS OF ANY EVENTUAL APPROACH TO THE OTHER MARITIME POWERS AND OF THE DRAFT DECLARATION FOR WHICH WE MIGHT CANVASS THEIR SUPPORT. WHEN THE CABINET DISCUSSED THIS THIS MORNING, IT WAS CLEAR TO US, FROM THE REPORTS ALREADY RECEIVED FROM OUR AMBASSADORS IN A NUMBER OF KEY MARITIME COUNTRIES, THAT WE SHOULD NOT GET THE KIND OF SUPPORT THAT IS REQUIRED FOR ANY SUCH DECLARATION UNTIL ALL EFFORTS TO GET SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE OUT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE DEMONSTRABLY FAILED. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND GIVEN THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF THE FRENCH PROPOSAL ANYWAY, WE FELT THAT BEFORE WE COULD FINALLY DECIDE ON THE TERMS AND METHOD OF PROPOSING THE JOINT APPROCH TO THE MARITIME POWERS, WE MUST GIVE THE FRENCH FOUR-POWER APPROACH A CHANCE TO PROVE ITSELF.

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SOSFA SENT 0133Z/26 MAY

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10, DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC (F.O.)

UK 001/25
213 ZULU
MAY 25, 1967
T 137/67
FROM PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT
SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No. T 137/67

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IF, MEANWHILE, YOU CAN LET ME KNOW HOWYOU SEE THINGS, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR TALK WITH MIKE, I SHALL WELCOME THIS.

MESSAGE ENDS

SECRET

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM PRIME MINISTER

I have not been in touch with you direct so far about the Middle East situation because our people have been in such close and continuous touch and particularly because George Thomson has been himself in Washington discussing all this with Dean Rusk. But we have taken stock today in the Cabinet in the light of what we have heard from George Brown in Moscow - (which I am bound to say, is not so far particularly encouraging on this front); of George Thomson's report; of my own talk yesterday with Eban (you will have had an account of this via George Thomson); and, finally, in the light of de Gaulle's proposal that this should be handled, at least initially, on a Four Power basis.

The French have told us - and no doubt yourselves - that they are thinking ~~the~~ in the first instance of a meeting of the four permament Representatives in New York. Their approach rests, as you know, on the basic proposition that, if any good is to come out of the Security Council, it can only result from some Four Power understanding. It is not at all clear to me how far de Gaulle has thought through this proposition. His political purposes are, of course, fairly transparent in terms of French influence and of seeking to avoiding French involvement in any exclusively Western approach. (Eban told me that

/... de Gaulle advised him strongly

de Gaulle advised him strongly not to get too closely involved in any exclusively Western tie-up.)

But ~~because~~ the fact that this approach may be designed to enhance French standing and, perhaps, to cut down to size some of the General's Western allies, need not, in my view, prevent our recognising its intrinsic merits. It seems to us to have two potential advantages. First, if we can get the Russians into a Four Power discussion - and as far as I am concerned I would be glad for this to happen either at Ambassadorial level in New York as at present suggested by the French, or eventually at a much higher level (Summit if necessary) somewhere else - this could mean that they are clear-headed enough to see the immense dangers of a major confrontation with the West in a part of the world where neither side can confidently expect to control the passions or reactions of the local participants. In that situation, there might be a prospect of reaching agreement with them. Secondly, if the French initiative peters out because the Russians will have nothing to do with it, the French can hardly then just fold their hands and play no further part. The prospect of drawing them into a wider Western operation should be somewhat enhanced. Either way, the prospects for peace should be a little brighter.

in view of the terrible dangers involved

These are the reasons why we decided today to announce our support for the French proposal - and I dare say that in authorising Arthur Goldberg's statement of support for the idea, which I saw last night, your Government had the same kind of considerations in mind.

Meanwhile, we have, as you will have heard, agreed that George Thomson should continue to work out with Dean Rusk the terms of any eventual approach to the other maritime powers and of the draft declaration for which we might canvass their support. When ~~we~~ I + Cabinet discussed this this morning, it was clear to us, from the reports already received from our Ambassadors in a number of key maritime countries, that we should not get the kind of support that is ~~immensely desirable~~ required for any such declaration until all efforts to get something constructive out of the Security Council have demonstrably failed. In these circumstances, and given the intrinsic value of the French proposal anyway, we felt that before we could finally decide on the terms and method of proposing the joint approach to the maritime powers, we must give the French four-power approach a chance to prove itself.

As I write this, I learn that ~~By~~ by the time ~~this~~ reaches you, you will probably have ~~be~~ talked ~~out~~ with Mike Pearson. I need not say how much I welcome this ~~I am sending him also an account of how we see things~~ meeting. Canada has a key role to play in all this and we shall of course be keeping in the closest touch with them too. This is indeed a further reason why I am very glad that I shall be able to see next week both Mike and yourself. Clearly we shall have to give a good deal of time to the Middle East situation. I hope things there will be a bit clearer by the time we meet - and I hope even more that there will not have been a major explosion there - but I am sure you share my own desire that, overshadowed as events may be for the time being by the Arab-Israel

crisis, we shall be able to have a good talk about the other important issues on our agenda. If, meanwhile, you can let me know how you see things, especially in the light of your talk with Mike, I shall welcome this.

Approved by Prime Minister

25/5/

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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Piece 1618

THREE
(PAPERS EXTRACTED AND
TEMPORARILY RETAINED
UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
PENDING COMPLETION
OF REVIEW

(date) 17-3-97

(Signed) J. R. Green

PRO DOCUMENT
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= 2 FEB 1999

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS.

GUIDANCE NO. 116 25 MAY, 1967 (IPG)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO CERTAIN MISSIONS TELEGRAM NUMBER GUIDANCE 116 OF 25 MAY.

MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

AFTER THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE ISRAEL AND SYRIAN AIR FORCES ON 7 APRIL, THERE CONTINUED TO BE INCIDENTS INSIDE ISRAEL CAUSED BY TERRORISTS COMING FROM SYRIA. WARNINGS BY ISRAEL LEADERS THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE SEVERE REPRISALS IF THIS CONTINUED APPEAR TO HAVE LED TO THE BELIEF IN SYRIA AND THE U.A.R., PERHAPS DELIBERATELY FOSTERED BY THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT, THAT ISRAEL WOULD MOUNT A LARGE SCALE ATTACK ON SYRIA.

2. THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT HAS IN RECENT YEARS BEEN EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS ABOUT GETTING INVOLVED WITH ISRAEL AND HAS GIVEN ONLY PROPAGANDA SUPPORT WHEN ISRAEL HAS CARRIED OUT REPRISAL ATTACKS ON SYRIA. ON THIS OCCASION, THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT EVIDENTLY DECIDED NOT TO FOLLOW THIS POLICY IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER ATTACK ON SYRIA, AND PROCEEDED TO TAKE LARGE AND OSTENTATIOUS MILITARY PRECAUTIONS, BRINGING ITS FORCES IN SINAI NEAR THE ISRAEL FRONTIER UP TO 4 DIVISIONS, INCLUDING SOME 6ØØ TANKS.

3. UP TO THIS STAGE U.A.R. ACTION COULD SIMPLY HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO DETER THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT AND GET A PRESTIGE VICTORY OUT OF BEING SEEN TO DO SO. ON 16 MAY, HOWEVER, THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT DEMANDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF) WHICH WAS SET UP AT THE END OF 1956 TO SUPERVISE WITHDRAWAL OF ANGLO/FRENCH AND ISRAEL FORCES FROM EGYPTIAN TERRITORY AND WHICH HAS REMAINED ON THE ISRAEL FRONTIER EVER SINCE TO ACT AS A BUFFER BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE OF THE FRONTIER. (THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO HAVE THE FORCE STATIONED IN ITS TERRITORY.)

/ 4. THE

4. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN OUR VIEW PRECIPITATELY, ACCEPTED THE DEMAND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCE. THIS CREATED FOUR DANGERS OF A SERIOUS CLASH:
(A) THAT THE SYRIANS, NOW CONFIDENT OF EGYPTIAN SUPPORT, MIGHT BE MORE AGGRESSIVE IN SUPPORTING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES:
(B) THAT THE INFILTRATION OF TERRORISTS WOULD NOW START FROM THE GAZA STRIP WHERE THERE ARE TWO BRIGADES OF THE SO CALLED QUOTE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY UNQUOTE:
(C) THAT SOME SPARK WOULD CAUSE AN EXPLOSION BETWEEN THE LARGE EGYPTIAN FORCE IN SINAI AND THE ISRAEL FORCES WHICH HAD BEEN MOBILISED TO FACE IT:
(D) THAT THE EGYPTIANS, HAVING SECURED THE REMOVAL OF THE UNEF DETACHMENT FROM THE SHORE OF THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, WOULD INTERFERE WITH SHIPPING PASSING THROUGH THE STRAITS TO ELATH IN ISRAEL OR AQABA IN JORDAN.
IT IS THE LAST DANGER WHICH HAS MATERIALISED AND CREATED THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION.

5. IT IS H.M.G.'S POLICY TO AVOID TAKING SIDES IN THIS DISPUTE OR PASSING JUDGMENTS. UNLIKE THE RUSSIANS, WHO HAVE FOR MANY YEARS BEEN OPENLY PARTISAN, WE ARE EQUALLY INTERESTED IN PEACE AND SECURITY FOR ALL COUNTRIES IN THE AREA. WHATEVER THE ORIGINS OF THE EGYPTIAN ACTION, THE SERIOUS ESCALATION RESULTS DIRECTLY FROM THE ARBITRARY REMOVAL OF A LONG-ESTABLISHED AND SUCCESSFUL PEACEKEEPING FORCE AND A REVERSAL OF THE POSITION IN THE GULF OF AQABA WHICH HAS EXISTED FOR THE PAST 10 YEARS. THESE TWO DEVELOPMENTS SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY THAT, SO FAR FROM MERELY REACTING TO EVENTS, THE U.A.R. MOVES WERE PLANNED IN ADVANCE AND HAD AN ASSURANCE OF RUSSIAN ACQUIESCENCE. AT THE VERY LEAST THE RUSSIANS HAVE, BY COMING OUT WITH AN UNCOMPROMISING PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR THE U.A.R., ENDANGERED THE PROSPECT OF A PEACEFUL OUTCOME.

/ 6. ALL

6. ALL ARAB GOVERNMENTS ARE LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO CLOSE THE STRAITS OF TIRAN TO ISRAEL SHIPPING AND THEY WILL ACCUSE THOSE WHO OBJECT OF SUPPORTING ISRAEL. THE OBJECTION IS, IN FACT, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WIDER INTEREST OF ALL MARITIME NATIONS IN ASSURING THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL STRAITS, EVEN WHEN THEY ARE WITHIN TERRITORIAL WATERS. POSTS IN ARAB COUNTRIES SHOULD GIVE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS TO THIS.

7. H.M.G., ALONG WITH MANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS, EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 4 MARCH 1957. AS PRESIDENT NASSER HAS NOW DECLARED HIS INTENTION OF DENYING THIS FREEDOM BY PREVENTING THE PASSAGE OF ISRAEL FLAG SHIPS AND EXERCISING COUNTRABAND CONTROL OVER OTHERS, H.M.G. ARE SUPPORTING ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DEAL WITH THE PRESENT DANGEROUS SITUATION AND ARE ALSO CONSULTING OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS ON MEANS OF ASSERTING FREEDOM OF PASSAGE.

8. THE FOREGOING IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND FOR USE IN CONVERSATION. IT IS NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN THIS FORM.

9. MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING GUIDANCE GIVES BACKGROUND TO H.M.G.'S POLICY STATEMENTS ON THESE SUBJECTS.

SOSFA/CROSEC SENT 0204Z 26 MAY

BY TELEGRAPH:

ANKARA	UKDEL NATO	KHARTOUM	WELLINGTON
ATHENS	ROME	RABAT	NEW DELHI
BONN	BELGRADE	BENGHAZI	RAWALPINDI
BRUSSELS	BERNE	TUNIS	ACCRA
COPENHAGEN	MOSCOW	ADDIS ABABA	FREETOWN
THE HAGUE	BAGHDAD	TOKYO	LAGOS
LISBON	TEHRAN	OTTAWA	KAMPALA
LUXEMBOURG	ALGIERS	CANBERRA	NAIROBI
OSLO	TRIPOLI	VALLETTA	LUSAKA
PARIS			ZOMBA

[ALL IMMEDIATE]

DUBLIN	WARSAW	RIO DE JANEIRO	JERUSALEM
MADRID	U.K.MISSION	MONTEVIDEO	KUWAIT
VIENNA	NEW YORK	PANAMA CITY	TEL AVIV
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BUDAPEST	WASHINGTON	BEIRUT	COLOMBO
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SOFIA	CARACAS	JEDDA	BHC SINGAPORE

[ALL PRIORITY]

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EN CLAIR AND BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

GUIDANCE NO. 117 25 MAY, 1967 (IPG)

UNCLASSIFIED

MIDDLE EAST SITUATION: FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR FOUR POWER TALKS.
THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED TODAY:-
QUOTE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WELCOMES THE PROPOSAL ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT FOR HIGH LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, UNITED STATES, SOVIET UNION AND GREAT BRITAIN ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE PREPARED TO CO-OPERATE FULLY IN GIVING EFFECT TO THIS PROPOSAL. UNQUOTE

1. YOU MAY SAY UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT WE WILL BE KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH ALL THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO DISCUSS HOW THIS PROPOSAL CAN BE IMPLEMENTED.
2. WE WILL BE FLEXIBLE ON THE WAY IN WHICH THE DISCUSSIONS CAN BE BROUGHT ABOUT, BUT WE WOULD WISH THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THESE TALKS AND THE UNITED NATIONS TO BE MAINTAINED.

SOSFA/CROSEC SENT 1955Z 25 MAY

BY TELEGRAPH:

ANKARA	PARIS	BAHRAIN
BONN	UKDEL NATO PARIS	JEDDA
BRUSSELS	UKDEL STRASBOURG	TEL AVIV
COPENHAGEN	ROME	BENGHAZI
THE HAGUE	MOSCOW	ADDIS ABABA
TOKYO		

[ALL PRIORITY]

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Israel 20A

SECRET

Extract from the record of a meeting between the Foreign Secretary and the Soviet Foreign Minister at 10 am on 25th May

Middle East

Mr. Brown said that there was one point which he wished to raise in connec
h the present Middle East crisis. Had Mr. Gromyko seen the proposa
neral de Gaulle for Four-Power consultations between France, the United Sta
Soviet Union and Britain? Mr. Brown's understanding was that the Fre
left open the question of where and how the meeting should take pl
ıld Mr. Gromyko give a preliminary view on this proposal?

2. *Mr. Gromyko* replied that the Soviet Government had had no offi
roach from the French. The most important issue at the present time was
y State to use its influence to prevent a military clash. This meant hold
Israel and those who had encouraged her and were still encouraging h
ıight be that those who had encouraged Israel were to-day taking a m
onable attitude. The Soviet Government had set out their position in th
ic statement, as Mr. Kosygin had made plain in the talks the previous day.

PJ

3. *Mr. Brown* said that the British Cabinet would be discussing the Frer
osal that day and it was probable that they would decide to welcome
aps the Soviet authorities could think matters over during the day and g
their views later.

9 June 66

4. *Mr. Gromyko* replied that he had nothing to add.

5. *Mr. Brown* reiterated that an indication of the Soviet attitude would
ful to the British Government. This was not a British proposal and he w
ırging it upon Mr. Gromyko in order to embarrass the Soviet Governme
it would really help the British Government to know later in the day wheth
Soviet Government were prepared to consider it seriously. *Mr. Gromy*
ed that the Soviet Government had received no proposal and that, therefo
had nothing to study.

SECRET

FOREIGN OFFICE COPY

Arab/Israel Dispute

21

SECRET

Cypher/Cat A

11 W/28.

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 372 26 May 1967

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 372 of 26 May. Repeated for information to Washington, UKMIS New York and Moscow.

Your telegram No. 1313 to Moscow.

It is encouraging that Eban is taking such a reasonable line and this read with Rafael's attitude in New York telegram No. 1058 to you suggests that Israelis are for the moment only making a real issue out of freedom of their shipping.

2. Against this Israelis must be becoming aware that the status quo in the Middle East has altered radically in the last fortnight without anybody trying to stop the process (including themselves):-

(i) Nasser has thrown out UNEF, employing threats of force (UKMIS New York telegram No. 1056) or actual force (my telegram No. 322) without this being made public by U Thant. On the contrary, they notice his censure of Israel for buzzing Rikhye's plane and the singling out in his report of Israeli statements (which they themselves would consider deterrent) to balance continued Arab threats over the years;

(ii) Nasser has occupied Shram es Sheikh with a powerful force and closed the Gulf of Aqaba;

(iii) He has introduced forces into Sinai which are capable of posing a threat, quite apart from the possibility of terrorist raids from Gaza starting again after ten years once the present tension has died down;

(iv) Syria must now definitely be counted on to take military action in the event of U.A.R./Israel hostilities and Egypt counted on to take action if there is an Israeli reprisal against Syria.

(v) The prospects for Kings Hussein and Feisal look much bleaker as the Nasser/Soviet bandwaggon gains momentum. If Nasser's prestige remains as high as it has now, unexpectedly become, Israel may have to face in the not too distant future the prospect of a really hostile Jordan;

(vi) If the Iraqis send troops to Syria a situation will have been created which the Israelis have always claimed to be a near casus belli and a violation of the Armistice Agreements.

/3. Israel

3. Israel has revised her original appreciation (shared by us) that each of Nasser's gestures was a propaganda one and not likely to be effective, so that she now believes he is working to a carefully co-ordinated plan. Nevertheless she has responded to Western advice not to act by herself and to give diplomatic action a chance to rectify the situation. As a result she has found herself faced by a series of situations (U Thant's visit to Cairo, Security Council Meeting, Anglo-American consultations, Mr. Eban's visit round the capitals, present French call for Four Power action) which have made it impossible for her to take any action without calling on her head the severest condemnation not only of her enemies but of those who are trying to help her.

4. Her moderation in the initial stages has also put her at a severe military disadvantage and Israel military advisers must be regretting bitterly that they were not allowed to hit the Egyptians when they first arrived in Sinai in some disarray, and that the enemy has now been given time to dig in, deploy, mount gun positions and sow minefields. What might have been a quick and easy victory (the severity of the air battle excluded) has been turned into a more formidable task more difficult even than the Sinai campaign. The Israelis have also thrown away their advantage of initial surprise and are well on the way to throwing away their advantage of being able to assemble troops and launch them into action more quickly than the Arabs.

5. They are furthermore undergoing the expense and disruption of civil life of a massive (though not total) call up which may become increasingly and all too obviously a step with no definite end in view. Each day that passes without action sees a lowering of civilian morale and will give rise to pressure on the Government to resort to operations against the Arabs whatever the consequences.

6. Fianlly, as my telegram DA/142 shows, terrorist activities have not ceased and there is the frightening possibility of people outside Egyptian or possibly even Syrian Governmental control pulling off a successful coup in terms of Israeli lives. This could happen any day and would, until Israel gets satisfaction on her main preoccupation of Tiran, be in my opinion certain to lead to an Israel reprisal.

7. There are therefore many factors which make it urgent for us to get satisfaction for Israel on the shipping question before she begins to realise that, quite apart from shipping, the longer term prospects for Israel are gloomy to a degree no Israeli could have foreseen a few days ago. Much will depend on the report Mr. Eban brings with him, but I believe that if he cannot assure the Cabinet that speedy and effective action is going to be taken to open the Straits to Israel shipping, it is almost inevitable that the argument that Israel must act now or never will prevail and further delays or reasonableness will be classified as Mr. Eban's course (A). In these circumstances it will be nearly

/impossible

impossible for us to produce arguments or create further delaying circumstances which are likely to succeed in deterring Israel action.

Foreign Office pass Washington 65, UKMIS New York 61 and Moscow 9.

Mr. Hadow Sent 1759Z 26 May

Recd 2130Z 26 May

[Repeated as requested]

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SECRET

Extract 21A

Extract from the record of a meeting between the Foreign Secretary and the President of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin at 11.0am on 26th May

Middle East

4. *Mr. Brown* then turned to the Middle East and referred to the French proposal for four-Power consultation. Since he had spoken to Mr. Gromyko both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Governments had received official approaches from the French. He had received a telegram from Mr. Wilson asking him to emphasise to the Soviet leaders the importance which Her Majesty's Government attached to this proposal and to the need for the four Powers to consult together so that everything possible should be done to keep tension down and avoid a flare-up in the Middle East.

5. *Mr. Podgorny* said that he knew about the French four-Power proposal but that his Government had only received an official communication from the French the previous evening. He was therefore not in a position to make considered comments. He could only say that the Arab States appeared to lack enthusiasm for the proposal and that clearly the four Powers could only act after taking into account the views of the Governments concerned. The Arabs appeared to believe that such a meeting would be unlikely to be useful. However, the Soviet Government had not yet had an opportunity to discuss the French proposal and he said that they would certainly give it the most careful consideration. Nevertheless he would like to say that in any case the Soviet Government was paying the closest attention to events in the Middle East and was certainly interested in seeing that there was no escalation, and that the problems that existed there were settled without resort to military action.

6. *Mr. Brown* agreed with what Mr. Podgorny had said. He saw no point in discussing the merits of the case; the essential was to avoid a conflagration. Certainly we had to take account of Arab views. There was no unanimity among the Arabs but nevertheless their views should be considered. But at the end of the day the major Powers had to consider their responsibility. They could not avoid involvement both because of their interests in the area and because in the nature of things a conflagration anywhere affected them. He therefore hoped that the Soviet Government would carefully consider the French proposal and any action that could be taken either inside or outside the United Nations. He stressed the dangers of delay with the attendant possibility of one of the parties taking the law into their own hands.

7. *Mr. Podgorny* agreed on the need for early discussions and prompt decisions on these matters. The Soviet reaction to the situation had been vigorous and quick and had been set out in the Soviet statement. It was true that the Arab viewpoint was not unanimous but the overwhelming majority were united. The Soviet Government would give the most serious consideration to the proposals that the French Government had made to the United Kingdom and the USSR, but whatever role the Great Powers might play it was a fact that they had to take into account the views of the countries concerned, including those of the Arabs. Unless they did, any conclusions they reached would be of no effect. The Soviet Government considered its basic task to ensure that a new war did not break out in that part of the world. The war in South-East Asia was quite bad enough, and they would do everything possible to avoid a flare-up elsewhere.

Copy on Foreign Policy
Oct 66

SECRET

Mr. Palliser

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~~Unclassified.~~

To:— Prime Minister

From

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

26/5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

A crucial meeting of the cabinet wld. take place either tomorrow evening or on Sunday morning. Important decisions wld. be taken then.

P.U.S
Sir D. Allen
Mr. Rose
Mr. Morris
~~Mr.~~ Mr. Speaight
Mr. Palliser
Private Secretary
Mr. Westbrook
Eastern Dept.

Draft Record of a Conversation between the Minister of State and the Israel Ambassador 6 p.m. 26 May.

Present

Minister of State. (Mr Thomson) — Mr. Remez. Mr. Anug.

Opening the discussion Mr. Remez said that the Cabinet in Israel had been in session all day and that in addition there have been feverish consultations between all the parties. Mr. Ben Gurion had also taken part. The Defence Committee had also been in continuous session. Nothing however had been decided as all were awaiting Mr. Eban's return. Mr. Eban was at this moment meeting Mr. Johnson and would leave Washington immediately after his talks for Israel. He might be passing through Paris or London and Mr. Remez was planning to catch him at one or other of these points so as to give him the most up to date news on the U.K.'s position. Mr. Remez was therefore anxious to have as clear a picture as possible so that he could report.

2. In reply Mr. Thomson explained that the Foreign Secretary was due to reach

/London

Dd.033009 Gp.863

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

London at any minute and the Prime Minister had called a meeting for 7 p.m. which would be the first chance for all of us to consider the situation in the light of the Foreign Secretary's discussions in Moscow and the Minister's in Washington. In Washington the Minister had had very full discussions about what steps could be taken to uphold our view on the international character of the Straits of Tiran which the Prime Minister had re-affirmed in his speech at Margate. We felt it important to get international support to keep the Straits open and would hope to use the United Nations machinery to the fullest towards this aim. To win international support it was important that the possibilities of the United Nations should be used to the full and if necessary exhausted. But of course these United Nations processes would take time. We would want to press the Israel Govt to accept this.

3. Mr. Remez commented that timing was of the essence. He was deeply concerned about likely delays in the Security Council. Supposing, as the Minister had suggested, Israel were to wait until the United Nations processes had been exhausted after, say, 2/3 weeks and then found in the absence of any solution that she had to go it alone it would, in Mr. Remez view, be a disastrous mistake for Israel. It might be part of the Russian tactics to ~~say little~~ give a little in the initial stages and then to prolong the U.N. procedures to unacceptable lengths. While time passed the situation deteriorated. In answer to a question Mr. Remez said that he did not think that supply of oil was an immediate problem.

/The

Dd.033009 Gp.863

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

The dangers of delay were that the whole political complexion of the area was undergoing transformation, the Arab countries were watching closely to see if Nasser got away with it and if he did the political situation in the area as a whole would, from the Western and from Israel's point of view, deteriorate. In addition there were dangers that as time passed the continuous military build-up would be consolidated. There were indications that at the moment the Egyptian forces in Sinai were badly disorganised but this would be rectified in time particularly as there was the prospect of Soviet legistic support and advice. In addition there were reports, admittedly unconfirmed, of shipments of military supplies to Egypt in particular naval missile craft and rockets. ~~The~~ Another reason why time was important was that the present situation challenged Israel's position. Israel like the 17 maritime nations was on record as determined to uphold its right of free passage through the Straits of Tiran. While the possible failure of the maritime powers to take action to uphold this right might be understood in Israel, Mr. Remez doubted if the Government could long resist pressure to act on her own to protect her lifeline. A further military consideration was that further delay might give time for the U.A.C. machinery to be setup and the Israel Government had had a message from the Jordan Government that in that case Jordan would have to play her part with the other Arabs. Israel was prepared to accept the necessity for seeking a solution in the U.N. but there would have to be a time

/ultimat

limit.

Mr. Thomson said that he hoped that H.M.G.'s actions up to now and our repeated affirmation of our support for the principle of free passage through the Straits together with the Foreign Secretary's efforts in Moscow and the Minister's efforts in Washington would convince the Israel Government of the seriousness of our determination. Mr. Thomson could not, however, stress too strongly the ~~feeling~~ fateful consequences likely to flow from any resort to force. Such action would be a threat not only to Israel but also to world peace. He did not think, if it had to be, two or three weeks was long in the life of a nation.

In concluding Mr. Remez stressed his anxiety about delay and emphasised the fact that tension in the area and in particular in Israel was close to danger point. He expressed the hope that later in the evening it might be possible for someone to give him the latest information on H.M.G.'s thinking.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

file

C. [redacted]CAT.A. SECRET

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO. 1472 26 MAY, 1967 (E)

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO PARIS TEL NO.1472 OF 26 MAY AND TO TEHRAN, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, DUBLIN,LISBON, ANKARA, TEGUCIGALPA, MEXICO, CARACAS, RIO DE JANEIRO, MANILA, ADDIS ABABA, NAIROBI, ABIDJAN, AND TANANARIVE.
YOU SHOULD SPEAK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOUR ARE ACCREDITED AND AS APPROPRIATE IN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.
2. WE ARE SURE THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS WHO HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION WILL SHARE OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE THREAT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.A.R. TO INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE OF SHIPPING THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. THE POSITION OF H.M.GOVERNMENT ON THIS WAS STATED BY THE BRITISH DELEGATE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 4 MARCH 1957 IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS.
QUOTE. IT IS THE VIEW OF H.M.G. IN THE U.K. THAT THE STRAITS OF TIRAN MUST BE REGARDED AS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY THROUGH WHICH THE VESSELS OF ALL NATIONS HAVE A RIGHT OF PASSAGE. H.M.G. WILL ASSERT THIS RIGHT ON BEHALF OF ALL BRITISH SHIPPING, AND THEY ARE PREPARED TO JOIN WITH OTHERS TO SECURE GENERAL RECOGNITION OF THIS RIGHT UNQUOTE.
THE PRIME MINISTER REAFFIRMED THIS STATEMENT ON 24, MAY.
3. SIMILAR STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY OTHER MARITIME COUNTRIES AND IT WAS ON THIS BASIS AND ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT A DETACHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE WOULD BE STATIONED THERE THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT AGREED TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM THE AREA OF THE STRAIT IN 1957.
4. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY VIEWS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED MAY WISH TO PUT TO US ON THIS SUBJECT. WE HOPE TO BE able TO PUT SOME SUGGESTIONS TO THEM WHEN OUR THINKING HAS DEVELOPED FURTHER.

SOSFA SENT 1956Z 26 MAY

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CYPHER/CAT A
ROUTINE BONN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 822.

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
26 MAY 1967.

RESTRICTED.

ADDDSD TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO.822 OF 26 MAY 1967. REPTD FOR INFMN SAVING TO AMMAN, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO.770 TO AMMAN: AQUABA.

FOLLOWING CONFIRMS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION GLADSTONE/BEAMISH.

THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY CANNOT CONFIRM THE REPORT THAT TWO WEST GERMAN SHIPS HAVE PASSED THROUGH THE STRAIT IF TIRAN. THEY THINK THE REPORT ORIGINATED IN A CAIRO NEWSPAPER ARTICLE AND IS CLEARLY GARBLED SINCE ONE OF THE SHIPS NAMED IS AT PRESENT IN THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE OTHER DOES NOT EXIST. WHILE AWAITING A REPORT FROM THEIR EMBASSY IN AMMAN THEY THINK THERE MAY BE SOME SUBSTANCE IN THE RUMOUR THAT ONE OR TWO EAST GERMAN SHIPS HAVE PASSED THROUGH THE STRAIT.

FO PASS SAVING TO AMMAN 1, TEL AVIV 2, JEDDA 2, WASHINGTON 86.

SIR FRANK ROBERTS

SENT 1830Z/26
RECD 1830Z/26

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No 10 Downing St

S E C R E T

COPY NO.

CYPHER CAT A
FROM F L A S H WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 1785

TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE
DATED 26 MAY 1967

S E C R E T
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1785 OF 26 MAY,
REPEATED FOR IMFORMATION TO UK MIS NEWYORK AND PARIS.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 5416: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, LIBERIAN TANKER.

I HAVE PASSED THESE VIEWS AND THE PRIME MIMISTER'S MESSAGE TO EUGENE ROSTOW AND LUKE BATTLE. THEY TOOK NOTE.
2. BATTLE TOLD ME THAT ACCORDING TO THEIR LATEST INFORMATION (A) NO TANKER SEEKING TO ENTER THE STRAITS FROM THE SOUTH IS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY THIS IS CONTRARY TO WHAT ROSTOW SAID YESTERDAY): AT THE MOMENT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT ANY TANKER WOULD TRY TO GO THROUGH THE STRAITS FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS SEMICOLON
(B) THE TANKER, NORA, HAD BEEN DIVERTED BY HER OWNERS IN CALIFORNIA SEMICOLON
(C) AN EMPTY TANKER COMING FROM ELIAT HAD PASSED THROUGH THE STRAITS SUCCESSFULLY.
3. THE PRESIDENT IS TALKING TO EBAN NOW AND LATER ON I HOPE TO LEARN WHAT HAS PASSED BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE ISRAELIS.
F O PASS F L A S H TO PARIS 137

SIR P DEAN

SENT 1630Z/26
RCVD 1630Z/26

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
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PRISEC (F.O.)

NNNNN

S E C R E T

SECRET - GUARD

CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON
TELNO 5441 26 MAY, 1967 (Eastern)

SECRET.
GUARD.
ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 5441 OF 26 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW AND PARIS.
ISRAEL AMBASSADOR CALLED ON MR THOMSON THIS EVENING ON INSTRUCTIONS. HE SAID THAT EBAN WAS AT THAT MOMENT WITH PRESIDENT. HE WOULD THEN FLY IMMEDIATELY BACK TO ISRAEL WHERE CABINET HAD BEEN IN CONTINUOUS SESSION ALL DAY AND THERE HAD IN ADDITION BEEN FEVERISH CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN ALL THE PARTIES. BEN GURION HAD TAKEN PART. NOTHING HAD BEEN DECIDED AS ALL WERE AWAITING MR EBAN'S REPORT OF HIS TALKS IN PARIS, LONDON AND WASHINGTON. A CRUCIAL MEETING OF THE CABINET HAD BEEN CALLED FOR SUNDAY MORNING AND MIGHT BE BROUGHT FORWARD TO SATURDAY EVENING. THE AMBASSADOR HOPED TO SEE EBAN IN TRANSIT IN EITHER LONDON OR PARIS.
2. THE CLEAR IMPLICATION OF REMEZ'S SUBSEQUENT REMARKS WAS THAT THIS WOULD BE A PEACE OR WAR CABINET, AT WHICH THE ISRAELIS WOULD DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO GO IT ALONE. MR REMEZ SAID THAT IF ISRAEL WERE TO WAIT UNTIL THE UNITED NATIONS PROCESSES WERE EXHAUSTED AFTER TWO/THREE WEEKS AND THEN FOUND THEY HAD TO GO IT ALONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY INTERNATIONAL PLAN TO KEEP THE GULF OPEN, IT WOULD BE A DISASTROUS MISTAKE.
3. PLEASE FIND OUT URGENTLY FOR OUR INFORMATION HERE EXACTLY WHAT EBAN SAID TO PRESIDENT AND TO STATE DEPARTMENT. I SUGGEST THAT YOU DO NOT - REPEAT NOT - START BY TELLING AMERICANS ABOVE SO THAT THEIR ACCOUNT OF WHAT EBAN SAID TO THEM IS UNINFLUENCED BY REMEZ'S STATEMENTS TO US.

SOSFA SENT 2130Z 26 MAY

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SECRET - GUARD

Subject

25
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SECRET COPY NO.....

CYPHER/ CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TEL NO.5392 26 MAY 1967 (PS)

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No T 138/67

SECRET
ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 5392 OF 26/5 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE).
MY TELEGRAM NO. 5382. (T157/67)
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN RECEIVED OVER THE PRIVATE WIRE.
I HAD A GOOD TALK TODAY WITH MIKE PEARSON. HE CAN EVIDENTLY, TALK FOR HIMSELF. BUT IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT HE WISHES US ALL TO STAY TOGETHER IN THIS MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: FIRST, TO SEE IF ANYTHING USEFUL CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE UN= AND THEN TO WORK OUT SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES THAT YOU HAVE SUGGESTED AND ABOUT WHICH GEORGE THOMSON HAS BEEN TALKING WITH OUR PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON. I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT - IF IT COMES TO THE POINT- THE CANADIANS WILL JOIN THE PARTY.
WE HAD HOPED - AND STILL HOPE - THAT THIS TRACK WILL KEEP THE ISRAELIS STEADY - BUT I SHOULD REPORT TO YOU THAT EBAN CAME IN THIS AFTERNOON TO DEAN RUSK, ON A VERY URGENT BASIS, WITH THE FOLLOWING.
HE REPORTED THAT A MESSAGE FROM HIS PRIME MINISTER INDICATES THEY FEAR AN EARLY GENERAL ATTACK ON ISRAEL BY THE UAR AND SYRIA.
WHAT THEY HAVE ASKED FOR IN THIS SITUATION IS IMMEDIATE APPLICATION OF THE U S COMMITMENT, BACKED UP BY A PUBLIC DECLARATION AS WELL AS PRACTICAL ACTIONS. THEY WOULD LIKE A STATEMENT BY US THAT AN ATTACK ON ISRAEL IS EQUIVALENT TO AN ATTACK ON THE U.S. THEY ALSO WANT THIS ANNOUNCEMENT ACCOMPANIED BY AN INSTRUCTION TO U.S. FORCES IN THE AREA TO COORDINATE ACTION WITH THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE AGAINST ANY POSSIBLE ATTACK.
OUR OWN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE DOES NOT BACK UP THEIR STATEMENT, AND WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO BE AS ALARMED AS THEY APPEAR TO BE.
WE ARE TAKING THE LINE WITH THEM HERE THAT OUR OWN KNOWLEDGE DOES NOT COINCIDE WITH THEIR ESTIMATES. WE ARE ALSO POINTING OUT THAT AS FAR AS THE U.S. IS CONCERNED, THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS MUST PROCEED TOGETHER IN DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM, AND ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS.

WE ARE ALSO URGING UPON EBAN THE REAL DANGER OF ANY PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION BY THE ISRAELIS WHICH WOULD CREATE AN IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS WELL AS IN THE U.S. IT WOULD, WE FEAR, CREATE REAL DIFFICULTY IN GETTING THE SUPPORT OF OTHER COUNTRIES, TO SAY NOTHING OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT IN THE U.S.

I WILL SEE EBAN TOMORROW, AS I FEEL I MUST. I PLAN TO FOLLOW THE SAME LINE WITH HIM DEAN RUSK IS TAKING TONIGHT.

I WOULD BE INTERESTED TO KNOW WHETHER YOUR INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE SHARE OUR JUDGEMENT THAT THE ISRAELI ASSESSMENT IS OVERDRAWN: AND, INDEED, WHAT YOUR ESTIMATE OF NASSER'S INTENTIONS.

I SHOULD ALSO LIKE YOU TO KNOW DIRECTLY MY OWN VIEW ABOUT THE NOTION OF FOUR-POWER MEETINGS OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS. I AM AGAINST THEM, FOR REASONS WE CAN DISCUSS WHEN WE MEET ON JUNE 2.

I AM , OF COURSE, QUITE CONTENT TO HAVE THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEET IN NEW YORK: BUT I DO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE UNWISE NOW TO ENCOURAGE QUADRIPARTITISM OUTSIDE THAT FRAMEWORK.

I MUST SAY THAT THE INITIATIVE YOU HAVE SHOWED IN THIS CRISIS THUS FAR HAS BEEN GREATLY APPRECIATED HERE WHERE OUR CAPACITY TO ACT HINGES SO GREATLY ON SOME OF US AT LEAST BEING ABLE TO MOVE TOGETHER.

SOSFA SENT 1110Z 26 MAY

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P R I S E C (FO):

&&&&&&

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY TEHRAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 730 26 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 730 of 26 May
Repeated for information to Washington.

Arab/Israel.

There is very little to report from here. Both Press and public are taking things calmly. The Press, while giving wide coverage to recent events and blaming Nasser for creating the crisis, has not gone further than this in taking sides between Israel and the Arabs. In answer to Nasser's accusation that Iranian oil was being shipped to Israel, official statement was issued denying that Iranian Government or N.I.O.C. were in any way involved in such oil exports.

2. With the Shah and his Foreign Minister both out of the country Ministers and officials are without guidance and are sitting on the fence, though it is apparent that their sympathies lie essentially with Israel. The Deputy Chief of Staff, who has visited Israel on a number of occasions, told me last night that he was confident that the Israelis could successfully cope with Arab attack on two fronts. This morning Minister of Court told me that Iran would not side with the Arabs.

3. Privately the Prime Minister and others have been saying that the crisis has been artificially created by Nasser with a view to blackmailing Americans and ourselves to bail him out of his current difficulties and to boost his prestige. The Prime Minister seems to fear that we and the Americans will in fact do just this in order to avoid trouble.

4. In spite of what Minister of Court told me it is most unlikely that any public declaration in support of Israel would be made here given Iranian links with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. It is much more likely that Iranians will seek to keep out of this squabble.

Foreign Office pass Washington 16.

Sir D. Wright

Sent 1200Z/26 May
Received 1339/26 May

[Repeated as requested]

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Eastern Dept.

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PPPPP

Mr. A.M. Palliser

COPY NO. 2.

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1108
CONFIDENTIAL.

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
26 MAY, 1967.

✓

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1108 OF
26 MAY, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS AND
MOSCOW.

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 1774 PARAGRAPH (3): MIDDLE EAST.

WE HAVE LOOKED AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT UNEF MIGHT BE RECONSTITUTED AS A NAVAL FORCE TO PATROL IN THE GULF OF AQABA. THERE SEEM TO BE THE FOLLOWING DIFFICULTIES:-

(A) UNEF WAS ORIGINALLY CONCEIVED OF ESSENTIALLY AS A LAND FORCE AND THERE IS NOTHING IN THE EXISTING GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS OR RELATED DOCUMENTS WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO GIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AUTHORITY, WITHOUT FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION, TO RECONSTITUTE UNEF AS A NAVAL PATROL FORCE.

(B) IN ANY EVEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS ALREADY WITH-DRAWN UNEF, AND POLITICALLY IT WOULD SEEM TO BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO SEEK WITHOUT NEW AUTHORITY TO RE-ESTABLISH ITS PRESENCE IN THE AREA EVEN AS A NAVAL PATROL FORCE.

(C) EVEN TO SEEK TO ATTACH A NAVAL PATROL ELEMENT TO UNTSO WOULD INVOLVE AN EXPANSION AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF UNTSO WHICH IN ALL PROBABILITY COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED IN THE CONTEXT OF A WIDER SETTLEMENT RELATED NOT SIMPLY TO FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA AS SUCH. (SEE MY TELEGRAM NO. 1106).

FO PASS PARIS 77 AND MOSCOW 72.

LORD CARADON

DESP 0015/27 MAY
RECD 0144/27 MAY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

PRISEC (F.O.)

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1107 26 MAY 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1107 OF 26 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, OTTAWA AND COPENHAGEN.

MIDDLE EAST : SECURITY COUNCIL.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

IN OUR SEARCH FOR NINE VOTES FOR A RESOLUTION ON FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IN THE GULF OF AQABA WE SHOULD HAVE TO LOOK FOR POSSIBLE VOTES, IN ADDITION TO THOSE OF OURSELVES AND THE U.S., FROM CANADA, DENMARK, THE TWO LATINS AND JAPAN. GIVEN THE KNOWN OPPOSITION OF THE U.A.R., THIS IS IN ITSELF A VERY UNCERTAIN LIST. BUT EVEN IF ALL THESE POSSIBLE VOTES MATERIALISED, IT WOULD STILL BE NECESSARY TO GET TWO MORE VOTES OUT OF NIGERIA, ETHIOPIA, FRANCE OR CHINA. RECENT TELEGRAMS FROM ADDIS ABABA AND PARIS NOW SHOW THAT ETHIOPIA AND FRANCE ARE MOST UNLIKELY SUPPORTERS. IN THE CONTEXT OF AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY, WHICH HAS SPILLED OVER FROM THE ASSEMBLY INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE THE EXPANSION IN 1966, NIGERIA COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO STAND OUT ON HER OWN. CHINA IS ALWAYS VULNERABLE AS A KEY VOTE.

2. IT IS THEREFORE VERY DOUBTFUL WHETHER WE COULD EVEN ACHIEVE THE TACTICAL SUCCESS OF GETTING THE NINE VOTES NEEDED FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION AND FORCING A SOVIET VETO.

F.O. PASS PARIS 76, MOSCOW 71 AND COPENHAGEN 18.

LORD CARADON DESP 0030/27 MAY
RECD 0148/27 MAY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1106 26 MAY, 1967.
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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1106 OF 26 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW OTTAWA COPENHAGEN TEL AVIV CAIRO AND DAMASCUS.

MIDDLE EAST.

I HAD A FULL DISCUSSION THIS MORNING WITH SEYDOUX (FRANCE) AND IN THE LIGHT OF OUR CONVERSATION I HAVE BEEN REFLECTING ON OUR PROSPECTS HERE.

2...SEYDOUX AND I FIRST CONSIDERED WHAT CHANCE THERE IS FOR A STRAIGHT RESOLUTION LIMITED TO FREE PASSAGE TO AQABA. HE THOUGHT THAT SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD HAVE NO CHANCE OF NINE VOTES, AND IT WOULD IN ANY EVENT BE VETOED BY THE RUSSIANS. IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT HE WAS OPPOSED TO PUTTING FORWARD SUCH A RESOLUTION AND I THINK THAT HIS JUDGEMENT ON THE VOTING IS RIGHT. A DETAILED COMMENT ON THIS IS IN M I F T (NOT TO ALL).

3...WE THEN TURNED TO CONSIDER TOGETHER THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR FOUR-POWER CONSULTATION. HE SAID THAT NO REPLY HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM MOSCOW (HE CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS THE FRENCH VIEW THAT IF SUCH CONSULTATION COULD BE UNDERTAKEN IT WOULD BE BEST CARRIED OUT AT THE U N). HE SAID THAT PERHAPS FOUR-POWER CONSULTATION WOULD NOT AT FIRST BE IN FORMAL MEETINGS BUT COULD START WITH SEPARATE TALKS LEADING ON TO FOUR-POWER MEETINGS. HE STILL THOUGHT THAT FOUR-POWER DISCUSSIONS AT THE U N OFFERED THE MOST PROMISING WAY TO PROCEED, BUT GOLDBERG LATER TOLD ME THAT HE SAW LITTLE PROSPECT OF THE RUSSIANS AGREEING TO THE FRENCH PROPOSAL SINCE THE U A R AND SYRIA WERE SAID TO BE AGAINST THEM.

4...IT MUST IN ANY EVENT BE RECOGNISED THAT IF WE GET ENGAGED IN FOUR-POWER CONSULTATIONS THEY MAY TAKE QUITE A LONG TIME. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE WE THINK THAT THEY MIGHT LAST FOR A WEEK OR MORE, AND CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL MIGHT ALSO BE PROTRACTED AS THERE WOULD INEVITABLY BE CONTACTS WITH THE TWO PARTIES AS WELL.

5...IT MUST ALSO BE REMEMBERED THAT WE COULD NOT EXPECT THAT CONSULTATIONS WOULD LEAD TO A RESOLUTION WHOLLY ACCEPTABLE TO EITHER SIDE, AND THE RESOLUTION WHICH EMERGED FROM THE CONSULTATIONS WOULD

/HAVE TO

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U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1106 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

2.

HAVE TO COVER MANY ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION (AND COULD NOT BE LIMITED TO THE QUESTION OF FREE PASSAGE TO AQABA). THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT ON HIS VISIT TO CAIRO WILL, NO DOUBT, LIKE HIS EARLIER REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, COVER A WIDE FIELD AND THE EVENTUAL RESOLUTION WILL DO THE SAME.

6...I MENTION IN PASSING THAT SEYDOUX THIS MORNING SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT WE MIGHT IN THE END GET U A R ACCEPTANCE OF FREE PASSAGE TO AQABA BUT IF WE DID HE THOUGHT WE WOULD GET IT BY NEGOTIATION RATHER THAN A RESOLUTION.

7...WE NOW HEAR THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT MAY BE AVAILABLE AT 11 A M TOMORROW MORNING (SATURDAY). THERE MAY BE A MOVE FOR SOME CONSULTATIONS BEFORE WE GO BACK INTO THE COUNCIL. GOLDBERG TELLS ME THAT HE HEARS THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET IS TO MEET ON SUNDAY AND THAT NASSER IS TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON SUNDAY TOO (YRTEL 5441 TO WASHINGTON REFERS). IT IS FOR CONSIDERATION WHETHER WE SHOULD AGREE WITH OUR FRIENDS TO CALL THE COUNCIL VERY SOON AFTER THE REPORT IS AVAILABLE. A PREMATURE MEETING MIGHT LEAD THE U A R AND THE ISRAELIS TO TAKE UP POSITIONS WHICH WOULD MAKE NEGOTIATIONS MORE DIFFICULT. BUT THERE MAY BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN THE COUNCIL ACTUALLY BEING IN SESSION AS A MORE EFFECTIVE RESTRAINT ON THE ISRAELIS THAN PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS, (THOUGH WE SHALL NO DOUBT ADJOURN FOR CONSULTATIONS FROM TIME TO TIME).

8...IN MY CONVERSATION WITH SEYDOUX THIS MORNING WE WERE BOTH VERY WELL AWARE OF THE MAIN DILEMMA. THE ISRAELIS MAY NOT BE PREPARED TO WAIT, WHEREAS THE PROCESSES OF THE COUNCIL ARE LONG AND CUMBERSOME. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT IN SPITE OF THE UNCERTAINTIES AND DELAYS WE SHOULD EXHAUST ALL EFFORTS TO FIND A TOLERABLE CONCLUSION IN THE COUNCIL. I HOPE HOWEVER TO HAVE FURTHER TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS, CANADIANS DANES AND OTHERS TOMORROW AND I WILL THEN MAKE A FURTHER RECOMMENDATION ON THE ACTION TO BE TAKEN HERE.

F O PASS PARIS 75, MOSCOW 70, COPENHAGEN 17, TEL AVIV 84, CAIRO 59 AND DAMASCUS 79.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0104/27 MAY

RECD 0137/27 MAY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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(date) 17-3-99

(Signed) J. R. Green

Mr Pattinson's Office
26/5

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

The Prime Minister saw the Attorney General this morning at 10.30 a.m. This was primarily about a very confidential matter (which I am recording in manuscript) but after it was concluded the Attorney General raised the legal position about freedom of passage of the Straits of Tiran.

The Attorney General reminded the Prime Minister of the decision of the International Court on the case of the Corfu Channel. Although we secured damages against Albania for the injury caused to the ship, the Court decided that by sending the Navy through the Corfu Channel by itself to clear the way for ships we had acted in breach of international law. The position was that we were not entitled to use force to protect our right of free passage; but we were entitled to use force to exercise our right of free passage. This meant in practice that we should be acting in conformity with international law if we escorted a merchant ship through the Straits of Tiran but we would be in breach of international law if we sent a naval ship through by itself. The Prime Minister asked the Attorney General to minute the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary expressing this opinion. At an ad hoc meeting which assembled at 12.45, attended by the Secretary of State for Defence, the Minister of State, Foreign Office (Mr. Mulley),

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Mr. Jeremy Thorpe, Leader of the Liberal Party, called at his own request to see the Prime Minister at No. 10 Downing Street at 2.45 p.m. on Thursday, May 25, 1967.

The Prime Minister gave Mr. Thorpe, in confidence and as between Privy Counsellors, an account of the situation in the Middle East.

At the end of the Prime Minister's exposition, Mr. Thorpe was assured that were there any significant worsening in the situation, Parliament could and would be recalled to debate the issues. Mr. Thorpe said that in any case he thought there ought to be a debate next week. It was agreed that Mr. Thorpe should be at liberty to make these two points publicly but should not of course reveal any other detail of his discussion with the Prime Minister.

Copies to: Foreign Office
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L. President's Office
Chief Whip's Office.

26/5.

May 26, 1967

SECRET

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE BAHRAIN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 356 26 May, 1967

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 356 of 26 May. Repeated for information to: BHC Aden, C.in C. Middle East Command, Tehran, Kuwait and Saving to: Bahrain Agency

Coastal Minesweepers in Gulf.

Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, has received instructions from Ministry of Defence to sail four minesweepers forthwith to Aden to standby for possible operation in Straits of Tiran. He is pointing out that ships have just been committed to exercise KHARGEX with Iranian Navy: and that whatever reason for withdrawal is given to Iranian Navy, true explanation will be guessed at once and leakage followed by full publicity could be expected. As instructions were secret such publicity would presumably be unwelcome in any case.

2. On political grounds, I am also very concerned at proposed move of minesweepers from Gulf. Unless and until there is United Nations decision in favour of international action to keep Straits open, United Kingdom minesweeping, or report that we are preparing for this as a result of withdrawal from KHARGEX, is liable to cause heavy Arab propaganda attack on us with accusation that we are supporting Israel. Use of minesweepers drawn from base in Arab country. Bahrain, would be liable to draw latter into current confrontation which has not as yet touched Southern Gulf deeply. So far Ruler of Bahrain has confined himself to routine message to Arab League in support of U.A.R., but use of Gulf minesweepers is almost certain to oblige him to take public stand against our action. Result would probably be, in short term, anti-British demonstrations and encouragement of sabotage action against our forces by subversive organizations: in longer term there would be damage to present full cooperation between us and Government of Bahrain and probable difficulties over use of military facilities in island. As you are aware, throughout discussions of military redeployment following decision to withdraw from South Arabia, clear aim has been to keep units in Gulf for operations in Gulf alone, and exclude idea that we were building up a new strategic base. This is the Ruler's understanding of our position and demonstration that we were departing from it would shake his confidence in us. I would hope that we would only do this where we had clear United Nations backing, and accordingly I hope that until this is secured, we should look elsewhere for minesweepers and should not (repeat not) make precautionary moves of those in this area.

Foreign Office pass Immediate BHC Aden, Tehran and M.O.D. as my telegrams PERSONAL 17, 15 and Unnumbered.

Sir S. Crawford

Sent 2005Z 26 May
Recd. 2158Z 26 May

[Repeated as requested. Sent to D.C.C.]

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D.I.S. M.O.D.

SECRET

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[illegible] North Caucasus: Some Possible Considerations

During the weekend the Foreign Office will be organising the preparation of a paper for Ministers on the whole range of political and defence policies for dealing with the Middle East crisis. The following pre-grums do not deal at all with the tactical situation described in telegrams and discussed so far, but only set out certain very serious basic problems which concern us.

Balance of Power

2. The events of the last ten days have as of today drastically altered the balance of power in the Middle East. The Soviet Union has now acquired a position of major influence for which it has been working for some time and this influence has been acquired at the expense of the United States, ourselves and Israel and of some of the Arab States.

Conduct of International Affairs

3. This change in balance of power has been achieved by rapid arming of the U.A.R. and Syria by the use of violent and mendacious propaganda and the action has taken a form which has resulted in throwing out the United Nations Emergency (Peace-keeping) Force and the re-closing of the Gulf of Aqaba which has been open to shipping for 10 years. Whatever may be one's political judgement on the change in balance of power, it has been achieved by methods which cut at the roots of acceptable international behaviour. The lessons of the past indicate that the use of such methods

encourages/

encourages their further use.

Relations with Israel and the Arabs

4. Any steps taken by countries wishing to amend the present situation will be represented by the mass propaganda as "pro-Israeli" and "anti-Arab". This propaganda is likely in turn to be relayed reproduced in our own media of publicity. We shall have to consider very carefully the effect on our relations with, and interests in, Arab countries of anything we may decide to do and how we decide to do it.

Israel Interests

5. As if the above were not already difficult enough, there is the consideration that the Israelis can be forgiven for arguing that our exhortations to them to behave "moderately" are in fact an invitation to them to do nothing and in the end to accept defeat and extinction. It is quite arguable that it is in the real interests of the Israelis, if they are to survive, to draw the logical conclusion that their only hope of survival is to break out and take on the Arabs, with some chance of success, even though with less prospect than in 1956.

Though

Method of Operation for Britain

6. Clearly in this situation it will be necessary for any British operation to be as international as possible and, in so far as is possible (which may not be very far) to be within a U.N. framework. In general it will be desirable that action to be taken outside the U.N. should be taken only when the U.N. has failed, though the timetable might at any moment make this restriction impossible to realise.

United/

United States

5. Of less immediate import but also needing ultimate consideration is the loss of standing of the U.N. in this whole episode. This does not mean that we shall wish to repudiate the U.N., but we shall want to consider whether the failure of the U.N. is a critical reason why to free this problem efforts our willingness to accept constant harassment on matters dear, particularly those on which we have a good conscience. (The views and intentions of the Secretary-General will be relevant in this connection.)

6. It is not claimed that the above is the least destructive but it is hoped that the items set out may lead to a comprehensive discussion.

(P.M. Gore-Booth)
23 Nov. 1967.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET IN THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW, AT 11 a.m. ON 20 MAY, 1967.

British

The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.

H.E. Sir Geoffrey Harrison

Mr. D.A. Greenhill

Mr. C.M. MacLehose

Miss Shapiro

Mr. N.V. Podgorny

Mr. A.A. Gromyko

Mr. B.P. Ponomarev

Mr. M.I. Stepanovsky (and Interpreter)

After courtesies Mr. Podgorny asked how Mr. Brown's talks had gone. Mr. Brown said that he was very content with them. He was particularly impressed with the way in which Anglo-Soviet exchanges were now conducted in such a frank and open manner. As long as they continued like this, things would be all right. He was very satisfied with the way the talks had gone.

2. Mr. Podgorny then made a brief speech of general welcome and expressed great pleasure at what he had heard of the progress made in the talks. He apologised for the short time available for him to accept Mr. Brown's invitation that the pressure on his programme was not always so heavy on at that time, and he hoped that next time Mr. Brown visited Moscow they would be able to have a discussion at greater leisure. He had been advised about the substance of the talks Mr. Brown had had with Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Gromyko; all the subjects were of great interest to the Soviet Union as well as to the

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the United Kingdom and even though agreement had not necessarily been reached on all points, he thought it must be a matter for gratification that views could have been exchanged so freely.

3. Mr. Brown agreed. He expressed thanks for the facilities given to him at both the House of Friendship and the House of Journalists for a free exchange of views. He said how important he believed this sort of thing to be. For instance, Mr. Kosygin's visit had had an enormous effect in the United Kingdom not only because of his personality but because he had freely expressed the right ~~we considered he had~~ to speak his mind while he was there. ~~He thought that~~ the free exchange of opinions was having a beneficial effect upon relations between the two countries.

MIDDLE EAST

4. Mr. Brown then turned to the Middle East and referred to the French proposal for a four power consultation. Since he had spoken to Mr. Gromyko both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Governments had received official approaches from the French. He had received a telegram from Mr. Wilson setting out to emphasise to the Soviet leaders the importance which H.M. Government attached to this proposal and to the need for the four powers to consult together so that everything possible should be done to keep tension down and avoid a flare-up in the Middle East.

5. Mr. Podgorny said that he knew about the French four power proposal but that his Government had only received an official communication from the French on the 19th

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evening. He was therefore not in position to make comprehensive comments. He could only say that the West Indians appeared to lack enthusiasm for the proposal and that clearly the four powers could only act after taking into account the views of the governments concerned. The Arabs appeared to believe that such a meeting would be unlikely to be useful. However, the Soviet Government had not yet had an opportunity to discuss the French proposal and he said that they would certainly give it the most careful consideration. Nevertheless he would like to say that in any case the Soviet Government was paying the closest attention to events in the Middle East and was certainly interested in seeing that there was no escalation, and that the problems that existed there were settled without resort to military action.

6. Mr. Brown agreed with what Mr. Podgorny had said. He saw no point in discussing the merits of the case; the essential was to avoid a conflagration. Certainly we had to take account of Arab views. There was not unanimity ~~on any point~~ amongst the Arabs but nevertheless their views should be considered. But at the end of the day the major powers had to consider their responsibility. They could not avoid involvement both because of their interests in the area and because in the nature of things a conflagration anywhere affected them. He therefore hoped that the Soviet Government would carefully consider the French proposal and any action that could

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be taken either inside or outside the United Nations. He stressed the dangers of delay with the attendant possibility of one or the other parties taking the law into their own hands.

7. Mr. Podgorny agreed on the need for early discussions and prompt conclusions of these matters. The Soviet reaction to the situation had been vigorous and quick and had be a set out in the Soviet statement. It was true that the Arab viewpoint was not unanimous but the overwhelming majority were united. The Soviet Government would give the most serious consideration to the proposals that the French Government had made to the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., but whatever role the great powers might play it was a fact that they had to take into account the views of the countries concerned, including those of the Arabs. Unless they did, any conclusions they reached would be of no effect. The Soviet Government considered its basic task to ensure that a new war did not break out in that part of the world. The war in South East Asia was quite bad enough, and they would do everything possible to avoid a three-way clearance.

VIETNAM

8. Mr. Brown said that it was excellent to hear Mr. Podgorny speak like this. As the Vietnam war had shown, it was easier to get into a war than end it.

9. Mr. Podgorny agreed and said that war was always like that, but in the case of Vietnam it was necessary to find ways and means of ending it.

10. Mr. Brown pointed out that he had made all sorts of suggestions and was only too anxious to help. His position was that a

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

military solution was both undesirable and impossible and that some ways should be found of starting talks. If the Soviet Government had any proposals we would be interested to hear them at any time.

11. Mr. Podgorny recalled that he thought there was a way. What was necessary was that the United States should end unconditionally the bombing of North Vietnam. That would create a new peaceable atmosphere in which to start negotiations. He thought that it was in Mr. Brown's power to bring this about.

12. Mr. Brown said that it really was not so simple as that. It was necessary first to have some knowledge of what would happen if the bombing stopped. It was true that the Americans had their own problems, but he did not think that he himself could recommend simply that one side should stop the bombing. He referred to the proposals made during Mr. Kosygin's visit and said that these proposals still stood. If we could be assured that something significant would happen, such as the stopping of infiltration, then certainly the Americans would follow with stopping their build-up and so on. If only we could know that Hanoi would make some definite response we really would be in business. But no one nobody had been able to tell him what really would happen if the bombing stopped.

13. Mr. Podgorny pointed out that the North Vietnamese have said that the United States must stop the bombing unconditionally. This would generate conditions leading to talks.

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He emphasized that this was what the North Vietnamese had said.

14. Mr. Brown said that he appreciated that so long as there was no evidence of that position, it was difficult to see how it would bring the conflict to an end. He promised to continue to urge a positive approach on those he could influence and urged Mr. Podgorny to do the same on those that he could influence.

15. Mr. Polyanov said that he was aware of the detailed discussions which Mr. Brown had had with Mr. Gromyko about Vietnam and of the discussions which Mr. Wilson had had in London.

16. He said that he was very pleased to have met Mr. Brown and to have had their discussion with him. He was glad that he had come to the Soviet Union and he was particularly pleased that his discussions had been so free and open on both international and bilateral problems.

17. Mr. Podgorny concluded with a warm reference to Mr. Wilson, whom he had met and spoken with, and asked Mr. Brown to convey his greetings. He also asked Mr. Brown that his greetings should be conveyed to Her Majesty The Queen and in her person to the entire British community. Mr. Brown made a suitable response and thanked Mr. Podgorny for the kindness and consideration he had received from Mr. Gromyko and his officials. He expressed a hope that, as he had described as "active peaceful cooperation" between the two countries would continue.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CABINET OFFICE,

WHITEHALL,

S.W.1

With the
Deputy
Secretary's Compliments

A. M. Palliser, Esq., CMG

26th May, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

British Shipping in the neighbourhood of the Gulf of Aqaba

At the meeting this morning, it was stated that we were considerably embarrassed in dealing with the present situation by lack of precise information about British shipping which might be approaching the Gulf of Aqaba and might therefore give rise to an "international incident". It was suggested that we should seek to remedy this by broadcasting a message to British shipping in the area asking them to report their movements to the Admiralty. I have now been able to discuss this with those concerned at the Board of Trade. They tell me that arrangements have already been made with all the shipping firms which might conceivably have any ships in this area, for the movements of those ships to be reported direct to the Operations Room in the Navy Department in the Ministry of Defence. The Board of Trade say that, while they cannot be certain that this arrangement will make certain of covering every British ship that may be in the area, it is, at the most, only one or two "stray tramps" which may not be covered. There is, in fact, no means of covering them since it is quite likely that they would disregard any general broadcast instructions even if it were in fact practicable to carry out such an operation and the Board of Trade take the view that the arrangements they have made give the best possible coverage.

I suspect that the difficulties which have arisen hitherto have been because this arrangement had not had time to come fully into effect and, in the circumstances, it seems to me that the action already taken by the Board of Trade meets fully what Ministers had in mind.

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Palliser, at No. 10 and to Pat Nairne in Mr. Healey's Private Office.

T. Rogers

Sir Denis Allen, KCMG.

ACTION COPY 20/1100 Guests 1870

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Oil plus Arab/Israel

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE KUWAIT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 197 27 May, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 197 of 27 May
Repeated for information to: Bahrain, Washington, Baghdad
and Saving to:- U.K.Mis New York.

My telegram No. 192.

Palestine.

Foreign Minister summoned me this morning. He said the National Assembly had charged him to inform Western Envoys that the Kuwait Government would take steps against the interests of any Power which committed hostile acts against the Arabs. The Kuwait Government would in fact occupy the oilfields and installations to prevent sabotage and would stop the flow of oil "until the matter was settled".

2. I said we were not in the habit of committing aggression: All we sought was the preservation of peace in the Middle East. The Minister replied that he too was for peace, but if hostilities should break out, any intervention in defence of Israel would constitute aggression against the Arabs.

3. The Minister then spoke of The Gulf of Aqaba as Arab Waters. I said we could not accept this: Tiran was an International Strait and we must assert the right of innocent passage for our shipping - those who disputed such passage would be the aggressors. The Minister was at first reluctant to say whether the forcible assertion of that right of passage would constitute "aggression" in the Arab view. (He hoped this matter could be settled in the United Nations but admitted that the Arabs would not accept a United Nations decision against them). He finally decided however that an enforced passage would amount to a hostile act within the meaning of his communication.

4. The Minister ended by informing me officially that Kuwaiti Forces would soon be joining their Arab brothers at the front. I said that whilst this was a matter for the Kuwait Government, I felt bound to deplore their decision, for the despatch of reinforcements must raise the tension. The Minister replied with a smile that he did not suppose the Israelis would be frightened by the small forces Kuwait could send against them.

/5. The

5. The Minister's tone was solemn but not unfriendly. He probably does not realise that the stoppage of oil would very soon involve the stoppage of the Associated gas on which Kuwait's electricity and water supplies depend.

6. The Minister spoke in similar terms, though much less explicitly, to my United States colleague, who interpreted the démarche as the minimum that the Kuwait Government could do, given their public support for the U.A.R.

Foreign Office please pass U.K.Mis New York as my telegram Saving No. 1 and to Washington as my telegram No. 10.

Mr. Arthur Sent 1315 27 May, 1967
Reca 1553Z 27 May, 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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CYPHER/CAT.A

IMMEDIATE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO OTTAWA

TELNO. 1572 27 MAY 1967

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO OTTAWA TELEGRAM NUMBER 1572 OF 27 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NOTES OF THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND MR. PEARSON AT LUNCH ON MAY 25.

1. QUOTE AT LUNCHEON AT HARRINGTON LAKE THE PRIME MINISTER REFERRED TO THE VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION IN THE MIDEAST.

2. QUOTE THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED WHETHER UNITED STATES VISITORS HAD LEARNED ANYTHING PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT FROM THEIR SOURCES DURING THE MORNING. ROSTOW SAID THEY HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT RELIEVED TO LEARN THAT TWO LIBERIAN TANKERS (ONE OF WHICH WAS THE LEON) WHICH SEEMED LIKELY MOMENTARILY TO APPROACH GULF OF AQABA WERE NOW NOT EXPECTED TO REACH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN BEFORE MAY 27, ACCORDING TO INFORMATION FROM LLOYDS.

3. QUOTE THE PRIME MINISTER REFERRED TO DISCUSSIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE REALIZED THAT THE CANADIAN RESOLUTION HAD NOT BEEN AS STRONG AS SOME, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, MIGHT HAVE WISHED BUT IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HAPPENED TO THAT RESOLUTION HE WAS JUST AS GLAD THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN MORE AMBITIOUS. HE EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT SOME WAY MIGHT BE FOUND FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

SECRET

NATIONS TO PREVENT A CONFLICT. IN THIS CONNECTION HE WONDERED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A ROLE FOR A MODIFIED UNTSO AND PERHAPS FOR SOME KIND OF UNITED NATIONS TYPE NAVAL PATROL IN THE STRAITS. HE REFERRED ALSO TO SUGGESTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE FOR SOME SORT OF FOUR-POWER DISCUSSIONS.

4. QUOTE THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF ANY FOUR-POWER MEETING. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS A WAY OF GETTING THE SUBJECT OUT OF THE UNITED NATIONS. HE OBVIOUSLY FAVOURED EXHAUSTING THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE WAS ATTEMPTED.

5. QUOTE THE PRIME MINISTER WONDERED IF A FOUR-POWER DISCUSSION MIGHT NOT BE RECONCILED WITH UNITED NATIONS RESPONSIBILITIES BY HAVING THAT DISCUSSION TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FRAMEWORK.

6. QUOTE THE PRESIDENT SAID HE MIGHT BE RATHER SUSPICIOUS BUT HE WAS NOT INCLINED TO RELY VERY MUCH ON RUSSIANS IN THIS SITUATION. HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT THE THREE GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD SUBSCRIBED TO TRIPARTITE DECLARATION SHOULD STAND BY IT.

7. QUOTE THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER REVERTED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A LARGER ROLE FOR UNTSO WHICH IT WAS THOUGHT MIGHT FIGURE IN U THANT'S PROPOSALS. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT FOR IT TO BE EFFECTIVE UNTSO WOULD HAVE TO OBSERVE ALONG THE WHOLE BORDER AND PRESUMABLY ALSO ON THE POINT OF LAND OPPOSITE THE STRAIT OF TIRAN. IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT IT WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE TO BE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER AND THERE WERE SOME INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF ISRAELIS ACCEPTING UNTSO ON THEIR SIDE

/OF

OF THE BOUNDARY. IT WAS NOTED THAT AT BEST UNTSO WOULD BE ONLY AN OBSERVER GROUP WITH NO FORCE AT ITS DISPOSAL AND THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO OPERATE WITH FAIRLY SMALL NUMBERS. THE PRIME MINISTER REMARKED THAT IF THERE WAS ANY CHANCE OF UNTSO BEING ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS IT WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO REDUCE OF REMOVE PROMINENT UNITED STATES ELEMENT. HE THOUGHT THE CANADIAN ELEMENT MIGHT ALSO BE SUSPECT.

8. QUOTE A REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THE SUGGESTION THAT MARITIME POWERS MIGHT MAKE A STRONG DECLARATION ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF INNOCENT PASSAGE AND MIGHT CONSIDER SOME ARRANGEMENT FOR SUPPORTING SUCH RIGHTS. IT APPEARED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT TOO FAMILIAR WITH DETAILS AND HE DID NOT SEEM TO LIKE WHAT HE HAD HEARD OF THE PROPOSAL.

9. QUOTE THE MINISTER INQUIRED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES HAD CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF REFERRING AQABA SITUATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT FOR AN ADVISORY OPINION. ROSTOW SAID THAT THIS POSSIBILITY HAD BEEN GONE INTO VERY THOROUGHLY AND THAT THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES WERE AGAINST SUCH A REFERENCE, PARTICULARLY WITH THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE COURT. THE MINISTER WONDERED WHETHER THE CORFU PRECEDENT WOULD NOT LEAD THE COURT TO REACH THE RIGHT OPINION. A REFERENCE TO THE COURT MIGHT SERVE AS A FACE-SAVER AND PROVIDE SOME TIME. THE UNITED STATES SIDE STILL DID NOT SEEM TO BE FAVOURABLE TO THE IDEA.

10. QUOTE AT THIS POINT WHILE THE REST LEFT THE ROOM THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER REMAIND FOR A PRIVATE CONVERSATION.

/11.

11. QUOTE AT A LATER STAGE WHEN THE DISCUSSION ON MIDEAST WAS RESUMED IN THE FRONT ROOM, THE PRIME MINISTER REEMPHASIZED HIS UNHAPPINESS AT ANY ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION BY A DEVICE WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE THE RUSSIANS. HE THOUGHT THEY SHOULD BE BROUGHT ALONG SOMEHOW. THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO SUGGESTED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE TO INVOLVE THE FRENCH AND FOR THIS REASON HE WONDERED WHETHER A PROPOSAL FROM DE GAULLE FOR A FOUR-POWER MEETING SHOULD BE REJECTED, ESPECIALLY IF SOME MEANS COULD BE FOUND OF BRINGING IT WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT APPEAR TO COMMIT HIMSELF REGARDING THE IDEA. IT WAS NOTED BY SOMEONE THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE CHINESE MIGHT MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO BASE ANYTHING ON THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT THIS APPEARED TO BE REGARDED AS A THEORETICAL PROBLEM WHICH COULD BE OVERCOME.

12. QUOTE THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT IF THERE WAS ANY WAY THAT OCCURRED TO HIM IN WHICH CANADA COULD PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE PART HE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR FROM HIM. UNQUOTE.

13. THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION HAVE ASKED FOR THE FOLLOWING AMENDMENT TO BE MADE. THE FOURTH SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 3 SHOULD NOW READ AS FOLLOWS:-
QUOTE. IN THIS CONNECTION HE WONDERED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A ROLE FOR A MODIFIED UNTSO AND PERHAPS, THOUGH THIS DID NOT SEEM VERY PRACTICAL AT THE MOMENT, FOR SOME KIND OF UNITED NATIONS TYPE NAVAL PATROL IN THE STRAITS. UNQUOTE.

CROSEC SENT 0115Z/28 MAY 1967

P R I S E C (C.O. AND F.O.)

SCSSS SECRET

31

Mr Palliser

S E C R E T COPY NO 14

CYPHER/CAT. A AND BY BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO BONN

TELNO. 1597 27 MAY 1967

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO BONN TELEGRAM NO 1597 OF 27 MAY AND TO THE HAGUE BRUSSELS ROME LUXEMBOURG REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKDEL NATO.
MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.
YOU SHOULD TAKE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN OUR CURRENT MOVES IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS TO THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. IN THE VIEW OF H.M.G. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST POSES AN IMMEDIATE THREAT OF AN ARAB/ISRAEL WAR WHICH MIGHT SPEEDILY DEVELOP WIDER REPERCUSSIONS. THE MOST DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN PRESIDENT NASSER'S DECLARED INTENTION TO CLOSE THE STRAITS OF TIRAN TO ISRAELI SHIPPING AND TO SHIPS CARRYING STRATEGIC MATERIALS (WHICH WE UNDERSTAND TO INCLUDE OIL) TO EILAT. THE ISRAELIS HAVE SAID THAT THEY REGARD FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS AS A VITAL ISRAELI INTEREST AND THAT ANY OBSTRUCTION OF THIS WOULD BE A CASUS BELLI. IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY WILL TAKE PRE-EMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION UNLESS THEY HAVE WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE ADEQUATE ASSURANCES OF EFFECTIVE ACTION TO KEEP THE STRAITS OF TIRAN OPEN.
2. IN THIS VERY THREATENING SITUATION WE SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO KEEP THE STRAITS OPEN. WE REGARD THE UNITED NATIONS AS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR ORGANISING SUCH ACTION AND WE HAVE BEEN AND WE STILL ARE, EXPLORING EVERY POSSIBILITY OF ORGANISING EFFECTIVE ACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS FORUM. HOWEVER, AS SPEED IS OF THE ESSENCE IN THIS SITUATION, AND AS UNITED NATIONS PROCESSES INEVITABLY TAKE SOME TIME, WE HAVE BEEN CONSULTING WITH MARITIME POWERS ABOUT THE STEPS THAT WOULD NEED TO BE TAKEN TO UPHOLD FREEDOM OF PASSAGE. MR THOMSON'S RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON WAS A PART OF THIS ROUND OF DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATION. AT THE SAME TIME H.M.G. HAVE WARMLY WELCOMED PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S INITIATIVE IN CALLING FOR FOUR POWER DISCUSSIONS AS A MEANS OF BRINGING THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL. WE HAD HOPED THAT MR MULLEY WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GO TO PARIS TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION AND IN PARTICULAR THESE FRENCH PROPOSALS: WE SUGGESED THIS TO THE FRENCH BUT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE TIME WAS NOT RIGHT FOR THIS.

/NEVERTHELESS

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FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1597 TO BONN

NEVERTHELESS THE FRENCH ROLE WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT IN ANY INTERNATIONAL ACTION WHICH MAY BE DECIDED ON, AND WE HAVE BEEN VERY CAREFUL TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THEM.

3. WE HAVE TO FACE THE POSSIBILITY THAT DIPLOMATIC ACTION MAY NOT IN ITSELF BE ENOUGH TO ACHIEVE THE SPEEDY ASSURANCE OF FREEDOM OF PASSAGE WHICH IS IMPERATIVE IF ISRAEL DIRECT ACTION AND ALL THE DANGERS WHICH WOULD FLOW FROM IT ARE TO BE AVOIDED. THE ESSENTIAL POINT IN THIS IS THAT IF PHYSICAL ACTION TO SAFEGUARD SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WERE TO BECOME NECESSARY IT WOULD HAVE TO BE IN ITSELF INTERNATONAL AND HAVE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE MEASURE OF INTERNATIONAL BACKING. AGAINST THE RISKS THAT WOULD BE INVOLVED IN PHYSICAL ACTION MUST BE WEIGHED THE RISKS OF DOING NOTHING AND ALLOWING AN ARAB/ISRAEL WAR TO BREAK OUT APPEAR TO US TO BE EVEN GREATER.

4. IN THIS SITUATION WE SHALL CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND WE WILL CONSULT WITH THEM ABOUT FURTHER STEPS TO BE TAKEN.

SOSFA SENT 0926Z/28 MAY 1967

PRISEC (F.O.)

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CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

FLASH AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 460 27 May, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 460 of 27 May.
Repeated for information to: Tel Aviv, Washington, U.K.Mission New York

Your telegram No. 789: Aqaba Interference with Shipping.

The German Embassy here have just told us that a German ship arrived in Aqaba at 1500 hours 26 May. The captain has reported that:

(a) There is no control at the Straits of Tiran;

(b) He saw no Egyptians ships there;

(c) He saw no evidence of mining.

2. My telegram No. 450 to you. WELSH CITY left Aqaba on the evening of 26 May.

3. We are unfortunately unable to spare anyone from our depleted staff to stay in Aqaba but we are arranging for frequent visits and are in touch with official and unofficial sources at Aqaba who are reporting daily to us.

Foreign Office pass Flash to Tel Aviv 53, Washington 61, U.K.Mission New York 22.

Mr. Adams

Sent 0840Z 27 May
Recd. 0929Z 27 May

[Repeated as requested]

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CYPHER/CAT.A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

TELNO. 607 27 MAY 1967 (V)

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELNO. 607 OF 27 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON MOSCOW AND PARIS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 372.

I REALISE THAT YOU HAVE ALREADY DONE YOUR UTMOST TO IMPRESS ON THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT IN THE PRESENT CRISIS. I NOTE YOUR VIEW THAT IT WILL BE NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CREATE FURTHER DELAYING CIRCUMSTANCES IF THE ISRAELIS FIND THE ASSURANCES WHICH MR. EBAN HAS BOUGHT BACK WITH HIM INADEQUATE. NEVERTHELESS, IN VIEW OF THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR'S WARNING THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET MEETING TOMORROW (OR EVEN TONIGHT) WILL BE CRUCIAL (MY TELEGRAM NO. 5441 TO WASHINGTON) I WISH YOU TO MAKE ONE FURTHER URGENT APPROACH TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT URGING THEM TO MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT POLICY OF RESTRAINT WHILE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS CONTINUE TO FIND A SOLUTION.

SOSFA SENT 1505Z/27 MAY 1967

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SECRET

CYPHER/CAT.A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

TELNO. 608 27 MAY 1967 (V)

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 608 OF 27 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW AND PARIS.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

I AM VERY GRATEFUL FOR ESTIMATE IN YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 372 OF THE ISRAELIS MOOD AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE. I NOTE YOUR VIEW THAT IF MR. EBAN CANNOT BRING BACK SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA, IT IS ALMOST INEVITABLE THAT THE ARGUMENT WILL PREVAIL THAT ISRAEL MUST ACT NOW OR NEVER, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MORE DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF THE QUOTE HAWKS UNQUOTE AND THE QUOTE DOVES UNQUOTE AND OF THE TUG BETWEEN THEM IN THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP. PLEASE LET ME HAVE YOUR REPLY BY THIS EVENING.

SOSFA SENT 1517Z/27 MAY 1967

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S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO 1503 27 MAY, 1967

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO PARIS TELNO. 1503 OF 27 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND MOSCOW AND SAVING TO CAIRO TEL AVIV DAMASCUS AMMAN AND UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO. 503: MIDDLE EAST.

THE FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRS, MONSIEUR ANDRE CALLED ON THE MINISTER OF STATE THIS MORNING TO ENQUIRE ABOUT HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON. MR. THOMSON EXPLAINED THIS VISIT IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS. IN THE VIEW OF H.M. GOVERNMENT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST POSED AN IMMEDIATE THREAT OF WAR WHICH MIGHT ESCALATE. THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO PREVENT WAR BREAKING OUT. THERE WERE RISKS IN ANY COURSE BUT WE MUST CALCULATE WHERE THE LEAST DANGER LAY. THE IMMEDIATE THREAT AROSE FROM THE CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF TIRAN BY THE U.A.R. THE ISRAELIS HAD SAID THAT THIS WAS AN ACT OF WAR AGAINST THEM AND THAT THEY WOULD REGARD IT AS A CASUS BELLI.

2. H.M.G. CONSIDERED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO PREVENT PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION BY ISRAEL WAS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO KEEP THE STRAITS OPEN. THIS WAS THE THINKING BEHIND THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH, REAFFIRMING OUR 1957 DECLARATION ON FREEDOM OF PASSAGE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE WERE EXCHANGING VIEWS WITH OTHER MARITIME COUNTRIES AND EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES OF JOINT ACTION WITH THEM. THE VISIT TO WASHINGTON WAS A PART OF THIS MULTI-LATERAL DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. WE HAD ALSO SUGGESTED THAT MR. MULLEY SHOULD GO TO PARIS AND WE HAD APPROACHED A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

3. MR. THOMSON MENTIONED THAT AFTER HE HAD LEFT FOR WASHINGTON PRESIDENT DE GAULLE HAD PROPOSED A FOUR POWER INITIATIVE TO DEAL WITH THE TENSE SITUATION. WE WELCOMED THIS BUT FEEL THERE WAS THE GREATEST NEED FOR SPEED IN FINDING OUT IF IT WAS A STARTER. WE WOULD BE GLAD TO HEAR FROM M. ANDRE NEWS OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THIS PROPOSAL AND IN PARTICULAR ON THE SOVIET UNION REACTION TO IT.

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4. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT EVERY POSSIBLE LINE OF ACTION THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD BE FULLY EXPLORED. HOWEVER, WE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT DIPLOMATIC ACTION WOULD FAIL TO PRODUCE AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF KEEPING THE STRAITS OPEN: HENCE SOME CONTINGENCY PLANNING WAS NECESSARY. THE ESSENTIAL POINT WAS THAT ANY MILITARY ACTION WOULD HAVE TO BE IN ITSELF INTERNATIONAL AND BACKED BY THE WIDEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL GROUPING. IN THIS CONTEXT WE SHOULD LIKE TO TALK TO THE FRENCH DISCREETLY ABOUT POSSIBILITIES: IN PARTICULAR WE HAD IN MIND THAT THERE WERE FRENCH NAVAL UNITS IN DJIBOUTI. IN ANY CASE THE FRENCH ROLE IN ANY OPERATION WOULD BE IMPORTANT.

5. IN THIS SITUATION TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE. THE ISRAELIS HAD TOLD US THAT THEY WERE HAVING A CABINET MEETING ON SUNDAY AT WHICH VERY CRUCIAL DECISIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN. IT WAS CLEAR THAT ISRAEL WAS UNLIKELY TO BE RESTRAINED UNLESS THEY CONSIDERED THAT THERE WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ACTION ON THE STRAITS.

6. M. ANDRE SAID THAT THERE WAS NO DEFINITE RESPONSE FROM MOSCOW TO THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR FOUR POWER TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. HOWEVER THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED AN INDICATION FROM THEIR AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO THAT PRESIDENT NASSER WELCOMED THE POSSIBILITY OF FOUR POWER DISCUSSION. IT WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR FOUR POWER DISCUSSION PROPOSAL THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN DOUBTFUL ABOUT MR. MULLEY'S VISITING PARIS AT PRESENT. THEY WERE ANXIOUS NOT TO PREJUDICE THE CHANCES OF THEIR INITIATIVE BY BEING SEEN TO ENGAGE IN BI-LATERAL TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AT THE SAME TIME. M. ANDRE WENT ON TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF ANY MILITARY ACTION. HE CONSIDERED THAT IT WAS BOUND TO LEAD THOSE PARTICIPATING IN IT TO A COLLISION COURSE FIRSTLY WITH THE U.A.R. AND SECONDLY PROBABLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE ENQUIRED WHETHER THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD OBTAINED ANY HARD NEWS ABOUT THE SOVIET POSITION WHILE HE WAS IN MOSCOW.

/7.

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1503 TO PARIS

7. MR. THOMSON TOLD M. ANDRE THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AT LENGTH WITH MR. KOSYGIN, MR. PODGORNY AND MR. GROMYKO. HE HAD FORMED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF ESCALATION AND THAT THEY WERE CONCERNED TO PREVENT THE SITUATION GETTING OUT OF CONTROL. ON THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE FOUR POWER TALKS THEY WERE NO DOUBT WAITING FOR THE REACTION OF THE ARAB CAPITALS. MR. THOMSON SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THAT INTERNATIONAL ACTION WOULD DETER THE U.A.R. PROVIDED THAT THEY HAD NO ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE OF SOVIET MILITARY BACKING. IT WAS NOTEWORTHY THAT IN THEIR STATEMENTS ABOUT THE SITUATION THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN VERY CAREFUL IN THEIR REFERENCES TO THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE LAW OF THE SEA ETC., WHICH SUGGESTED THAT THEY WERE ANXIOUS NOT TO ENCOURAGE THE EGYPTIANS BEYOND CERTAIN LIMITS.

8. M. ANDRE MENTIONED THAT PRESIDENT DE GAULLE HAD URGED MR. EBAN THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO ATTACK AS IN THAT EVENT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT COULD NOT EXPECT GREAT POWER SUPPORT.

9. YOU MAY ALSO SPEAK TO THE QUAI D'ORSAY ABOUT MR. THOMSON'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, BEING GUIDED BY PARAGRAPHS 1 - 6 ABOVE.

SOSFA SENT 1735Z 27 MAY, 1967

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FLASH PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TEL NO. 513 27 MAY 67
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FO TEL NO. 513 OF 27 MAY REPTD FOR INFMN IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TEL NO. 1498: MIDDLE EAST.

I HAVE SEEN ALPHAND WHO GAVE ME FOLLOWING ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS:-
(A) NO.
(B) NOTHING SPECIAL. THEY THINK IT SIGNIFICANT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT SAID NO, AND THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE REFLECTING.
(C) NO, UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN A REPLY FROM MOSCOW. THEY STILL DO NOT FAVOUR A MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE ONE IS RECEIVED.

2. ON YOUR (D) APLPHAND SAID WITH SOME EMBARRASSMENT THAT HE COULD ONLY GIVE ME HIS PERSONAL OPINION. HE DID NOT THINK IT WAS FOR FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO DISSUADE H.M.G. FROM TAKING ANY ACTION WHICH THEY THOUGHT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO GET FOUR POWER DISCUSSIONS GOING. HE COULD NOT HELP WONDERING HOWEVER WHETHER THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO, IF THE FRENCH COULD NOT IN SPITE OF THEIR REASONABLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

3. ALPHAND SUMMED UP THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AS FOLLOWS. THE FIRST PRIORITY IS TO PERSUADE BOTH SIDES NOT TO TAKE ANY UNREMEDIABLE ACTION. THE FRENCH WERE USING ALL THEIR INFLUENCE BOTH WITH ISRAEL AND ARABS TO THIS END. AFTER THE EXPLANATIONS WHICH THEY HAVE GIVEN OF THEIR FOUR POWER PROPOSAL THEY BELIEVED THAT THE EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT OPPOSE IT. THE NEXT THING WAS TO GET FOUR POWER DISCUSSIONS GOING, PREFERABLY IN THE U.N., BUT IF NOT, ELSEWHERE. THE FRENCH THOUGHT THAT THESE MIGHT RESULT IN SOME KIND OF NEGOTIATED UNDERLINE NEXT TWO WORDS MODUS VIVENDI WHICH

/WOULD

WOULD HAVE TO BE A COMPROMISE. THEY HAD AS YET NO PRECISE IDEAS ABOUT IT, BUT WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF ARRANGEMENTS TO ALLOW THE PASSAGE TO EILAT OF CARGOES OTHER THAN ARMAMENTS. CLEARLY THE QUESTION WHETHER OIL WOULD OR WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED WOULD BE CRUCIAL. ALPHAND ADDED HOWEVER, THAT HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT EILAT WAS REALLY SO VITAL TO ISRAEL OR THAT IF TRAFFIC WAS INTERUPTED FOR 15 DAYS OR SO UNTIL SOME ARRANGEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT, CONSEQUENCES FOR ISRAEL WOULD BE REALLY SERIOUS.

4. BURIN DES ROZIERS HAD EARLIER TODAY SPOKEN TO ME ON MUCH SAME LINES, EMPHASING EXTREME COMPLICATION OF LEGAL POSITION. BEAUMARCHAIS SPOKE VERY SIMILARLY IN CONVERSATION WITH HEAD OF CHANCERY AT LUNCH TODAY.

5. FROM THESE CONVERSATIONS IT IS CLEAR (I) THAT THE FRENCH SEE NO VIRTUE IN ANY U.N. ACTION AT THE PRESENT TIME WHICH IS BOUND TO ATTRACT A SOVIET VETO. THEY ARE EXPLICITLY NOT IN FAVOUR OF AN ATTEMPT TO PASS A RESOLUTION ENDORSING RIGHTS OF FREE PASSAGE. IF SUCH AN ATTEMPT WERE MADE I FEAR THEY WOULD ABSTAIN. (II) FOR SIMILAR REASONS THE FRENCH WILL NOT FAVOUR ANY DECLARATION BY THE MARITIME POWERS OUTSIDE THE U.N. (BEAUMARCHAIS HAD ALREADY HEARD OF THIS PROPOSAL AND TOOK INITIATIVE IN INDICATING THAT FRENCH WOULD NOT WISH TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH SUCH A MOVE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.)
(III) IN ORDER TO SECURE THE VARIOUS OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN MY TEL NO. 492, FRENCH SEE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO CONCENTRATE ON THEIR PROPOSAL FOR FOUR POWER CONSULTATIONS: THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES ANY FURTHER AT THIS STAGE NOR TO CONSIDER CONTINGENCY PLANS IN THE EVENT OF A NEGATIVE SOVIET RESPONSE.

FO PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON 175 UKMIS NEW YORK 35 AND MOSCOW 29.

SIR P REILLY

SENT 1817Z 27 MAY

RECD 1817Z 27 MAY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
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FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO. 1498 27 MAY 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO PARIS TELEGRAM NUMBER 1498 OF 27 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEWYORK MOSCOW.
MIDDLE EAST.
IT IS ESSENTIAL TO OBTAIN IMMEDIATE CLARIFICATION OF THE POSITION OVER THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR CONCERTING 4 POWER CONSULTATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. PLEASE OBTAIN ANSWERS, AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:
(A) HAS A REPLY BEEN RECEIVED FROM MOSCOW?
(B) IF NOT WHAT ARE THEY DOING TO STIMULATE ONE OR OTHERWISE TO GET THE CONSULTATIONS STARTED ?
(C) SPECIFICALLY WILL THEY USE THE OPPORTUNITY OF TODAYS MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TRY TO INITIATE 4 POWER CONSULTATION IN NEW YORK?
(D) IF THE ANSWERS TO (B) AND (C) ARE NEGATIVE WOULD THEY SEE OBJECTION TO OUR ACTING ?
2. IN VIEW OF THE CRUCIAL NATURE OF THE MEETING OF THE ISRAELI CABINET ON SUNDAY EVENING WE MUST KNOW WHERE THE FRENCH STAND ON THEIR PROPOSAL IMMEDIATELY. PLEASE LET ME HAVE A REPLY BY 6 P.M. LONDON TIME THIS EVENING.

3. TELEGRAM FOLLOWS ON INTERVIEW MR THOMSON HAD WITH FRENCH MINISTER THIS MORNING.

SOSFA SENT 1408Z/27 MAY 1967

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Telegraphed to Cheques 28/5

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat.A

FLASH TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 389 27 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 389 of 27 May. Repeated for information to Washington, UKMIs.New York, Moscow and Paris.

Your telegram No. 608.

Israeli Ministers' meeting in Tel Aviv have been in almost continuous session all day. Nothing has leaked out of their deliberations, but indications are that position is very finely balanced and that Eban, who is expected within the hour, will need all his eloquence to persuade his colleagues to accept further delay.

2. Eban himself must be counted amongst the "doves" along with Eshkol. Allon is undoubtedly leader of "hawks" supported by Sharef, Burg and probably Sapir. It is rumoured that Ben Gurion has been brought into inner councils to offer his advice which almost certainly would be in favour of action now.

3. We believe Army leaders are applying intense pressure on government to take action and are underlining danger of Egyptians getting in first blow (cf. paragraph 4 of Washington telegram No. 599). My American colleague has told me that in lengthy interview this morning with Levavi, Director-General of Foreign Ministry, latter (whose influence up to now has been strongly in favour of diplomatic rather than military solution) appeared genuinely concerned, on basis of Israeli intelligence assessment, that Egyptians intended to make pre-emptive strike against Israeli airfields. This assessment, if accepted by Cabinet, could be decisive factor.

Foreign Office pass Washington 72, UKMis.New York 65, Moscow 13 and Paris 20.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 2004Z/27 May 1967
Recd. 2103Z/27 May 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 390 27 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 390 of 27 May, Repeated for information to Washington, UKMIS New York, Paris and Moscow.

My telegram No. 389, paragraph 3.

I have just been to Beersheba to check on Army feeling. Conclusions are:-

(1) They are no longer interested in Party politics or "Hawks" and "doves" - they want leadership.

(2) As result of activities of Dayan (my telegram No. 384 paragraph (d)) his stock, even amongst those who hitherto heartily dislike him has soared. He has been careful not to play a Rafi versus Government game and has thereby emerged as a "national" Army candidate for leadership.

(3) Even if Eshkol orders Army attack, he must have Dayan in War Cabinet.

(4) If ordered not to fight, Army will certainly obey but only Dayan could provide leadership that would hold country together after the let-down.

(5) Army expect no help from America or Britain in the fight. Only question asked is "How long will we have for the job before your pressure to stop becomes intolerably effective".

(6) Army quite disinterested in Tiran issue 'per se'. It is the alteration of general 'status quo' and probability of slow decline of Israel and all effective power in Middle East area if Nasser is not discredited that worries them. I was even lectured on British interests in Aden and the Persian Gulf, though it was made clear that Israel would not be fighting for these but for her own survival.

(7) They are fully aware that by delay they have thrown away most cards in their hand, but there is little if any resentment against the West - it is all against Eshkol and Eban.

(8) They are still confident they can win, but consider that the air battle must now be fought with entirely military requirements in mind, i.e. theremust not be much dispersion of effort to stop Egyptian bombing of civilian concentrations. They do not trust Eshkol to face up to this.

/(9) There

(9) There has been another Egyptian air incursion - one Mig at 'low' level over Beersheba today. Perhaps this and the one reported in my telegram No. 384(B) help account for Israeli appreciation in Washington telegram No. 1804, paragraph 4.

(10) Unless something noteworthy occurs I shall not send usual morning Sitrep tomorrow.

Foreign Office pass Washington 73, UKMIS New York 66, Paris 21 and Moscow 14.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 0050Z 28 May
Recd 0400Z 28 May

[Repeated as requested]

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SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH WASHINGTON

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO.1804

27 MAY 1967

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.1804 OF 27 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS MOSCOW TEL AVIV.
ATTENTION FIRST THING 27 MAY.
YOUR TEL 5441.

I HAVE JUST SEEN EUGENE ROSTOW. HE SAID THAT EBAN TALKED TO HIM AND RUSK ON THE EVENING OF 25 MAY, TO MACNAMARA AT 10.30 A.M. ON 26 MAY AND THE PRESIDENT AT 7.30 P.M. THE SAME DAY. EBAN THEN LEFT FOR NEW YORK WHERE HE WAS TO SEE GOLDBERG AT 11.45 P.M.. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE DELAY IN SEEING THE PRESIDENT WAS DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE DRAMA: RUSK HAS NOW GONE TO DES MOINES AND THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO BE OUT OF WASHINGTON FOR PART OF THE WEEKEND.

2. ACCORDING TO ROSTOW, THE PRESIDENT GAVE EBAN THE FOLLOWING QUOTE SCENARIO UNQUOTE. FIRST U.N. PROCEDURES MUST BE FULLY EXHAUSTED THOUGH BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT IT WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THIS WOULD LEAD TO ANYTHING USEFUL. SECONDLY AND AT THE SAME TIME A DECLARATION SHOULD BE GOT OUT, SIGNED BY AS MANY MARITIME POWERS AS POSSIBLE. THIRDLY THE FORMATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL NAVAL PRESENCE SHOULD BE VIGOROUSLY PURSUED ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS. THE PRESIDENT HAS INSISTED THAT THIS MUST ENSURE THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN FOR ALL STATES SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING ISRAEL: HE WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH ANY HALF-WAY SCHEMES.

3. ROSTOW SAID THAT THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH EBAN HAD RESULTED IN AS CONCRETE A COMMITMENT AS WAS POSSIBLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, GIVEN THE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES, PROBLEMS OF TIMING AND THE NEED TO MAKE THE PLAN AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE PLAN WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY CONVINCING TO DETER

/ ISRAEL.

SECRET

ISRAEL. THE PRESIDENT AND HE HAD EMPHASISED OVER AND OVER AGAIN THE GRAVE IMPRUDENCE OF THE ISRAELIS STRIKING THE FIRST BLOW. ONE ISSUE WHICH HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED WAS WHETHER THE ACTUAL CLOSING OF THE STRAITS AS OPPOSED TO ANNOUNCING THE CLOSURE WAS SUCH A HOSTILE ACT AS TO JUSTIFY ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. THE U.S. HAD TAKEN NO DEFINITIVE POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. THE WHOLE PURPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT ACT ALONE AND SHOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO STRIKE.

4. THE ISRAELIS CAME BACK REPEATEDLY TO THE IDEA THAT THERE WAS A THREAT OF U.A.R. ATTACK. THREE SEPARATE U.S. INTELLIGENCE GROUPS HAD REVIEWED THE POSITION ON 26 MAY AND WERE CONVINCED THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE IN A DEFENSIVE POSTURE. THERE SEEMED NO REASON WHY NASSER SHOULD RISK HIS PRESENT POLITICAL GAINS BY TAKING THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE. HOWEVER IN THE LIGHT OF ISRAELI CONCERN, THE U.S. HAD TOLD THE U.A.R. THAT THEY HAD HEARD THESE RUMOURS, AND HOPED THAT THEY WERE NOT TRUE, SINCE THEY COULD HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. IN THIS CONNEXION ROSTOW SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS ESTIMATED THERE WERE 800 U.A.R. TANKS IN SINAI AGAINST THE U.S. ESTIMATE OF 600, AND 70,000 TROOPS AGAINST U.S. ESTIMATES OF 50,000. ROSTOW SAID HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR OUR VIEWS ON THIS.

5. ROSTOW SAID THAT SOMEWHAT TO U.S. SURPRISE, EBAN HAD COME TO WASHINGTON TO CHECK ON U.S. INTENTIONS AND PROMISES, RATHER THAN TO THREATEN AN IMMEDIATE ISRAELI STRIKE. ROSTOW DESCRIBED EBAN AS SOBER AND SERIOUS BUT NOT AGITATED. ON 25 MAY EBAN HAD SAID THAT THE U.S. PROPOSALS COULD BE A STARTER, IF THE PRESIDENT'S ASSURANCES WERE SUFFICIENT. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD IN FACT SPOKEN WITH GREAT EARNESTNESS AND SHOULD HAVE SATISFIED EBAN BUT IT WAS STILL IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S OBVIOUS AND POSITIVE DETERMINATION AND COMMITMENT AND HIS ASSURANCES (SUBJECT, ROSTOW SAID, TO THE USUAL QUALIFICATIONS) WOULD BE ENOUGH TO DETER THE ISRAELIS. THE PRESIDENT HAD URGED EBAN TO MAKE EVERY SORT OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO MAKE THE PROPOSED PLAN A SUCCESS. EBAN THOUGH APPARENTLY SYMPATHETIC DID NOT COMMIT HIMSELF, ALTHOUGH AT ONE POINT HE HAD ASKED THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE NAVAL FORCE SINCE THEY WERE SO CLOSELY INVOLVED.

/6.

6. ON OTHER POINTS ROSTOW SAID:

(A) THAT ON THE PROPOSAL TO MAKE A TEST CASE OF THE LIBERIAN TANKER THE PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN NO DECISION. DEAN RUSK WANTED TO THINK OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S ADVICE AND MEANWHILE NOTHING WOULD BE DONE TO PUT THIS INTO EFFECT UNTIL WE HAD AGREED ON A COMMON POLICY.

(B) THE PRESIDENT CAME BACK FROM CANADA THINKING HE HAD A PROMISE OF SHIPS FOR A NAVAL FORCE FROM MR. PEARSON.

(C) THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN VERY GUARDED IN THEIR STATEMENTS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA.

7. SUMMING UP ROSTOW SAID THAT U.S. POLICY WAS TO GO FULL STEAM AHEAD WITH THE PROPOSALS DISCUSSED DURING MR. THOMSON'S VISIT. IN PARTICULAR WORK ON THE PROPOSED DECLARATION SHOULD PROCEED URGENTLY AND CONCURRENTLY WITH ACTION IN THE U.N. WE SHOULD EXPLORE TOGETHER WAYS AND MEANS OF GETTING AS MANY NATIONS AS POSSIBLE TO SIGN THE DECLARATION. IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO WEAKEN THE WORDING A LITTLE IN ORDER TO ATTRACT SIGNATORIES. ONLY A FEW COUNTRIES WOULD BE NEEDED FOR A FORCE BUT AS MANY AS POSSIBLE SHOULD SIGN THE DECLARATION. ROSTOW ALSO WANTED THE CONTINGENCY MILITARY PLANNING TO PROCEED AND PROMISED TO LET ME KNOW TOMORROW WHETHER THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE ADMIRAL BARTOSIK HERE OR WOULD FIRST LIKE TO SEND AN AMERICAN OFFICER TO LONDON.

8. ROSTOW ALSO ASKED ME ABOUT THE MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHAT I MAY TELL HIM ABOUT THIS AND ABOUT YOUR THINKING GENERALLY.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TO PARIS 140 MOSCOW 109 TEL AVIV 19.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT ø626Z/27
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CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1805 27 MAY 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1805 OF 27 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK.
CONFIRMING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION AMBASSADOR/MORRIS.

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

GENE ROSTOW HAS JUST TOLD ME THAT THE US HAVE JUST RECEIVED AN URGENT WRITTEN MESSAGE FROM THE RUSSIANS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, SAYING THAT ACCORDING TO RUSSIAN INFORMATION THE ISRAELIS ARE PREPARING TO STRIKE AND THAT, AGAIN ACCORDING TO RUSSIAN INFORMATION, THE EGYPTIANS HAVE NO INTENTION OF STRIKING. THE RUSSIANS APPEAL TO THE US TO USE ALL THEIR INFLUENCE TO PREVENT AN ISRAELI STRIKE. THE RUSSIANS SAY THAT THEY WILL USE THEIR GOOD OFFICES ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE.

2. ROSTOW SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE US HAD GIVEN THE ISRAELIS THE FIRMEST KIND OF SUPPORT PERMITTED BY THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION TO ASSURE ISRAEL THAT THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY, AND VITAL INTERESTS OF ISRAEL WOULD BE PROTECTED THE AMERICANS CONSIDER ISRAEL WOULD BE RECKLESSLY FOOLISH TO STRIKE. THE PRESIDENT HAD TOLD EBAN YESTERDAY TWO OR THREE TIMES THAT ISRAEL ''WILL NOT BE ALONE UNLESS YOU GO ALONE''.

3. ROSTOW SAID THAT DEAN RUSK WAS DRAFTING A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO ESHKOL TO SAY THAT AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF U.S. AURANCES AND ASSURANCES OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS, AN ISRAELI STRIKE WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE AND SUICIDAL.

4. EMPHASISING THAT THERE WAS NO TIME TO LOSE AND SPEAKING WITH GREAT EARNESTNESS ROSTOW ASKED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD SEND A PARALLEL MESSAGE TO ESHKOL.

5. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, ROSTOW SAID THAT THE US HAD NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM WHAT THE RUSSIANS WERE SAYING ABOUT AN ISRAELI STRIKE, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE STILL THOUGHT IT WAS VITAL TO SEND A MESSAGE TO THE ISRAELIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. FOREIGN OFFICE REPEAT FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

SIR P DEAN

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EN CLAIR
FLASH U K MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1110 DATED 27 MAY 1967
UNCLASSIFIED
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.1110 OF 27 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS,
OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS AND AMMAN.
MIDDLE EAST.
THE REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HIS VISIT TO CAIRO HAS JUST APPEARED. THE FIRST PART IS A JUSTIFICATION OF HIS ACTION IN WITHDRAWING UNEF. THE SECOND PART DEALING WITH HIS DISCUSSIONS IN CAIRO AND PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE READS AS FOLLOWS:
9. DURING MY STAY IN CAIRO I HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER AND MR. MAHMOUD RIAD, THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THEY EXPLAINED TO ME THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, WHICH IS SUBSTANTIALLY AS SET FORTH IN THE SPEECH GIVEN BY PRESIDENT NASSER TO THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AIR FORCE ADVANCE COMMAND ON 22 MAY 1967 WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED FULLY IN THE PRESS. PRESIDENT NASSER AND FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD ASSURED ME THAT THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC WOULD NOT INITIATE OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL. THEIR GENERAL AIM, AS STATED TO ME, WAS FOR A RETURN TO THE CONDITIONS PREVAILING PRIOR TO 1956 AND TO FULL OBSERVANCE BY BOTH PARTIES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.
10. THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC TO RESTRICT SHIPPING IN THE STRAIT OF TIRAN, OF WHICH I LEARNED WHILE EN ROUTE TO CAIRO, HAS CREATED A NEW SITUATION. FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAIT IS ONE OF THE QUESTIONS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL CONSIDERS MOST VITAL TO HER INTERESTS. THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IS THAT THE STRAIT IS TERRITORIAL WATERS IN WHICH IT HAS A RIGHT TO CONTROL SHIPPING. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL CONTESTS THIS POSITION AND ASSERTS THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH THE
/ STRAIT.

STRAIT. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS FURTHER DECLARED THAT ISRAEL WILL REGARD THE CLOSING OF THE STRAIT OF TIRAN TO ISRAEL FLAGSHIPS AND ANY RESTRICTION ON CARGOES OF SHIPS OF OTHER FLAGS PROCEEDING TO ISRAEL AS A CASUS BELLI. WHILE IN CAIRO I CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH COULD ENSUE FROM RESTRICTING INNOCENT PASSAGE OF SHIPS IN THE STRAIT OF TIRAN, I EXPRESSED MY DEEP CONCERN IN THIS REGARD AND MY HOPE THAT NO PRECIPITATE ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN.

11. A LEGAL CONTROVERSY EXISTED PRIOR TO 1956 AS TO THE EXTENT OF THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE BY COMMERCIAL VESSELS THROUGH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN AND THE GULF OF AQABA. SINCE MARCH 1957, WHEN UNEF FORCES WERE STATIONED AT SHARM EL SHEIKH AND RAS NASRANI AT THE MOUTH OF THE GULF OF AQABA, THERE HAS BEEN NO INTERFERENCE WITH SHIPPING IN THE STRAIT OF TIRAN.

12. IT IS NOT MY PURPOSE HERE TO GO INTO THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THIS CONTROVERSY OR TO ENTER INTO THE MERITS OF THE CASE. AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE I FEEL THAT MY MAJOR CONCERN MUST BE TO TRY TO GAIN TIME IN ORDER TO LAY THE BASIS FOR A DETENTE. THE IMPORTANT IMMEDIATE FACT IS THAT, IN VIEW OF THE CONFLICTING STANDS TAKEN BY THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND ISRAEL, THE SITUATION IN THE STRAIT OF TIRAN REPRESENTS A VERY SERIOUS POTENTIAL THREAT TO PEACE. I GREATLY FEAR THAT A CLASH BETWEEN THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND ISRAEL OVER THIS ISSUE, IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WILL INEVITABLY SET OFF A GENERAL CONFLICT IN THE NEAR EAST.

13. THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN IS NOT, HOWEVER, THE ONLY IMMEDIATE ISSUE WHICH IS ENDANGERING PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST. OTHER PROBLEMS, SUCH AS SABOTAGE AND TERRITORIST ACTIVITIES AND RIGHTS OF CULTIVATION IN DISPUTED AREAS IN THE DEMILITARISED ZONE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, WILL, UNLESS CONTROLLED, ALMOST SURELY LEAD TO FURTHER SERIOUS FIGHTING.

/ 14.

14. IN MY VIEW, A PEACEFUL OUTCOME TO THE PRESENT CRISIS WILL DEPEND UPON A BREATHING SPELL WHICH WILL ALLOW TENSION TO SUBSIDE FROM ITS PRESENT EXPLOSIVE LEVEL. I THEREFORE URGE ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO EXERCISE SPECIAL RESTRAINT, TO FOREGO BELLIGERENCE AND TO AVOID ALL OTHER ACTIONS WHICH COULD INCREASE TENSION, TO ALLOW THE COUNCIL TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT CRISIS AND TO SEEK SOLUTIONS.
15. THERE ARE OTHER POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE REDUCTION OF TENSION IN THE AREA. IN PARAGRAPH 16 OF MY REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 19 MAY (S/7896) I REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE EGYPT-ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION (EIMAC) PROVIDING A LIMITED FORM OF UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN THE AREA. IN THAT REPORT I STATED THAT ''IT WOULD MOST CERTAINLY BE HELPFUL IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WERE TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION AND RESUME ITS PARTICIPATION IN EIMAC''. I SUGGEST THAT THE COUNCIL CONSIDER THIS POSSIBLE APPROACH ALSO DURING ITS SEARCH FOR WAYS OUT OF THE PRESENT CRISIS. THIS FORM OF UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE COULD TO SOME EXTENT FILL THE VACUUM LEFT BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF.
16. IN PARAGRAPH 17 OF MY PREVIOUS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL I ALSO SUGGESTED THAT '' IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF QUIET ALONG THE ISRAEL-SYRIA LINE IF THE TWO PARTIES WOULD RESUME THEIR PARTICIPATION IN ISMAC, BOTH IN THE CURRENT EMERGENCY SESSION AND IN THE REGULAR SESSIONS'', AND I WOULD WISH ON THIS OCCASION TO REPEAT THAT SUGGESTION.
17. IT ALSO WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE COUNCIL TO RECALL THAT, BY ITS RESOLUTION 73 (1949) OF 11 AUGUST 1949, THE COUNCIL FOUND THAT:

''...THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT PEACE IN PALESTINE...''.

AND REAFFIRMED:

''...THE ORDER CONTAINED IN ITS RESOLUTION 54 (1948) TO THE GOVERNMENTS AND AUTHORITIES CONCERNED, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 40 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, TO OBSERVE AN UNCONDITIONAL

CEASE-FIRE AND BEARING IN MIND THAT THE SEVERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS INCLUDE FIRM PLEDGES AGAINST FURTHER ACTS OF HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND ALSO PROVIDE FOR THEIR SUPERVISION BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES, RELIES UPON THE PARTIES TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED APPLICATION AND OBSERVANCE OF THESE AGREEMENTS...''.

18. IN MY DISCUSSION WITH OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND ISRAEL I HAVE MENTIONED POSSIBLE STEPS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN BY MUTUAL CONSENT AND WHICH WOULD HELP TO REDUCE TENSION. I SHALL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO MAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CRISIS. THE PROBLEMS TO BE FACED ARE COMPLEX AND THE OBSTACLES ARE FORMIDABLE. I DO NOT BELIEVE HOWEVER THAT WE CAN ALLOW OURSELVES TO DESPAIR.

19. IT SHOULD BE KEPT ALWAYS IN MIND THAT IN SPITE OF THE EXTREME DIFFICULTIES OF THE SITUATION, THE UNITED NATIONS HAS PLAYED AN ESSENTIAL AND IMPORTANT ROLE FOR MORE THAN EIGHTEEN YEARS IN MAINTAINING AT LEAST SOME MEASURE OF PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST. IN THAT TASK IT HAS ENCOUNTERED MANY SETBACKS, FRUSTRATIONS, CRISES, CONFLICTS AND EVEN WAR, BUT THE EFFORT CONTINUES UNABATED. WE ARE NOW CONFRONTED WITH NEW AND THREATENING CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT I STILL BELIEVE THAT WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN PARTICULAR, MUST CONTINUE TO SEEK, AND EVENTUALLY TO FIND, REASONABLE, PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTIONS.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 73, PARIS 78, COPENHAGEN 19, TEL AVIV 35, DAMASCUS 80 AND AMMAN 74:
LORD CARADON

SENT 1524Z 27 MAY
RECD 1526Z 27 MAY

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IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 1112 27 MAY 1967
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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1112 OF 27 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS OTTAWA COPENHAGEN TEL AVIV DAMASCUS AND AMMAN.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1117 : MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING ARE THE FIRST EIGHT PARAGRAPHS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT.

1. IN MY REPORT OF 19 MAY 1967 (S/7896), WHICH I SUBMITTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOLLOWING THE RECEIPT ON 18 MAY 1967 OF THE OFFICIAL REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF), I DESCRIBED THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST AT PRESENT AS QUOTE MORE DISTURBING, INDEED.... MORE MENACING, THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE FALL OF 1956 UNQUOTE. I CAN ONLY REITERATE THIS ASSESSMENT.

2. IT HAS BEEN ALLEGED IN SOME QUARTERS THAT THE PROMPT COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUEST FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCE IS A PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE NEAR EAST. THIS IGNORES THE FACT THAT THE UNDERLYING BASIS FOR THIS AND OTHER CRISIS SITUATIONS IN THE NEAR EAST IS THE CONTINUING ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT WHICH HAS BEEN PRESENT ALL ALONG, AND OF WHICH THE CRISIS SITUATION CREATED BY THE UNEXPECTED REQUEST FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF IS THE LATEST EXPRESSION. IN MY SPECIAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (A/6669), IN PARAGRAPH 12, I GAVE THE MAIN REASONS FOR THE POSITION THAT I HAVE TAKEN ON THIS ISSUE. IN MY REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 19 MAY 1967 (S/7896), I RESTATED THE BASIS FOR MY DECISION AND POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS A QUOTE WIDESPREAD MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE NATURE OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN GENERAL AND UNEF IN PARTICULAR UNQUOTE. IN VIEW OF THE EVIDENT PERSISTENCE OF THIS MISUNDERSTANDING AND OF VARIOUS

/RECENT

RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY SOME RESPONSIBLE LEADERS, I FEEL OBLIGED ONCE AGAIN, BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH MY REPORT, TO RESTATE BRIEFLY THE GROUNDS FOR THE POSITION WHICH I HAVE TAKEN ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF.

3. UNEF WAS INTRODUCED INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC ON THE BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PRESIDENT OF EGYPT. THE CONSENT OF THE HOST COUNTRY, IN THIS AS IN OTHER PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, WAS THE BASIS FOR ITS PRESENCE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC. WHEN THAT CONSENT WAS WITHDRAWN, THE ESSENTIAL PART OF THE BASIS OF UNEF'S PRESENCE CEASED TO EXIST.

4. AS STATED IN MY SPECIAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (A/6669), I CONSULTED WITH THE UNEF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 18 MAY 1967. THE COMMITTEE DID NOT MOVE, AS IT WAS ITS RIGHT TO DO UNDER THE TERMS OF PARAGRAPH 9 OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1001 (ES-I), TO REQUEST THE CONVENING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE SITUATION WHICH HAD ARISEN. IT WAS AFTER THIS MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ON THE EVENING OF 18 MAY, THAT I TRANSMITTED MY REPLY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC CONCERNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF.

5. MY DECISION IN THIS MATTER WAS BASED UPON BOTH LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. IT IS A PRACTICAL FACT THAT NEITHER UNEF NOR ANY OTHER UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION COULD FUNCTION OR EVEN EXIST WITHOUT THE CONTINUING CONSENT AND COOPERATION OF THE HOST COUNTRY. ONCE THE CONSENT OF THE HOST COUNTRY WAS WITHDRAWN AND IT WAS NO LONGER WELCOME, ITS USEFULNESS WAS ENDED. IN FACT, THE MOVEMENT OF UAR FORCES UP TO THE LINE IN SINAI EVEN BEFORE THE REQUEST FOR WITHDRAWAL WAS RECEIVED BY ME HAD ALREADY MADE THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF UNEF IMPOSSIBLE. I MAY SAY HERE THAT THE REQUEST RECEIVED BY ME ON 18 MAY WAS THE ONLY REQUEST RECEIVED FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, SINCE THE CRYPTIC LETTER TO MAJOR-GENERAL RIKHYE FROM GENERAL FAWZI ON 16 MAY WAS BOTH UNCLEAR AND UNACCEPTABLE. FURTHERMORE, I HAD VERY GOOD REASON TO BE

/CONVINCED

CONVINCED OF THE EARNESTNESS AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IN REQUESTING THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF. IT WAS THEREFORE OBVIOUS TO ME THAT THE POSITION OF THE PERSONNEL OF UNEF WOULD SOON BECOME EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, AND EVEN DANGEROUS, IF THE DECISION FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCE WAS DELAYED, WHILE THE POSSIBILITY FOR ITS EFFECTIVE ACTION HAD ALREADY BEEN VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED. MOREOVER, IF THE REQUEST WERE NOT PROMPTLY COMPLIED WITH, THE FORCE WOULD QUICKLY DISINTEGRATE DUE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF INDIVIDUAL CONTINGENTS.

6. IT MAY BE RELEVANT TO NOTE HERE THAT UNEF FUNCTIONED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC SIDE OF THE LINE IN A ZONE FROM WHICH THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC HAD VOLUNTARILY STAYED AWAY FOR OVER TEN YEARS. IT WAS THIS ARRANGEMENT WHICH ALLOWED UNEF TO FUNCTION AS A BUFFER AND AS A RESTRAINT ON INFILTRATION. WHEN THIS ARRANGEMENT LAPSED UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC TROOPS MOVED UP TO THE LINE AS THEY HAD EVERY RIGHT TO DO.

7. IF UNEF HAD BEEN DEPLOYED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINE AS ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED IN PURSUANCE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION, ITS BUFFER FUNCTION WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE ENDED. HOWEVER, ITS PRESENCE ON THE ISRAEL SIDE OF THE LINE HAS NEVER BEEN PERMITTED. THE FACT THAT UNEF WAS NOT STATIONED ON THE ISRAEL SIDE OF THE LINE WAS A RECOGNITION OF THE UNQUESTIONED SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO WITHHOLD ITS CONSENT FOR THE STATIONING OF THE FORCE. THE ACQUIESENCE IN THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCE AFTER TEN AND A HALF YEARS ON UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC SOIL WAS LIKEWISE A RECOGNITION OF THE SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC. IN NO OFFICIAL DOCUMENT RELATING TO UNEF HAS THERE BEEN ANY SUGGESTION OF A LIMITATION OF THIS SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY.

8. IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, AND ESPECIALLY IN ORDER TO EXAMINE WITH THAT GOVERNMENT THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF, I DECIDED TO ADVANCE THE DATE OF A VISIT TO CAIRO

/WHICH

WHICH I HAD PLANNED SOME TIME AGO FOR THE BEGINNING OF JULY. I ARRIVED IN CAIRO ON THE AFTERNOON OF 23 MAY AND LEFT CAIRO ON THE EARLY AFTERNOON OF 25 MAY TO RETURN TO UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 75, PARIS 80, COPENHAGEN 20, TEL AVIV 86, DAMASCUS 81 AND AMMAN 75.

LORD CARADON

SENT 1804Z 27 MAY
RECD 1804Z 27 MAY

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TELEGRAM NO. 1114 27 MAY 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1114 OF 27 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS AND MOSCOW.

MY TEL NO. 1113 : MIDDLE EAST.

SEYDOUX (FRANCE) TELLS ME THAT HE IS NOT IN FAVOUR OF A VERY EARLY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS VERY ANXIOUS TO RECEIVE THE RUSSIAN REPLY TO THE FRENCH FOUR POWER PROPOSAL AND THEY THOUGHT A REPLY MIGHT COME SOON (HE SAID POSSIBLY TODAY OR TOMORROW). HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET GENERAL AGREEMENT ON ANY RESOLUTION UNTIL SOME LITTLE TIME HAD BEEN PROVIDED FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS AND OTHERS.

2. HE ADDED THAT OF COURSE IF THERE WERE A SUDDEN NEW EMERGENCY THE COUNCIL COULD BE CALLED AT VERY SHORT NOTICE AT ANY TIME.

3. SEYDOUX WENT ON TO TELL ME THAT HIS MISSION HAD BEEN IN TOUCH THIS MORNING WITH ONE OF U THANT'S ASSISTANTS WITH REGARD TO 'POSSIBLE STEPS' REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT. THE ASSISTANT HAD SAID THAT U THANT HAD HAD TWO POSSIBILITIES IN MIND - ONE WOULD BE THE APPOINTMENT OF A DELEGATE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO BE SENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST, THE OTHER WOULD BE TO APPOINT A SMALL COMMITTEE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO VISIT THE MIDDLE EAST. SEYDOUX'S COMMENT WAS THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO GET A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CONCERNED INCLUDING THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS. HE THOUGHT THEREFORE THAT THE SECOND PROPOSAL FOR A COMMITTEE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT BE BEST.

4. I SHALL REPORT FURTHER ON THIS WHEN WE CAN GET FURTHER INFORMATION.

5. WE HEAR THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS NOT WELL TODAY SUFFERING FROM AN INFECTED TOOTH AND IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO SEE HIM SOON.

F O PASS PARIS 82 AND MOSCOW 77
LORD CARADON

SENT 1723Z 27 MAY
RECD 1720Z 27 MAY

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EASTERN DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

File

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CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH U. K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1116 27 MAY 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1116 OF 27 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA.
UNEF

WHEN WE MET EARLY THIS AFTERNOON WITH THE DANES AND CANADIANS AND AMERICANS, IGNATIEFF (CANADA) TOLD US THAT AT 11 A.M. THIS MORNING A MESSAGE HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT FROM THE U.A.R. CALLING ON THE REMOVAL OF ALL CANADIAN UNEF TROOPS FROM EGYPTIAN SOIL WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS. THE MESSAGE WAS IN EXTREMELY OFFENSIVE TERMS AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT FACILITIES WOULD BE PROVIDED TO ENABLE THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT TO LEAVE AT ONCE FOR CYPRUS.

2. THE CANADIANS ARE OF COURSE FURIOUS ABOUT THIS. I GATHER THAT THEY HAVE SAID THAT THEY WILL NOT ACT ON SUCH A MESSAGE BUT WILL RESPOND TO A REQUEST FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THAT ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE FOR THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT TO LEAVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (WHETHER TO CYPRUS OR ELSEWHERE IS NOT YET CLEAR). THE ORIGINAL INTENTION HAD BEEN THAT THE CANADIANS WOULD BE THE LAST TO LEAVE AND THAT THEY WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE WHOLE UNEF FORCE.

3. IGNATIEFF SAID THAT IN CONSEQUENCE RELATIONS BETWEEN CANADA AND THE U.A.R. WERE EXTREMELY STRAINED. HE REPORTED THIS AT ONCE BECAUSE CANADA NOW REPRESENTS OUR INTERESTS IN CAIRO.

LORD CARADON

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RECD 2017Z 27 MAY

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 1117 27 MAY 1967
UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1117 OF 27 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV.

MIDDLE EAST.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER DELIVERED BY THE U.A.R. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON.

SIR:

UPON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST FORMALLY THE INCLUSION OF THE FOLLOWING ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

''ISRAELI AGGRESSIVE POLICY, ITS REPEATED AGGRESSION THREATENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ENDANGERING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.''

THE FOLLOWING ARE BUT FEW ILLUSTRATIONS OF CONTINUED ISRAELI AGGRESSIVE POLICY:

1. THE ISRAEL AGRESSION AGAINST OM RASHRASH (ON THE RED SEA) ON THE 1ØTH OF MARCH 1949 AND ITS ANNEXATION DESPITE THE ADOPTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON CEASE-FIRE AND OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
2. THE ISRAELI ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE OF EL OUGA AND ITS OCCUPATION BY FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THE EGYPTIAN ISRAELI ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, THE EXPULSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS, THE LOWERING OF THE UNITED NATIONS FLAG AND THE EXPULSION BY FORCE OF ITS ORIGINAL INHABITANTS, I.E., THE PALISTINIAN AZAZMA TRIBES.
3. BEN GURION'S DECLARATION THAT THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IS ''DEAD AND BURIED'' AFTER THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION IN 1956.

/ 4.

4. THE REPEATED ISRAELI ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST JORDAN AND ITS RECENT AGGRESSION ON THE VILLAGE OF EL SAMOUH.
5. THE ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM IN VIOLATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
6. THE ISRAELI AGRESSION AGAINST THE WATER PROJECTS IN SYRIA UTILIZING ISRAELI AIR FORCE.
7. THE REPEATED ISRAELI AGGRESSION ON THE DEMILITARIZED ZONES SPECIFIED IN THE SYRIAN ISRAELI GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
8. THE CONTINUED ISRAELI THREAT AND THE RECENT ISRAELI MOBILIZATION OF ITS FORCES DURING THE CURRENT MONTH OF MAY IN PREPARATION FOR THE INVASION OF SYRIA AS CONFIRMED IN THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 19 MAY 1967, DOCUMENT S/7896.

I SHALL BE GRATEFUL IF NECESSARY STEPS ARE TAKEN TO HAVE THE ABOVE ITEM CONSIDERED URGENTLY BECAUSE IT CLEARLY SHOWS THE DANGEROUS SITUATION WHICH HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY ISRAELI'S CONTINUED VIOLATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS, THUS, THREATENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV 87.
LORD CARADON

SENT 2125Z/27
RECD 2144Z/27

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Telegraphed to Chequers 28/5

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CYPHER CAT/A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 1120 27 MAY 1967
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO.1120 OF 27 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW COPENHAGEN OTTAWA AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV AMMAN DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

M.I.P.T. : SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

AT OUR RESUMED MEETING IN THE DANISH MISSION THIS AFTERNOON IT WAS FIRST OF ALL REPORTED THAT THE U.A.R. DID NOT WISH THEIR LETTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO BE INTERPRETED AS A CALL FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, THEN WE HEARD THAT SEYDOUX (FRANCE) HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT A RESOLUTION IN THE SENSE OF PARA 14 OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT (HE ALSO SAID THAT AN ATTEMPT TO GO FURTHER IN THIS HOLDING RESOLUTION WOULD GIVE IT NO CHANCE OF SUCCESS).

2. THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES, HAVING PREVIOUSLY CONSULTED, SUGGESTED THAT RATHER THAN A RESOLUTION BASED SOLELY ON PARA 14 OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT, WE SHOULD ENDEAVOUR TO PERSUADE THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS TO ACCEPT A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE REFERENCE TO ''THE DEEP CONCERN OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ABOUT THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH WOULD ENSUE FROM RESTRICTING INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND HIS HOPE THAT NO PRECIPITATE ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN IN THIS REGARD''. THE OPERATIVE SECTIONS OF THE RESOLUTION WOULD THEN READ AS FOLLOWS:

''(I) URGES ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO EXERCISE SPECIAL RESTRAINT, TO FOREGO BELIGERENCE AND TO AVOID PRECIPITATE ACTION AND ALL OTHER STEPS WHICH COULD INCREASE TENSION,

(II) DECIDES TO CONSIDER THE SITUATION FURTHER AS A MATTER OF URGENCY'

/3.

3. IT WAS NOTED THAT THERE WOULD NO DOUBT BE SOME HORSE-TRADING BEFORE A FINAL RESOLUTION EMERGED BUT IT WAS THE STRONG VIEW OF THE DANES AND THE CANADIANS, WHICH THE AMERICANS ACCEPTED, THAT THE FORMERS' APPROACH TO THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS SHOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF PARA 14 OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT ALONE. THEY FELT THAT NOTHING MORE THAN THAT COULD POSSIBLY BE ACCEPTABLE AND HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

4. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO PRESS FOR A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH INCLUDED REFERENCES TO FREE PASSAGE TO AQABA BUT THE DANES AND THE CANADIANS SAID THAT THEIR APPROACH TO THE OTHER NON-PERMENENT MEMBERS WOULD BE ON THE BASIS ONLY OF PARA 14 OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE PARIS 84 MOSCOW 79 COPENHAGEN 23
AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV 4 AMMAN 4 DAMASCUS 11 CAIRO 23.
LORD CARADON

SENT Ø15ØZ/28
RECD Ø154Z/28

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JPC

Teleprinted to Cheques 28/5

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CYPHER CAT/A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 1121 27 MAY 1967
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1121 OF 27 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW COPENHAGEN OTTAWA TEL AVIV AMMAN DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

M.I.P.T. (SAVING TO MIDDLE EAST POSTS) THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

AS FORECAST IN MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM TABOR (DENMARK) AND IGNATIEFF (CANADA) CALLED A MEETING OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS EVENING. THE UPSHOT WAS THAT (APART FROM INDIA WHICH IS A HUNDRED PER CENT WITH THE UAR) AND BULGARIA THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A HOLDING RESOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF PARA 14 OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT BUT THEY NEED TO GET INSTRUCTIONS AND DO NOT WISH TO CALL THE COUNCIL AT ONCE.

2. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL THIS EVENING THAT I WAS IN FAVOUR OF AN IMMEDIATE MEETING PREFERABLY TONIGHT BUT NOT LATER THAN TOMMORROW (SUNDAY) MORNING. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE NOTED WHAT I SAID BUT THAT NO ONE HAD YET FORMALLY REQUESTED A MEETING.

3. I CONSULTED IGNATIEFF AND TABOR AND THE U.S. MISSION. THEIR ADVICE WAS TO DELAY A DECISION ON CALLING THE COUNCIL TILL TOMORROW (SUNDAY) MORNING. IT WOULD STILL THEN BE POSSIBLE TO CALL THE COUNCIL FOR LATER IN THE DAY, BUT I FEAR THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT WE SHALL NOW GET GENERAL APPROVAL FOR A MEETING TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE MONDAY MORNING. IF WE CALLED A MEETING AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE OTHER MEMBERS WE WOULD INVITE AN ADVERSE REACTION AND A BAD RESULT. I FELT BOUND TO ACCEPT THIS ADVICE AND REPORTED TO YOU ACCORDINGLY.

/4.

4. I WELL REALISE WHAT A ROTTEN POSITION IT IS THAT THE COUNCIL WILL NOT MEET IMMEDIATELY EVEN AFTER RECEIVING THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S WARNINGS IN HIS REPORT. NEVER THE LESS WE HAVE TO REMEBER THAT WE CANNOT HOPE TO GET ANY RESULT FROM THE COUNCIL UNTIL THE PERMANENT MEMBERS AND THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS ARE READY TO ACT. FOR VARIOUS REASONS THEY ARE NOT READY YET.
5. I SHALL REPORT AGAIN AFTER CONSULTING OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TOMORROW MORNING.

F.O.PASS IMMEDIATE PARIS 85 MOSCOW 80 COPENHAGEN 24 TEL AVIV 88
PRIORITY AMMAN 76 DAMASCUS 82 AND CAIRO 60.
LORD CARADON

SENT 0215 28/5
RECD 0305 28/5

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

The Prime Minister telephoned Mr. Heath at 9.20 on the evening of Friday, May 26 and Mr. Thorpe at 9.45 on the same evening, to seek their agreement to his proposal that, unless the House were to be recalled earlier, the first day after the Recess - Wednesday, May 31 - should be devoted to a Debate on the Middle Eastern situation. Both agreed and the Prime Minister subsequently instructed Trevor to release the information to the Press.

May 27 1967

1. Tel for L.R.I.

Look in King's L.R.I. how best to
bond Col. Secy. Thro' wide declin
until Fan P- proposal. No duties
for Colonies to do subscriptions until
G.A. no good - Cuttenden & Can't be
advised.

Now see days of Israel Colonies
until decision yes - no. Appeal to
L.R.I. in stick under.... Cfe
Kingsley either Bally Town or address
our Ceremonies. Can see outlying cases
Now ask Law if G-d no good.
- Right thing & send Reilly boy.
1) How does G-d stay working now?
Invisibly? Do for Lazarus - No. in
gap - Ecclesia? For Tabernacle!
Be Tabernacle? Or G Christ is No
Jesus Christ:- Can't say as one for
person. Does G stay and the no
one Body of Colonies Church Body
Christ Why good Israel Right Church
Can Colonies - Church Christ

Cl 3 Wo. Ken?

1.1. Ich weiß woanders.

Cl3 Du 3 Wo. warst / Mexiko.

A1 Co. "Nov.: Atlantic & zu 2.

Cl3 Flog a zurückkam. Kann nicht
warten.

C2 Ich weiß. Hast du schon Ding in den
Ich weiß wenn Kollegen Colonia ist wo.
Ich will Kollegen anwesend Kollegen & fragen
ob zu viel / Ich fühle für sehr fragen ob
Kollegen und wenn wenn sie zu Ostern.
Ihren Prospekte / Colonia kommt mit in
2-P - dann Schule (und Name)
Will zu zu Ihrer Patrick in Woche?

Cl2 Ich C1 Was sagen und schon wenn-
du? Tun ich Ihnen.

Cl3 OK. Fo bis!

C1. Leben sie in contact mit Straight. Ich
ring zu ab 7.

M. P.G. DA M+MP
1256 27/5 (GT Jun 1.15.)

P. One further Mark in Tel Aviv.
(Check on Film)

PM Crowning of Diamond
Wedding anniversary celebrations
of Israeli top LAS & their country
our nearest LAS Neighbour.

P. Gt. Film Fair Chance
PM Have doubts as to exact steps?
Seem of genuine use.

Feel something to the Tune.

Cab Film & Paris. Leave to Cabinet.
PM What is Difference in Tel Aviv? Ask Hodson.
Cab Doubts not to their feasibility as
to suggested forum.
Adv. Can live on peace footing
with Egypt.
LAS; etc. Need for Final
PM. Our Attitude
Cab. Further understood as right.

- Garden also to take
- action for sale in book.

(x) Bank to book Good response.
Work working in right direction.

SECRET

NOTE OF A MEETING IN THE CABINET ROOM AT 1 P.M. ON SATURDAY, MAY 27, 1967

Present: The Prime Minister
Mr. George Thomson (from 1.15 p.m.)
Sir B. Trend
Sir P. Gore-Booth
Sir D. Allen
Mr. Halls
Mr. Palliser
Mr. Le Cheminant (for part of the time)

The Middle East Situation

There was a general discussion of the latest developments, including President Johnson's talk with the Israeli Foreign Minister the previous day and talks which Mr. Thomson had had with the Israel Ambassador and with the French Chargé d'Affaires. The meeting agreed that certain action was required, provided the Foreign Secretary concurred, and the Prime Minister then spoke on the telephone to the Foreign Secretary at Dorney Wood.

The Prime Minister said that it looked from the account of President Johnson's talk with Mr. Eban as though the President had not understood, or was disregarding the decision of the British Cabinet - which had been conveyed to Dean Rusk by Mr. Thomson -

that there should be no canvassing of opinion of a public declaration by the Maritime Powers until the outcome was known of the French Four-Power proposal. In particular there was no authority from Cabinet to bring out any declaration simultaneously with the United Nations procedures; or at least until it had been shown that the French proposal would be ineffective. There was, however, a real danger that, at its meeting the following day, the Israeli Cabinet would decide that pre-emptive action must be taken by Israel unless absolutely firm guarantees about freedom of passage through the Tiran Straits were obtained from the United States. If they appealed for this to the President, he might give the assurance without consulting Britain or assuming our concurrence in it. But there was no Cabinet authority for this. If however the Four-Power proposal had been shown to be ineffective, then the Cabinet authority could perhaps be presumed.

The Prime Minister said that he therefore considered that instructions should be sent to H.M. Ambassador in Paris to enquire urgently how the French Government saw their Four-Power proposals as likely to operate. Were they contemplating immediate action to give effect to them; should this be by the four U.N. Permanent Representatives - possibly at some convenient interlude in the Security Council proceedings; should it be a French initiative or would the French Government prefer Britain to propose this at New York; or would they prefer that the four Permanent Representatives should

initially at least discuss the matter bilaterally among themselves. The French would probably reply that they could not give a firm answer until they had a response from the Soviet Government to their proposal. But if they said this, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary would be part of the way towards resolving the problem of the Cabinet ~~arrangement~~ requirement that the French proposal should first be exhausted. He thought therefore that this should be done as rapidly as possible. Obviously, however, if there were an Israeli ultimatum the Cabinet might have to be called urgently.

The Foreign Secretary asked whether, if the Four-Power proposal failed, there was any prospect of a Tripartite action. The Prime Minister said that General de Gaulle would reject this; and the Foreign Secretary said that, given the General's attitude, Tri-Partitism would probably be the most unsatisfactory arrangement for Britain. The Prime Minister agreed but said that the General was bound to reject it. The alternative to a Four-Power position was a Two-Power position. The Foreign Secretary said he was glad that the Prime Minister was absolutely clear on this point. He thought there might be a demand for Tri-Partite action by some of their colleagues. The Prime Minister repeated that General de Gaulle would not accept it; but it was urgent to find out what the French were now proposing to do. If the Israelis went to war, the Cabinet would have to meet at once. If they sent an ultimatum to the United States (and probably to Britain)

the alternatives would be to get together as many Cabinet Ministers as possible or for him and the Foreign Secretary to take joint responsibility for accepting the failure of the Four-Power attempt and for agreeing rapidly to canvass the opinion of the Maritime Powers. The Cabinet had also been concerned that there should be no exclusively Anglo-American operation. The Foreign Secretary commented that Norway was prepared to co-operate. The Prime Minister said that there had also been a helpful statement by the Dutch.

The Foreign Secretary agreed with the Prime Minister that instructions should be sent forthwith to H.M. Ambassador in Paris on the lines described above; and that he and the Prime Minister would meet that evening at Chequers.

Earlier in the meeting, and before the Prime Minister spoke to the Foreign Secretary, it had also been agreed that H.M. Ambassador in Tel Aviv should be asked for his assessment of the current political situation there and should be instructed to make a further attempt to restrain the Israeli Government from hasty action; and that telegrams should be sent to H.M. representatives in the other five E.E.C. countries instructing them to inform the Governments of the Five of H.M.G.'s position so that they could take an appropriate line with the French at a Summit Meeting of the Six at Rome in the following week.

May 27, 1967

Copy sent to B. Trend. 28/5.

Subject

T 142/67

PRIME MINISTER'S
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF GENERAL DE GAULLE'S
REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER

SERIAL No. T142/67

Thank you for having let me know your views about the development of the Middle East situation. Our preoccupations are the same as yours, all the more so because the violent incidents that are going to take place with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba can at any moment know consequences which are evidently very serious.

Our first problem is therefore to maintain peace in the area and I think that we all agree on this. It is with this intention that the French Government desires that the Powers principally responsible should concert together more closely to show that they would disapprove of a military confrontation, thereby reducing tension.

I am happy that your Government accepted so quickly the proposal that we have made to organise at least at an early moment discussions between the Permanent Representatives of the four principal Powers at the Security Council.

In any case it is necessary that our two Governments should keep in close contact concerning this affair, which is far from being ended.

I await with pleasure our visit next month.

T142/67

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
LONDRES

Le 27 Mai 1967.

PRIME MINISTERS
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No T142/67

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

Je vous prie de bien vouloir trouver ci-après le texte d'un message qui vous est adressé par le Général de Gaulle :

" Je vous remercie de m'avoir fait part de vos vues concernant le développement de la situation au Moyen-Orient. Nos préoccupations rejoignent les vôtres, d'autant plus que les incidents violents qui menacent de se produire à propos du Golfe d'Akaba peuvent, à tout moment, entraîner des conséquences évidemment très graves.

Le premier problème qui se pose à nous est donc de maintenir la paix dans la région, et je pense que nous sommes tous d'accord à ce sujet. C'est dans cette intention que le Gouvernement français souhaite que les puissances principalement responsables se concertent entre elles pour

./...

montrer qu'elles réprouveraient un affrontement militaire et, ainsi, réduire la tension.

Je suis heureux que votre Gouvernement aît accepté aussitôt la proposition que nous avons faite d'organiser au moins dans un premier temps, des discussions entre les représentants permanents des quatre principales puissances au Conseil de Sécurité.

De toutes façons, il est nécessaire que nos deux Gouvernements gardent un étroit contact sur cette affaire qui n'est pas près d'être terminée.

J'attends avec grand plaisir votre visite le mois prochain ".

Signé: Charles de Gaulle

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, les assurances de ma plus haute considération.

Chargé d'affaires

ADVANCE COPIES

F.O.
MR. THOMSON
P.U.S.
SIR D. ALLEN
MR. BRENCHLEY
MR. GREENHILL
MR. HAYMAN
MR. ROSE
HD. OF EASTERN DEPT.
HD. OF N.E.A.D.
HD. OF D.D. & P.U.S.D.
HD. OF U.N. DEPT.
HD. OF NEWS DEPT.
~~HD. OF CONSULAR DEPT.~~
EMERGENCY UNIT
~~HD. OF PERSONNEL DEPT.~~
Hd of Mil Dept

Mr Hancock
Mr Mulley

C.O.
P.S.
P.U.S.
HD. OF M.E.W. & U.N.D.

NO. 10 DOWNING ST.
D.I.O. CABINET OFFICE
D.I.S. M.O.D.
D.O.C. M.O.D.
Sir B. Trend. Cab. Office.
S. of S. for Defence
Res Clerk.

2y Xerox.

Are we talking in confidence to Kenyatta? He might be - would rely - influence Africa UN opinion - ± with Nkrumah. Co/Fo (WH) the

CYPHER/CAT A

FROM IMMEDIATE NAIROBI
TEL NO. 1597

TO CWEALTH OFFICE
27 MAY

CONFIDENTIAL.

YOUR CIRCULAR Y 46: MIDDLE EAST.

THERE HAVE BEEN NO (NO) PUBLIC REACTIONS BY KENYA GOVERNMENT SO FAR.

2. OFFICIAL OF KENYA MY F A INDICATES THAT KENYA MINISTERS HAVE NOT (NOT) ADOPTED ANY FORMAL POSITION IN FREGARD TO THE DISPUTE BUT THEY ARE FOLLOWING EVENTS MOST ANXIOUSLY. THEY CONSIDER THAT THE PRECIPITATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE U N FORCE AND THE IMMEDIATE MOVEMENT OF EGYPTIAN FORCES UP TO FRONTIERS HAD GREATLY INCREASEDD :RI

~~ON ISRAE- -RAL HOSTILITIES A S HAD GREATLY INCREASEDD~~
RISK OF GENERAL HOSTILITIES AND THAT AVOIDANCE OF WAR NOW DEPENDS ON ISRAELI RESTRAINT IN FACE OF ARAB PROVOCATION.

3. EDITORIAL OPINION IN THE TWO LEADING ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEWS-PAPERS HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF EGYPTIAN POLICIES. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE:
(1) THERE CAN BE NO POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO ISRAEL WHOSE SOVREIGNTY WAS

LAW FOR CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO ISRAEL WHOSE SOVREIGNTY WAS UPHELD BY U N RESOLUTION IN 1948:£

(11) U A R ATTEMPT TO SEAL OFF GULF OF AKABA IS QUOTE TANTAMOUNT TO A DECLARATION OF WAR UNQUOTE:

(111) BLOCKADE OF EILAT WILL HAVE SERIOUS EFFECT ON KENYA-ISRAELI TRADE AND ISRAELI AID PROJECTS:

(1V) U A R ACTION RESULTS FROM DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES AND MILITANT DESIRE TO ESTABLISH HER LEADERSHIP OF ARAB WORLD AND IN CIRCUMSTANCES QUOTE U A R CANNOT EXPECT MORAL SUPPORT OR CONTINUED FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE UNQUOTE:

(V) DECISION BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE DEPENDS UPON THE GREAT POWERS: RUSSIA MUST EXERCISE PACIFYING INFLUENCE ON ARAB STATES AND AMERICA ON THE ISRAELIS:

(V1) PRESTIGE OF U N ITSELF IS AT STAKE AND U THANT SHOULD NEGOTIATE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF U N PRESENCE.

4. '' STANDARD'' HAS ALSO ACCUSED U A R PRESS ATTACHE OF BREACH OF PROTOCOL FOR ISSUING VITRIOLIC STATEMENT ATTACKING PRESS FOR PREJUDICED REPORTING. THE ATTACHE HAS BEEN IN TROUBLE PREVIOUSLY FOR THIS SORT OF THING AND WE UNDERSTAND KENYANS HAVE NOW ASKED FOR HIS WITHDRAWAL.

5. PRESENT SYMPATHY HERE BOTH IN OFFICIAL QUARTERS AND AMONGST PUBLIC FOR ISRAELIS WHOSE AMBASSADOR IS A SKILFUL DIPLOMAT AND A POPULAR FIGURE HERE. THIS SYMPATHY COULD EVAPORATE WERE ISRAELIS TO ABANDON PRESENT POLICY OF LIMITED RESPONSE AND INSTEAD TO LAUNCH GENERAL ATTACK AGAINST ARAB STATES.

PECK

D. 0905 27/5

R. 0945 27/5

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE NAIROBI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 1597 27 May, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Your Circular Y46: Middle East.

There have been no (no) public reactions by Kenya Government so far.

2. Official of Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that Kenya Ministers have not (not) adopted any formal position in regard to the dispute but they are following events most anxiously. They consider that the precipitate withdrawal of the United Nations force and the immediate movement of Egyptian forces up to frontiers had greatly increased risk of general hostilities and that avoidance of war now depends on Israeli restraint in face of Arab provocation.

3. Editorial opinion in the two leading English Language Newspapers has been critical of Egyptian policies. Following are main points that have been made:

(i) There can be no possible justification under International Law for continued opposition to Israel whose sovereignty was upheld by United Nations Resolution in 1948:

(ii) U.A.R. attempt to seal off Gulf of Aqaba is "tantamount to a declaration of war"

(iii) Blockade of Eilat will have serious effect on Kenya-Israeli trade and Israeli Aid projects:

(iv) U.A.R. action results from domestic difficulties and militant desire to establish her leadership of Arab world and in circumstances "U.A.R. cannot expect moral support or continued financial assistance":

(v) Decision between war and peace depends upon the Great Powers: Russia must exercise pacifying influence on Arab states and America on the Israelis:

(vi) Prestige of United Nations itself is at stake and U Thant should negotiate immediate return of United Nations presence.

/4. "Standard"

4. "Standard" has also accused U.A.R. Press Attaché of breach of Protocol for issuing vitriolic statement attacking Press for prejudiced reporting. The Attaché has been in trouble previously for this sort of thing and we understand Kenyans have now asked for his withdrawal.

5. Present sympathy here both in official quarters and amongst public for Israelis whose Ambassador is a skilful diplomat and a popular figure here. This sympathy could evaporate were Israelis to abandon present policy of limited response and instead to launch general attack against Arab states.

Sir E. Peck

Sent 0905Z 27 May
Recd 0945Z 27 May

[Copies sent to Cabinet Office for Sir B. Trend].

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M.E.W. and U.N. Dept.

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S E C R E T

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE NICOSIA TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 409 27 May 1967

S E C R E T

Addressed to Commonwealth Office tele
27 May

Repeated for information to Athens, Washir is New York and H.Q. B.F.C.

My telegrams Nos. 400 and 402: Near East Situation.

I had opportunity last night, 26 May, to discuss informally with Papadopoulos, Labour Minister, Archbishop's recent statement (my telegram No. 399). Papadopoulos said Archbishop spoke on his own initiative but had full support of Cyprus Cabinet who, Papadopoulos claimed, regarded statement as contribution to peace (sic). In fact it contained nothing which Archbishop had not said before except reference to Cyprus people as well as Government. Archbishop was, said Papadopoulos, opposed to use of bases for attack on any country even Turkey.

2. I reminded Papadopoulos that bases were Sovereign and asked if he believed that, paying as we did some £15,000,000 per annum for their upkeep, we could be expected to welcome Cyprus Government's statement. He replied that Archbishop and Cabinet fully recognised our Sovereignty, but equally believed they had right to make their point of view known. Cabinet had been influenced by two considerations:

(a) Arabs had stood by Greek Cypriots in their struggle and Nasser alone in August 1964 had provided concrete assistance albeit limited. Most Greek Cypriot public opinion supported Arabs against Israelis. When Nasser asked for help, Archbishop felt he had to do something. Nasser had also asked Turkey for gesture of support, but Turks were being slow to respond and Cyprus Government believed (doubtless with much satisfaction) this was already causing Turks to lose ground in Egypt.

(b) Ministers had reason to believe that Egyptian agents in Cyprus had plans, in event of bases becoming involved in Arab/Israeli conflict, to provoke attacks and sabotage on bases. Cyprus Government would then be called upon to end this and would be in delicate position. Archbishop's statement was effort to prevent such situation occurring.

/3. I

S E C R E T

3. I spoke to Papadopoulos on lines of Guidance No. 111 while at same time making our position over Tiran Straits and support for United Nations action plain. I went on to point out that Cyprus Government's views as expressed by Archbishop had appeared in Press but there had been no official communication. Papadopoulos said Archbishop had meant to make his point to Mr. Crossman on 24 May, but opening had not occurred in conversation. He would be making communication in near future.

4. It is not clear how this communication would be made it might be conveyed by Kyprianou in London or I might be summoned here. Against latter eventuality, I should be grateful for any guidance on line to take.

Commonwealth Office please pass Routine to Washington 90 and UKMis New York 97.

Sir N. Costar

Sent 0911Z/27 May 1967
Recd 1110Z/27 May 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE LAGOS TO COMMONWEALTH OFFI

Telno. 919 27 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. Y 46. Middle

Nigerians remain preoccupied with wn affairs. Middle East crisis is being reported factually in Press, but so far without comment.

2. Officials comment only in the most general terms. It is possible that suspicion of Israeli support for Eastern Nigeria, and Moslem influence on Federal Military Government may incline latter towards Arab side. But there is as yet no evidence of this and I think it likely that Nigeria's main concern, in the Security Council and elsewhere, will be to avoid taking up a position which would give offence to either side.

Sir D. Hunt

Sent 1210/27 May
Received 1410/27 May

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UNITED NATIONS DEBATES 1957

STATEMENTS BY MARITIME POWERS

UNITED KINGDOM

"It is the view of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the Straits of Tiran must be regarded as an international waterway through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage. Her Majesty's Government will assert this right on behalf of all British shipping and is prepared to join with others to secure general recognition of this right."

His words were echoed by other delegates representing substantial maritime nations. The Declaration then made remains the view and the policy of Her Majesty's Government and we shall promote and support intetnational action to uphold this right of free passage.

Copy in P.H. Tons Afford (Useful documents folder)

FRANCE

The French Government considers that the Gulf of Aqaba, by reason partly of its breadth and partly of the fact that its shores belong to four different States,

constitutes international waters. Consequently it believes that, in conformity with international law, freedom of navigation should be ensured in the Gulf through the Straits which give access to it. In these circumstances no nation has the right to prevent the free and innocent passage of ships, whatever their nationality or type.

ITALY

As far, in particular, as free navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran are concerned, I do not need to restate here that we consider that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits giving access thereto.

THE NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands Government is in full agreement with the statements made by Israel, the United States, France and a number of other countries to the effect that passage through the Straits of Tiran should be free, open and unhindered for the ships of all nations.

AUSTRALIA

Let me now turn to the issue of the Gulf of Aqaba. In this case, we have a gulf of importance to the commerce and shipping of at least two States - Israel

and Jordan - and bounded by the territory of four States, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. I think no one could fairly deny that the Gulf of Aqaba is a part of the seas where the principle of the freedom of maritime communication applies - a principle which the International Court of Justice, in its judgement of 9 April 1949 on the Corfu Channel case characterized as one of "certain general and well-recognized principles".

NEW ZEALAND

The New Zealand Government shares the view expressed by the United Kingdom and other Governments that the Straits of Tiran must be regarded as an international waterway through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage.

NORWAY

With respect to shipping in the straits of Tiran, it is the view of the Government of Norway that these waters constitute an international water-way and that no State bordering on this water-way should undertake measures which would hamper the right of ships of any nation to innocent passage in these waters. This view, we hold, is fully consistent with accepted practices and principles of international law and, consequently, they are in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

DENMARK

In the view of the Danish Government, the Straits of Tiran must be regarded as an international water-way through which vessels of all nations have a right of passage. Several countries border on the Gulf of Aqaba and have ports therein. Therefore, in the opinion of the Danish Government, the Straits of Tiran cannot be treated differently from Straits which are generally recognised as international Straits.

M. Le Chemineau
No 1035.

EN CLAIR AND BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

GUIDANCE NO. 120 27 MAY 1967 (J.I.P.G.D.)

UNCLASSIFIED

GULF OF AQABA.

U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL (IN A NOTE TO THE ASSEMBLY DATED 27 FEBRUARY, 1957) REPORTED AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL THAT UNEF'S FUNCTION WOULD INCLUDE THE PREVENTION OF ACTS OF BELLIGERENCY AT THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, AND THAT THE PROCEDURE FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM SHARM ES SHEIKH WOULD BE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INFORM THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF UNEF, WHO WOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THE MATTER SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE ASSEMBLY.

2. THE UNITED STATES:

(A) PRESIDENT EISENHOWER WAS QUOTED BY ISRAEL M.F.A. AS HAVING PUBLICLY STATED ON 20 FEBRUARY, 1957, QUOTE WE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT, IF ISRAEL WITHDRAWS, EGYPT WILL PREVENT ISRAEL SHIPPING FROM USING THE SUEZ CANAL OR THE GULF OF AQABA UNQUOTE.

(B) WHITE HOUSE MEMORANDUM OF 11 FEBRUARY NOTED THAT ISRAEL QUOTE WILL WITHDRAW FROM SHARM ES SHEIKH IF CONTINUED FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS IS ASSURED UNQUOTE: DESCRIBED THE GULF OF AQABA AS QUOTE INTERNATIONAL WATERS UNQUOTE IN WHICH NO NATION HAD THE RIGHT TO PREVENT FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE: AND STATED THAT THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE ON BEHALF OF U.S. VESSELS AND QUOTE TO JOIN WITH OTHERS TO SECURE GENERAL RECOGNITION OF THIS RIGHT UNQUOTE.

(C) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, IN THE ASSEMBLY DEBATE OF 2 MARCH, 1957, IN NOTING THE ISRAEL STATEMENT SAID THAT THE U.S. DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE ISRAEL DECLARATIONS MADE ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SHARM ES SHEIKH CONDITIONAL, BUT THAT THEY CONSTITUTED QUOTE RESTATEMENTS OF WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN SAID BY THE ASSEMBLY OR BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS REPORTS, OR HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS WHICH SEEM TO US NOT UNREASONABLE IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRIOR ACTIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY UNQUOTE.

3. THE ISRAEL M.F.A. NOTED WITH GRATIFICATION THAT LEADING MARITIME POWERS FORESAW A NORMAL AND REGULAR FLOW OF TRAFFIC OF ALL CARGOES IN THE GULF OF AQABA, WERE PREPARED TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE DOCTRINE SET OUT IN THE U.S. MEMORANDUM AND HAD A SIMILAR INTENTION TO EXERCISE

/THEIR

THEIR RIGHTS. ISRAEL WAS RESOLVED ON BEHALF OF VESSELS OF ISRAEL REGISTRY TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE AND WAS PREPARED QUOTE TO JOIN WITH OTHERS TO SECURE UNIVERSAL RESPECT OF THIS RIGHT UNQUOTE. SHE WOULD REGARD INTERFERENCE BY ARMED FORCE WITH SUCH ISRAEL SHIPPING AS AN ATTACK ENTITLING HER TO EXERCISE HER INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER AND TO QUOTE TAKE ALL SUCH MEASURES AS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE OF HER SHIPS UNQUOTE.

4. U.K. STATEMENTS WERE REPORTED IN VERBATIM 222.

5. FRANCE REGARDED THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AS CONSTITUTING INTERNATIONAL WATERS, INTENDED TO EXERCISE ITS RIGHT OF FREE NAVIGATION EFFECTIVELY , AND CONSIDERED THAT ANY OBSTRUCTION OF ITS FREEDOM OF PASSAGE WOULD BE CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THAT IT MIGHT TAKE MEASURES UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. THE FRENCH DELEGATE STATED THAT IN THE FRENCH VIEW NONE OF THE STATES BORDERING ON THE GULF OF AQABA WAS IN A STATE OF WAR AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY ISRAEL'S POSITION APPEARED PERFECTLY IN ACCORD WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.

6. ITALY CONSIDERED THE GULF OF AQABA AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY IN WHICH NO NATION HAD THE RIGHT TO PREVENT FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE.

7. THE NETHERLANDS CONSIDERED THAT PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN SHOULD BE QUOTE FREE, OPEN AND UNHINDERED FOR THE SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS UNQUOTE. IT GAVE 4 REASONS:-

(I) THE GULF OF AQABA WAS TO BE REGARDED AS PART OF THE OPEN SEA SINCE IT WAS BORDERED BY FOUR DIFFERENT STATES AND HAD A WIDTH IN EXCESS OF THE THREE MILES OF TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THOSE LITORAL STATES.

(II) THE STRAITS OF TIRAN CONSEQUENTLY WERE STRAITS CONNECTING THE OPEN SEAS.

(III) THERE WAS A RIGHT OF FREE PASSAGE THROUGH/STRAITS EVEN IF THEY WERE SO NARROW AS TO FALL ENTIRELY WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF ONE OR MORE STATES.

/(IV)

(IV) IN SUCH A CASE THE LITTORAL STATES HAD THE RIGHT TO VERIFY THE INNOCENT CHARACTER OF THE PASSAGE. BUT THIS RIGHT OF VERIFICATION DI D NOT EXIST WHERE A STRAIT CONNECTED TWO PARTS OF THE OPEN SEA.

8. NEW ZEALAND SHARED H.M.G.'S VIEW AND BELIEVED THAT THE DECLARATIONS MADE BY THE U.K. AND OTHER LEADING MARITIME POWERS SHOULD SATISFY ISRAEL'S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS. THEY REGARDED THE ISRAEL STATEMENT NOT REPEAT NOT AS LAYING DOWN CONDITIONS FOR WITH-DRAWAL, BUT AS TAKING NOTE OF DECLARATIONS OF POLICY BY THE LEADING MARITIME POWERS.

9. AUSTRALIA ASSOCIATED ITSELF WITH THE U.S. AND U.K. POSITIONS BUT EXPECTED ISRAEL IN EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER, TO MAKE FULL USE OF EXISTING U.N. MACHINERY IN SEEKING REDRESS AGAINST ANY ACT OF BELLIGERENCY.

10. BELGIUM CONSIDERED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE GULF OF AQABA IMPLIED THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN AND THE GULF IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOGNISED RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

11. NORWAY REGARDED THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AS AN INTERNATIONAL WATER-WAY IN WHICH NO STATE SHOULD UNDERTAKE MEASURES WHICH WOULD HAMPER THE RIGHTS OF SHIPS OF ANY NATION TO INNOCENT PASSAGE.

12. DENMARK REGARDED THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY THROUGH WHICH ALL NATIONS HAD THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE. SINCE SEVERAL COUNTRIES BORDERED ON THE GULF OF AQABA AND HAD PORTS THERE-IN, THE STRAITS OF TIRAN COULD NOT BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY FROM STRAITS WHICH WERE GENERALLY RECOGNISED AS INTERNATIONAL STRAITS.

13. ICELAND ASSOCIATED ITSELF WITH DECLARATIONS MADE BY MANY DELE-GATIONS BUT ADDED THAT ANY DISPUTE SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THE INTER-NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.

14. CANADA DID NOT SUGGEST THAT THE ASSEMBLY SHOULD DETERMINE THE LEGAL RIGHTS IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE GULF OF AQABA, BUT THAT

/IT SHOULD

IT SHOULD AS A POLITICAL ACT AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO INTERFERENCE OF INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH THOSE WATERS.

SOSFA/CROSEC SENT 1655Z/29 MAY 1967

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COPENHAGEN
THE HAGUE
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B.I.S. NEW YORK
WASHINGTON
ADEN (PERSONAL)
AMMAN
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IMMEDIATE KUWAIT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 197 27 May, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 197 of 27 May Repeated for information to: Bahrain, Washington, Baghdad and Saving to:- U.K.Mis New York.

My telegram No. 192.

Palestine.

Foreign Minister summoned me this morning. He said the National Assembly had charged him to inform Western Envoys that the Kuwait Government would take steps against the interests of any Power which committed hostile acts against the Arabs. The Kuwait Government would in fact occupy the oilfields and installations to prevent sabotage and would stop the flow of oil "until the matter was settled".

2. I said we were not in the habit of committing aggression: All we sought was the preservation of peace in the Middle East. The Minister replied that he too was for peace, but if hostilities should break out, any intervention in defence of Israel would constitute aggression against the Arabs.

3. The Minister then spoke of The Gulf of Aqaba as Arab Waters. I said we could not accept this: Tiran was an International Strait and we must assert the right of innocent passage for our shipping - those who disputed such passage would be the aggressors. The Minister was at first reluctant to say whether the forcible assertion of that right of passage would constitute "aggression" in the Arab view. (He hoped this matter could be settled in the United Nations but admitted that the Arabs would not accept a United Nations decision against them). He finally decided however that an enforced passage would amount to a hostile act within the meaning of his communication.

4. The Minister ended by informing me officially that Kuwaiti Forces would soon be joining their Arab brothers at the front. I said that whilst this was a matter for the Kuwait Government, I felt bound to deplore their decision, for the despatch of reinforcements must raise the tension. The Minister replied with a smile that he did not suppose the Israelis would be frightened by the small forces Kuwait could send against them.

/5. The

5. The Minister's tone was solemn but not unfriendly. He probably does not realise that the stoppage of oil would very soon involve the stoppage of the Associated gas on which Kuwait's electricity and water supplies depend.

6. The Minister spoke in similar terms, though much less explicitly, to my United States colleague, who interpreted the démarche as the minimum that the Kuwait Government could do, given their public support for the U.A.R.

Foreign Office please pass U.K.Mis New York as my telegram Saving No. 1 and to Washington as my telegram No. 10.

Mr. Arthur Sent 1315 27 May, 1967
Reca 1553Z 27 May, 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister.

You saw this yesterday. But the Canadian Counsellor gave us later a few amendments made personally by Mr. Pearson on re-reading the texts. They are underlined: and in the attached quite innocuous, though not very distinguished.

KO
28/3

(See flags)

OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA,
CANADA HOUSE,
LONDON, S. W. 1.

S E C R E T

May 27, 1967

My dear Prime Minister -

The High Commissioner, Mr. Charles Ritchie, is at present on official duty in Scotland but he will be returning to London during the week-end. In his absence and on instructions from Ottawa, I am enclosing a message addressed to you by Prime Minister Pearson. This message is in reply to your message to Mr. Pearson on May 25.

I have also been instructed to transmit to you for your personal information one paper containing notes on the luncheon discussion between President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson on May 25; and another containing the Prime Minister's note on his private discussion of the Middle East question, with President Johnson, on the same date.

If I can be of any further assistance to you as a channel of communication, I shall be glad to do so.

Yours sincerely

Geoffrey Murray

Geoffrey Murray
Deputy High Commissioner

The Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson, O.B.E., M.P.
Prime Minister of Great Britain
10 Downing Street
London, S.W. 1

Original message T140/67 returned to Mr. Murray under cover of Mr. Andrew's letter of 31/5/67 — see Mr. Murray's letter of 30/5 enclosing amended message

MICHAEL PALLISER FROM PRIME MINISTER

THE THREAT IN THE KUWAIT TELEGRAM ABOUT STOPPING THE OIL FLOW AND INTERFERING WITH OIL INSTALLATIONS A THREAT WHICH HAS ALSO APPEARED IN A NUMBER OF SUNDAY PAPERS, MUST BE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY.

MINISTRY OF POWER AT MINISTERIAL AND OFFICIAL LEVEL SHOULD BE ASKED URGENTLY TO PREPARE AN APPRECIATION. PRESUMABLY THERE WOULD BE NO IMMEDIATE PROBLEM FROM A SHORT TERM CUT OFF. BUT WE MUST MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF OUR IMMEDIATE AND LONG TERM SITUATION

(A) IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN

(B) IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN AND WERE FOLLOWED BY OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AND

(C) IF AN OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING LED AS IS THREATENED TO CUTTING OFF PIPELINES

WE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CONSIDER WHETHER TO ISSUE A WARNING THAT IF PIPELINES WERE CUT AGAIN WE SHOULD REORIENTATE OUR WHOLE OIL IMPORT POLICY ON A BASIS OF ENDING OUR DEPENDENCE ON THE ~~MILLLLLL~~L MIDDLE EAST, WITH ALL THAT MEANS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST.

WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER URGENTLY INTERDEPARTMENTALLY (AND THIS ~~MEANNNNNNN~~ MUST INCLUDE THE TREASURY) WHETHER A WARNING BE GIVEN TO KUWAIT IF THEY TAKE (Iran, EXONOMIC ACTION AGAINST BRITAIN IN EITHER AN OIL OR STERLING SENSE WE SHALL IMMEDIATELY CONSIDER REPLACING KUWAITI OIL SUPPLIES ON A LONGTERM BASIS EG BY TEN YEAR CONRACTS OR SUPPLIES FROM ELSEWHERE. IS THIS REALISTIC? IS THE OIL THERE? MINISTRY OF POWER SHOULD GET DOWN TO AN URGENT ASSESSMENT AT ONCE BASED ON A STUDY OF THE FACTS AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST.. NO, REPEAT NO, CONSIDERATIONS OF THE PROFITABILITY OR PRESSURE S CAPABLE OF BEING MOUNTED BY BRITISH AND SEMI BRITISH OIL COMPANIES SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO AFFECT AN OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITON. WE OUGHT TO KNOW WITHIN 48 HOURS WHETHER A WARNING TO KUWAIT OF THIS KIND WOULD BE CREDIBLE. IT NEED NOT EVEN BE DIRECT BUT MIGHT BE PASSED THROUGH TO THE SHEIK BY ONE OF A NUMBER OF CHANNELS, EVEN HIS BRITISH FINANCIAL ADVISERS IN LONDON.

ENDS

SECRET - IMMEDIATE May 28, 1967

The Prime Minister has seen Kuwait telegram No. 197 of May 27 reporting the Kuwaiti threat to stop the oil flow and interfere with oil installations, in connection with the current crisis in the Middle East.

He considers that this threat, which has also been reported in a number of today's newspapers must be taken very seriously; and he has minuted as follows:-

> "Ministry of Power at Ministerial and official level should be asked urgently to prepare an appreciation. Presumably there would be no immediate problem from a short-term cut-off. But we must make an assessment of our immediate and long-term situation:-
>
> (a) if this were to happen;
>
> (b) if this were to happen and were followed by other Arab countries; and
>
> (c) if an outbreak of fighting led as is threatened to cutting off pipelines.

We should immediately consider whether to issue a warning that if pipelines were cut again we should reorientate our whole oil import

policy on a basis of ending our dependence on the Middle East, with all that means for the Middle East.

We should also consider urgently inter-Departmentally (and this must include the Treasury) whether a warning be given to Kuwait that, if they take economic action against Britain in either an oil or sterling sense, we shall immediately consider replacing Kuwaiti oil supplies on a long-term basis, e.g. by ten-year contracts or supplies from elsewhere. Is this realistic? Is the oil there? Ministry of Power should get down to an urgent assessment at once based on a study of the facts and the national interest. No, repeat no, considerations of the profitability or pressures capable of being mounted by British and semi-British oil companies should be allowed to affect an objective assessment of the position. We ought to know within 48 hours whether a warning to Kuwait of this kind would be credible. It need not even be direct but might be passed through to the Sheik by one of a number of channels, even his British financial advisers in London."

You will no doubt wish to inform your Minister urgently of this. As you know, I have already warned your Ministry's Duty Officer.

I am sending copies of this letter to MacLehose (Foreign Office), Baldwin (Treasury) and Meynell (Board of Trade), and Reid (Cabinet Office)

Am Pallister

A. Blackshaw, Esq.,
Ministry of Power.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE AT 12.30 p.m. ON SUNDAY, 28 MAY, 1967.

Present

The Rt. Hon. George Brown M.P.

The Rt. Hon. George Thomson, M.P.

Mr. T.F. Brenchley

Mr. D.M. Day

Mr. Aharon Remez

Mr. Yesneyaun Arug

M. Remez said that he had seen the Israel Foreign Minister in Paris. M. Eban had told him that he had had a thorough and satisfying discussion with President Johnson. The United States were firmly committed to keeping the Straits of Tiran open for all shipping including Israel ships and ships flying the Israel flag. There would be no compromise on this. President Johnson thought that there was little prospect of a successful outcome in the Security Council. The Russians could not be expected to cooperate. Nevertheless, action through the Security Council should be attempted although a long drawn out debate should be avoided. President Johnson had told M. Eban that he was satisfied with cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom.

/If

If it came to action outside the United Nations, the United States hoped that as many countries as possible would participate. Evidence to date was encouraging.

2. M. Remez said that the Israel Cabinet would be meeting today and one probable outcome would be the formation of a national government including representatives of the opposition parties. This would help the Government to control the situation. This was a critical day for Israel and M. Remez wished to enquire about the latest thinking of H.M. Government.

3. M. Remez did not regard U Thant's report as very encouraging. It appeared to give the United Nations seal to full Egyptian sovereign rights over the Straits of Tiran. This report and the U.A.R. letter to the Security Council introduced two new elements into the situation. M. Remez asked what the attitude of H.M. Government was to the U.A.R. letter and to U Thant's report.

4. Mr. Thomson asked what the 1949 Armistice Agreements meant in terms of Israel's interests. M. Remez replied that these Agreements had been intended to end hostilities and lead towards negotiations for a peaceful settlement.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Israel could not regard these Agreements as binding in all other respects whilst the U.A.R. continued to ignore the call in the Agreements for peace negotiations. If the other Governments concerned were prepared to respect all the conditions of the Armistice Agreements, Israel would certainly agree.

5. In reply to a question by Mr. Thomson, M. Romez said that the U.A.R. had no authentic grounds for claiming that Elath did not belong to Israel under the terms of the Armistice Agreements. Elath was on Israel possession when the Agreements were signed.

6. Mr. Brown explained that we had been unable to get an early meeting of the Security Council. It had also been impossible to get agreement on a draft resolution which went beyond the terms of paragraph 14 of U Thant's report. We had tried hard to get a meeting of the Security Council today with a view to securing a broader resolution. Opinion in New York was strongly against holding a meeting today and, after discussing the matter with Lord Caradon at midnight last night, he had agreed that we should not press for the meeting today. Mr. Thomson added that in pressing for an early

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

meeting we had hoped that the Security Council would assert the right of free navigation through the Straits of Tiran. Mr. Brown said that there was not enough support in New York for a meeting on that basis. When the meeting was held we hoped that it would be agreed that the situation in the Middle East should be kept under attention as a matter of urgency. He would be keeping in close touch with Lord Caradon in New York.

7. Mr. Thomson said that in our view the call in paragraph 14 of U Thant's report on all parties "to forgo belligerence" meant that Israel should exercise restraint and that the U.A.R. should permit free passage through the Straits. This would be made clear in our statement in the Security Council.

8. M. Remez thought that a resolution on the lines of U Thant's report would merely sanction the status quo. He feared that unless the Security Council had before it a resolution specifically asserting the right of free passage, the chances of getting any such resolution considered after the Security Council had adopted a milder resolution would be remote.

9. Mr. Thomson asked whether Israel intended to rebut in detail the allegations in the U.A.R. letter to

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

the Security Council. M. Remez thought not. His talk with M. Eban in Paris had left him with the impression that the Israel Government would see no point in engaging in a review of past history. The main issue was the U.A.R. aggression in blockading the Gulf of Aqaba and Israel would not want the Security Council to be distracted from this central problem.

10. Mr. Thomson thought that, if the Security Council was to come up with the right answer, it might be necessary to keep the discussions going for some time. With this in mind it would seem important and worth while for the Israel case to be deployed fully and firmly.

11. M. Remez thought that time was against a peaceful solution because of the danger of surprise attack by the U.A.R. Such an attack could not be halted by the United Nations or the United States before Israel had suffered severe political and actual harm.

12. Mr. Thomson said that our intelligence did not suggest that the U.A.R. intended to launch a surprise attack. Why should she, since she had already achieved her objective in closing the Straits? M. Remez thought that a

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

further strike at Israel would represent another victory for Nasser whose prestige would be enhanced throughout the Arab world. He knew of no firm intelligence that proved/the U.A.R. was planning such an attack but Israel could not discount the possibility.

13. M. Ramez then made two specific requests:

(a) Israel urgently needed 2,000 more rounds of ammunition. These could be picked up in Germany by El Al aircraft or any chartered aircraft. Israel reserves were dangerously low. These 2,000 rounds would be part of existing orders.

(b) Israel was due to take over ~~in July~~ another British submarine in July. Israel would appreciate it if this submarine could be made available immediately.

Mr. Brown undertook to examine these two requests and get in touch with the Israel Ambassador later in the day.

14. Mr. Brown said that he had explained frankly the position in the United Nations and he felt that Israel should not assume that the U.A.R. intended to make a pre-emptive strike. He hoped that Israel

/would

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

would not make a strike on their own. He said that time would be needed to get decisions in the United Nations or on any other form of international action.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

39

SECRET

May 28, 1967

The Prime Minister has seen Nicosia telegram No. 409 of May 27 about the Middle East situation and has noted the reference in paragraph 3 of the telegram to a conversation between Archbishop Makarios and the Lord President on May 24.

He has asked whether there has been any report of this conversation from the High Commissioner; and he would be grateful if the Lord President could be asked to dictate a comprehensive note of the conversation.

Copy on Cyprus May 1967

I am sending copies of this letter to Ward (Lord President's Office), Forster (Commonwealth Office), Mairne (Defence) and Reid (Cabinet Office).

A. Palliser

C.M. Maclehose, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

May 28, 1967

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of May 19 and Pat Kelly's letter of May 25 about his enquiry whether the Middle East Development Division should be not be moved from Beirut to the Gulf.

He has noted the views expressed in these two letters and has commented that the whole thing is in any case rather in the melting pot now.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Pat Kelly (Foreign Office).

A M Palliser

G.W. Thom, Esq., O.B.E.,
Ministry of Overseas Development.

May 28, 1967

The Prime Minister has seen Nairobi telegram No. 1597 of May 27 about the Middle East crisis. He has commented as follows:-

> "Are we talking in confidence to Kenyatta? He might be a useful ally in influencing African U.N. opinion and with Mombasa.
>
> H.W."

I am sending copies of this letter to Forster (Commonwealth Office), Hastie-Smith (Ministry of Defence) and Reid (Cabinet Office).

A M Palliser

Derek Day, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

May 28, 1967

The Prime Minister has seen Lagos telegram No. 919 of May 27 about the Middle East crisis. He has commented:-

"But they are at the United Nations. Is this not a chance to twist their tails?!

H.W."

I am sending a copy of this letter to Forster (Commonwealth Office).

A. M. Palliser

Derek Day, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Yost, when? Knew Lall, is a very able speaker - shrewd and tougher than he looks.

CYPHER/ CAT A

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1126 28 MAY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1126 OF 28 MAY

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

FOLLOWING CONFIRMS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION YOUDE/LAMBERT.

MIDDLE EAST.

THE AMERICANS HAVE TOLD US THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ARE SENDING CHARLES YOST TO CAIRO TO SUPPORT THEIR SOMEWHAT INEXPERIENCED AMBASSADOR THERE (YOST WAS AN AMBASSADOR AND DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN THE U.S. MISSION UNTIL LAST YEAR AND HAD A VERY HIGH REPUTATION HERE.)

2. YOST CARRIES NO SPECIAL MESSAGE AND HIS VISIT IS BEING PLAYED IN A LOW KEY. EL KONY (U.A.R.) HAS BEEN INFORMED. THE AMERICANS ARE MAKING NO SPECIFIC PRESS RELEASE BUT ACCEPT THAT THE NEWS WILL SOON BECOME PUBLIC.

3. YOST WILL ARRIVE IN LONDON BY TWA 702 AND STAY TONIGHT AT THE EXCELSIOR HOTEL. HE HAS NO PLANS TO APPROACH ANYONE IN LONDON BUT WOULD BE GLAD TO TALK TO ANYONE WHO WANTS TO TALK TO HIM.

LORD CARADON

SENT 1717Z 28/5
Recd 17/72 28/5

RD

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Telepitted to Chequers 28/5

Cypher/Cat A

FLASH TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 401 28 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Secretary of State's Telephone Call.

I saw Yigal Allon, Minister of Labour, at 6 p.m. Tel Aviv time tonight after Cabinet meeting. The upshot is:

(i) External. The Israelis are going to play along with us and the Americans. Only danger is if they think Egyptians are about to make a pre-emptive strike.

(ii) Internal. Situation completely in control. Inter-party negotiations continue, but Allon relaxed and Government are being very reasonable with regard to Opposition interests.

(iii) Comment. Paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 389 and my telegram No. 390 should not be misinterpreted as possibility of military coup.

This seems inconceivable in Israel, at any rate at this juncture. Eshkol's main difficulty in addressing the Knesset tomorrow is that he is not allowed to tell them, even in outline what we and the Americans have in mind with regard to the international naval force.

2. All I have on this latter is Washington telegram to you No. 1084 and I should be grateful for more detail.

3. Full report on Allon conversation follows in my two immediately following telegrams which I am now down-grading from Flash to Immediate.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1925Z/28 May
Received 1955Z/28 May

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Eastern Dept.

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15

40

SECRET - GUARD

Cypher/Cat A

FLASH TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 402 28 May 1967

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 402 of 28 May, Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington, Moscow and Paris.

GUARD.

My immediately preceding telegram (to Foreign Office only) and my telegram No. 393: Middle East.

Mr. Allon, Minister of Labour, invited me to call on him tonight at 6 p.m. just after the Cabinet.

2. He said he regretted he had got back from Moscow too late. He agreed that Israel militarily and politically had missed the boat. They could have stopped the complete alteration of the status quo - if they had acted at the end of last week, "but once you send a Minister to talk to your Allies and your Allies show the response that they have done, you have to play through to the end". He understood that real steps were already under way to set up the International Naval Force. (I said I had no details about this). It was unfortunate that the preliminary steps of the United Nations and United States constitutional requirements had to be gone through but Israel could wait a certain time. He understood that Her Majesty's Government were in favour of greater speed than the Americans. Meanwhile Israeli shipping bound for Eilat would be held up.

3. The Government were in some trouble since they could [?gp omitted ?not) inform the Israel people and Parliament of the very solid commitment for the Naval Force which they had obtained. He recalled his talks with the Prime Minister in London and said that he was very heartened by the fact that it was Her Majesty's Government who was playing such a positive role in the present crisis. He asked that we should -

(a) continue to press for the earliest possible appearance of the Force,

(b) that one statement should be made as soon as possible indicating that it was to be set up, and

(c) that we should realise that any proposals to obtain a ruling by the International Court on the exact status of the Strait of Tiran were totally unacceptable to Israel.

4. Tiran was only a small portion of the picture however. Nasser had upset the 'status quo' and was now riding very high. He might think that he had got himself, unwittingly perhaps, into the position of an all out Arab assault on Israel which he had said he would not be in for another four years. He lived on prestige, so what would he do when first Israeli ships were run into Eilat under international protection? He would have to react. Israelis had noticed the

/Egyptian

Egyptian claim to Security Council that Eliat was not really a part of Israel. They also noticed military dispositions. There was a possibility that Nasser would be dirven to try to seize Eilat in order to nullify the opening of the Straits. But Nasser knew that any action against Israel gave the Israelis a 'casus belli' which would allow them to put in the pre-emptive air strike which was vital to either side in the present circumstances. He could not therefore make first bid for Eilat or any other prestige gesture without first striking the Israeli air bases.

5. I said that all our indications were that Nasser's positions were defensive. Allon accepted this out said you could not tell whether air dispositions were defensive or offensive. If at any time Israel had the slightest indication from their Intelligence that Nasser was contemplating a strike against Israel air bases, Israel could not afford not to take action first. He added that even if there only appeared a 'possibility' of Nasser doing this Israel would have to hit first - it was a question of her existence.

6. But for this factor he accepted that the question of reducing Nasser's prestige after his present success was going to be a long slow haul. During this period things might be difficult for Israel they were going to be worse for Hussein, Feisal and general Western interests in the Middle East, such as Aden. Another contribution to peace in the Middle East on the part of Her Majesty's Government which he stressed was that as soon as we had settled the Tiran business we should be pressing for a preliminary reduction of Forces on each side between the UAR and Israel. A successful achievement of this would nullify some of the Israeli fears about Egyptian intentions to attack. In the immediate future this could only be done by firm declarations by the United States and Great Britain that any aggression against Israel would be considered an aggression against the United States and the United Kingdom themselves. I said I thought he was asking for the moon and that the best he could ever expect to get would be something more on the lines of a re-affirmation of the Tripartite Declaration, which, as he knew, was a difficult matter for us.

7. 'Comment' for the time being downgrade Allon from "hawk" to at least "realistic hawk".

Foreign Office pass UKMIS New York 69, Washington 76, Moscow 16, Paris 23.

Mr. Haddow

Sent 2029Z 28 May
Recd 2242Z 28 May

[Repeated as requested]

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Telegraphed to
COPY NO. Cheques 29/5

Cypher/Cat A

[redacted]ASH TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 403 28 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 403 of 28 May, Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington, Moscow and Paris.

My immediate preceding telegram: Internal happenings.

For the Prime Minister's personal information, Mr. Allon gave me the following outline of events:-

(i) Rafi had seized on the crisis to exploit their political advantage. They had first demanded representation in the Cabinet and had been offered representation in Internal Committee of Cabinet dealing with security. Government had also offered Gahal similar post.

(ii) This had been turned down and the demand was made for Gahal and Rafi to actually hold Cabinet positions. Allon had strongly advocated that for public morale it was necessary to show that national interests came before Party interests and Government had made offer to include in Cabinet (Without Portfolio) Dayan (Rafi) Beigin (Herut/Gahal), and Rimalt (Gahal/Liberal). This offer had been turned down on grounds that Parties must be invited and not individuals. Later this had been toned down to an offer that, provided Parties were invited, the individuals named by the Government would be the selection of their Parties. Government had all along insisted that if these individuals were brought in Mrs. Meir (Mapai) must also be brought in to balance;

(iii) Gahal and Rafi then pointed out that Cabinet representation was on proportional basis and Gahal had claimed four seats and Rafi two. Allon was strongly in favour of accepting on grounds of presenting public with broad based National Coalition in present crisis and Government had agreed. Gahal were happy but at prompting of Rafi had upped the stakes to demanding that a Rafi representative must be Minister of Defence. Government could not have this as it would be a sign of no confidence in the Prime Minister who is also Minister of Defence.

2. Negotiations were continuing. Ben Gurion is being rather a nuisance in inhibiting Dayan from accepting various Government proposals. Dayan has told Government that he would be prepared to accept Government post if Ben Gurion would let him, but the old man's first position within the Party was that he should be made Prime Minister and Eshkil his Deputy Prime Minister. Dayan realises this is quite unrealistic.

/3. Dayan

3. Dayan is the only one in Rafi who realises that the public may soon get tired of Rafi appearing to wish to make political capital out of the troubles. He thinks their best course is to show themselves as willing to join in any broad based Coalition in the National interest.

4. Foreign Office pass UKMIS New York 70, Washington 77, Moscow 17, Paris 24.

Mr. Hadow Sent 2100 28 May
Recd 2330 28 May

[Repeated as requested]

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street]

PRISEC (F.O.)

NNNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/ CAT A
FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 1808

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
28 MAY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1808 FO 28 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW
PARIS AND TEL AVIV.

MIDDLE EAST.

TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS **HAYMAN-KILLICK**

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KOSYGIN'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. BEGINS.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ACCORDING TO INFORMATION WHICH IS BEING RECEIVED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, THE STATE OF ISRAEL IS ACTIVATING MILITARY PREPARATION AND, AS IS EVIDENT, WISHES TO CARRY OUT ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST THE NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES. UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF SHARP TENSION ALONG THE BORDER OF ISRAEL WITH THE UAR AND SYRIA, ISRAELI MILITANT CIRCLES ARE TRYING TO IMPOSE UPON THE GOVERNMENT, THEIR COUNTRY AND PEOPLE AN ADVENTUROUS ACTION WITH THE AIM OF RESOLVING ALL PROBLEMS BY MILITARY MEANS. THE DANGER EXISTS THAT THESE CIRCLES CAN PROVOKE A MILITARY CONFLICT WHICH WOULD BE FRAUGHT WITH GREAT CONSEQUENCES FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

WE UNDERSTAND THAT IT DEPENDS IN LARGE PART ON THE UNITED STATES, ON YOU PERSONALLY, MR. PRESIDENT, WHETHER ISRAEL SHOULD TAKE SUCH A RECKLESS STEP. THERE CAN BE NO OTHER OPINION ON THIS SCORE. IF THERE IS NO ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE UNITED

/ STATES

STATES SIDE, ISRAEL WILL NOT DECIDE TO OVERSTEP THE BOUNDARY.

IN YOUR LETTER OF MAY 22, YOU CALL UPON US TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT, HOWEVER COMPLICATED THE SITUATION MAY BE IN THE REGION OF THE BOUNDARIES OF ISRAEL, SYRIA, AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, MEANS MUST BE FOUND TO LIQUIDATE THIS CONFLICT AS A MILITARY ONE. THE SITUATION IS SUCH THAT, IN OUR OPINION, THIS CAN BE DONE. WE CANNOT PERMIT A NEW HOT BED OF WAR TO BREAK OUT IN THE WORLD.

THEREFORE, WE STAND FOR RESTRAINING INFLUENCE, BUT, NATURALLY, NOT TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE ARAB STATES. THEIR ACTIVITIES HAVE A DEFENSIVE CHARACTER. IN THIS REGARD THEY ARE DISPLAYING RESTRAINT AND, AS WE KNOW, DO NOT WISH A MILITARY CONFLICT.

OF COURSE, IF AN ADVENTURISTIC LINE PREVAILS AND THE GUNS BEGIN TO SPEAK, THEN THIS CAN BECOME THE BEGINNING OF LARGE EVENTS. IF ISRAEL COMMITS AGGRESSION AND BEGINS MILITARY ACTIONS, WE SHALL RENDER AID TO THE COUNTRIES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO AGGRESSION.

NEITHER WE, NOR YOU, NOR THE ARAB COUNTRIES, NOR THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL HAVE AN INTEREST IN A CONFLICT. WE TURN TO YOU WITH AN APPEAL TO UNDERTAKE ALL MEASURES TO SEE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MILITARY CONFLICT. AND WE ON OUR PART WILL ALSO UNDERTAKE MEASURES IN THIS DIRECTION.
ENDS.
2. PLEASE SEE FURTHER TELEGRAMS TO FOLLOW.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 110, PARIS 142 AND TEL AVIV 20

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT 1639Z/28
Recd At 1639Z/28

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CYPHER/CAT 'A'
FLASH WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1809 28 MAY 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1809 OF 28 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV.
MIDDLE EAST. M.I.P.T.
FOLLOWING IS GIST OF REPLY SENT YESTERDAY BY THE PRESIDENT TO KOSYGIN, SHOWN TO ME BY EUGENE ROSTOW THIS MORNING.
2. THE PRESIDENT WAS NO LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE CRITICAL SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAD SINCE SENT A FURTHER COMMUNICATION TO ESHKOL. HE COULD ASSURE KOSYGIN THAT HE WAS MAKING THE MAXIMUM EFFORT TO COUNSEL MODERATION ON ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBOURING ARAB STATES. HE AGREED THAT KOSYGIN AND HE MUST BOTH DO ANYTHING THEY COULD TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. HE WELCOMED KOSYGIN'S ASSURANCES OF HIS EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WERE IN A STATE OF HIGH TENSION AND EVERYTHING MUST BE DONE TO REDUCE FURTHER INFLAMMATION. THE KEY ISSUE WAS A PROMPT SOLUTION FOR THE PROBLEM OF THE STRAIT OF TIRAN. BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U S HAD A LARGE INTEREST AS MARITIME POWERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PASSAGE THROUGH NARROW WATERS CONNECTING INTERNATIONAL SEAS. HE URGED THAT THE U.A.R. SHOULD BE COUNSELLED TO REFRAIN FROM INTERFERING WITH PASSAGE. HE HOPED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD FIND AN EARLY ANSWER, BUT DID NOT WANT TO UNDERESTIMATE THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION. IF IT COULD BE RESOLVED HE THOUGHT THE PROSPECTS FOR REDUCTION OF TENSION IN THE AREA WOULD BE GREATLY IMPROVED. HE HOPED THE PARALLEL EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. WOULD SUCCEED.

F O PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 111, PARIS 143 AND TEL AVIV 21.

SIR P. DEAN SENT 1705Z28 MAY
RECD 1705Z28 MAY [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER/CAT 'A'
FLASH WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1810 28 MAY 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1810 OF 28 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW
YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV.
MIDDLE EAST - MY TELEGRAM NO. 1809.
GENE ROSTOW TOLD ME THAT THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY HAD BEEN PREPARED IN A HURRY AND THAT HE THOUGHT WE OUGHT TO GET A FURTHER MESSAGE TO THE RUSSIANS AMPLIFYING WHAT HAD ALREADY BEEN SAID TO THEM. ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS WERE TRYING TO SETTLE FOR WHAT THE U.A.R. HAD GAINED, THEIR RECENT MESSAGES HAD BEEN SOMETHING OF AN APPEAL, AND WE OUGHT TO GO BACK TO THEM IN A NON-PROVOCATIVE WAY. WE OUGHT TO GO A LITTLE FURTHER ON THE BASIC ISSUE OF PRINCIPLE ABOUT THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. HE THOUGHT THE FOLLOWING FOUR POINTS IN PARTICULAR SHOULD BE PUT TO THE RUSSIANS:-
(I) THE STRAITS WERE NOT YET ACTUALLY CLOSED AND THE U S WISHED TO USE THE PRESENT PERIOD FOR DIPLOMACY. THEY WANTED TO HOLD BACK SHIPS FROM MAKING ANY CHALLENGE:
(II) IT WAS THE USE OF ARMED FORCE TO CLOSE THE STRAITS WHICH WOULD BE A HOSTILE ACT JUSTIFYING RETALIATORY ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER (ROSTOW POINTED OUT THAT THIS HAD BEEN THE U S OFFICIAL REACTION IN THE PAST):
(III) IF THE PROBLEM OF THE STRAITS WAS SOLVED IN THE LIGHT OF THE SETTLEMENT OF 1957 AND THE 1958 CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (ROSTOW WAS KEEN TO MENTION THIS SINCE THE SOVIETS HAD SIGNED IT), ALL OTHER PROBLEMS WERE SOLUBLE:

/(IV) THERE

(IV) THERE SHOULD BE AN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT ARMS LIMITATION IN THE AREA.

2. ROSTOW THOUGHT THE SOVIET UNION COULD BE TOLD THAT THE U S WERE PERFECTLY READY TO NEGOTIATE IN ANY WAY THE SOVIETS WISHED INCLUDING A QUADRIPARTITE BASIS BUT ROSTOW SAID THAT THE U S WOULD STILL WISH QUADRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS TO BE CONFINED TO THE U.N.

3. ROSTOW SAID THAT HE EXPECTED TO SUBMIT IDEAS ON THESE LINES TO HIS COLLEAGUES AND IF THEY AGREED TO THE PRESIDENT SOME TIME TODAY. HE WAS NOT FIRMLY WEDDED TO ANY WAY OF PUTTING THEM ACROSS. HE WOULD LIKE YOU TO CONSIDER WHETHER THEY MIGHT BE EMBODIED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO KOSYGIN'S MESSAGE OR IN A FURTHER MESSAGE FROM HMG TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE U S WOULD PROBABLY NOT SEND A FURTHER MESSAGE ABOUT THEM DIRECT TO KOSYGIN AND WERE MORE LIKELY TO PUT THEM ACROSS ON THE DIPLOMATIC LEVEL TO GROMYKO BUT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENSURE THAT THEY WERE PUT TO KOSYGIN.

4. ROSTOW SAID HE EXPECTED TO HAVE A FURTHER TALK WITH ME LATER TODAY.

F O PASS IMMEDIATE PARIS 144, MOSCOW 112 AND TEL AVIV 22.

SIR P.DEAN

SENT 1815Z/27
RECD 1615Z/27

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CYPHER/CAT 'A'
FLASH WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1811 28 MAY 1967
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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1811 OF 28 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS,
MOSCOW, TEL AVIV.
MY TELEGRAM NO. 1810.
ON THE WAY OUT FROM ROSTOW, I HAD A FEW WORDS WITH RUSK. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS RATHER ENCOURAGED BY THE MESSAGE FROM KOSYGIN WHICH SEEMED TO HIM A STRAIGHTFORWARD AND SOBER REPLY TO THE PARAGRAPH ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF 22 MAY TO KOSYGIN. THIS PARAGRAPH READ ROUGHLY AS FOLLOWS QUOTE INCREASING HARRASSMENT OF ISRAEL BY ELEMENTS BASED IN SYRIA WITH ATTENDANT INCIDENTS WITHIN ISRAEL AND WITHIN ARAB COUNTRIES HAS BOUGHT THE AREA CLOSE TO MAJOR VIOLENCE. YOUR AND OUR TIES WITH NATIONS IN THE AREA COULD BRING US INTO DIFFICULTIES WHICH I AM CONFIDENT NEITHER OF US SEEKS. THE TIME HAS NOW COME FOR EACH OF US TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO THE FULL IN THE COURSE OF MODERATION, INCLUDING OUR INFLUENCE OVER ACTION AT THE U.N. UNQUOTE.
2. RUSK SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD SAY NOTHING TO THE FRENCH ABOUT KOSYGIN'S MESSAGES TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE REPLIES AT LEAST UNTIL THE FRENCH DISCLOSED WHETHER THEY HAD RECEIVED A PARALLEL MESSAGE AND WHAT OTHER EXCHANGES, IF ANY, THEY MIGHT BE HAVING WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. I MADE NO COMMENT, BUT RUSK IS CLEARLY SUSPICIOUS OF WHAT THE FRENCH MAY BE UP TO WITH THE RUSSIANS, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL FOR QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATION.

F O PASS IMMEDIATE PARIS 145, MOSCOW 113 AND TEL AVIV 23.

SIR P. DEAN SENT 1729Z28 MAY
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CYPHER/CAT 'A'
FLASH WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1812 28 MAY 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1812 OF 28 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV.
MY TELEGRAM NO. 1809 - MIDDLE EAST.
ROSTOW REPEATED THAT THE U S HAD NO HARD INTELLIGENCE THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD INTENDED TO STRIKE. THE PRESIDENT HAD SENT ESHKOL A MESSAGE AS FORECAST IN MY TEL. NO. 1805 ROSTOW DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD STRIKE AFTER WHAT THE U S HAD TOLD THEM AND THOUGHT THAT THE EGYPTIANS WOULD BE HELD BACK BY THE SOVIET UNION.
2. WITH REGARD TO FUTURE PLANS, ROSTOW SAID HE BELIEVED THE FIRST RESOLUTION ACHIEVED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE THE LAST AND WOULD THEREFORE IN EFFECT BE THE SETTLEMENT. THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN GOING BEYOND PARA 14 OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT SINCE FOREGOING QUOTE BELLIGERENCE UNQUOTE COULD BE INTERPRETED AS PRECLUDING AN EGYPTIAN ACTION TO CLOSE THE STRAITS. THE U S HAD PRESSED THE FRENCH VERY HARD TO GO ALONG WITH A RESOLUTION.
3. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT PLAN TO RUN A TEST SHIP SO FAR AS HE KNEW. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THAT WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF RUNNING A TEST SHIP POSSIBLY EVEN BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE REFERRED TO THE EXAMPLE OF THE CUBAN MISSILES CRISIS, WHERE THE BLOCKADE HAS BEEN IMPOSED BEFORE ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
4. ROSTOW SAID WE MUST DECIDE VERY SOON HOW TO ORGANISE

/DIPLOMATICALLY

DIPLOMATICALLY THE MARITIME DECLARATION. HE KNEW THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD PREFER A BRITISH INITIATIVE SUPPORTED BY THE U S. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT, SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, THAT YOU WOULD PREFER FOR THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO ACT TOGETHER THOUGH NOT OF COURSE NECESSARILY BY MEANS OF JOINT APPROACHES. MY PERSONAL OPINION WAS THAT IT MIGHT BE BEST TO DECIDE IN EACH CAPITAL WHICH OF OUR EMBASSIES COULD TAKE A MORE EFFECTIVE INITIATIVE.

5. ROSTOW APPEARED TO AGREE WITH THIS. HE ALSO SAID THAT WE MUST CONSIDER THE FORM OF THE DECLARATION AND DECIDE WHETHER OUR OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET AS MANY ADHERENTS TO IT AS POSSIBLE OR AS FIRM A DECLARATION AS POSSIBLE. THE DRAFT AGREED DURING MR THOMSON'S VISIT SHOWED THE QUOTE IRON HAND UNQUOTE A LITTLE TOO CLEARLY : IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO ACCEPT RATHER A FUZZIER ASSERTION OF OUR RIGHTS IN ORDER TO ATTRACT OTHER GOVERNMENTS.

6. ROSTOW ALSO ASKED WHETHER WE SHOULD KEEP MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON A US/UK BASIS OR BRING IN OTHER COUNTRIES , EG. THE DUTCH AND THE CANADIANS, SINCE THEY AGREED TO THE LINE OF OUR POLICY.

7. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY VIEWS YOU MAY HAVE ON THE ABOVE POINTS.

F O PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 114, PARIS 146 AND TEL AVIV 24.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT 1837Z 28 MAY
RECD 1839Z 28 MAY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER/CAT 'A'
FLASH WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1813 28 MAY 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1813 OF 28 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, PARIS.
MY TEL. NO. 1811 - MIDDLE EAST.
ROSTOW HAS JUST TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT THEY HAVE HEARD THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAVE ACCEPTED THE POLICY ALONG THE LINES PUT TO EBAN BY THE PRESIDENT. IT WAS NOW ESSENTIAL TO FULFIL OUR SIDE OF THE BARGAIN. ALTHOUGH NO FINAL DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN HERE, IT WAS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT THE U S WOULD GO FULL STEAM AHEAD WITH MILITARY PLANNING.
2. ROSTOW ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD JUST HEARD THAT LLOYD'S WERE REFUSING TO INSURE SHIPS BOUND FOR THE GULF OF AQABA. THIS MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH THAT NASSER HAD IN FACT NOT REPEAT NOT INSTITUTED A BLOCKADE. HE THOUGHT THIS MADE IT ESSENTIAL TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE POLICY OF RESTRAINING SHIPS FROM SAILING THROUGH THE GULF. ROSTOW THOUGHT THAT OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO PASS AS MANY SHIPS AS POSSIBLE THROUGH TO ELIAT. ROSTOW ALSO ASKED WHETHER WE COULD GET LLOYD'S TO RESCIND THEIR ORDER. I INDICATED THAT THIS MIGHT BE VERY DIFFICULT.

F O PASS IMMEDIATE TELAVIV 25, MOSCOW 115 AND PARIS 147.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT 1844Z 28/5
Rec 1844Z 28/5

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CYPHER CAT A

IMMEDIATE U K MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO.1125 DATED 28 MAY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.1125 OF 28 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, COPENHAGEN, OTTAWA, AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO.1121 : SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

LATE LAST NIGHT I RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL ASKING IF I WOULD AGREE TO A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TOMORROW (MONDAY) AFTERNOON. I SAID THAT AS THE PRESIDENT KNEW I WAS IN FAVOUR OF A VERY EARLY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AND IN ANY EVENT THE MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. I HAVE SINCE CHECKED THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING ON MONDAY AFTERNOON CAME FROM THE PRESIDENT (AND NOT AS A RESULT OF THE REQUEST OF ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL). DR. CHAI OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT, WHO SPEAKS FOR THE PRESIDENT IN SUCH MATTERS, SAID THAT IN COMING TO HIS DECISION TO PROPOSE A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FOR MONDAY THE PRESIDENT TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE RESULT OF HIS INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AND THE UAR LETTER. FROM THE CONSULTATIONS IT APPEARED THAT SOME MEMBERS **WISHED TO HAVE A VERY EARLY MEETING WHEREAS THE MAJORITY FAVOURED A MEETING** ON MONDAY.

3. IT HAS NOW BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT THE COUNCIL WILL MEET ON MONDAY AFTERNOON AT 3 PM.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS PARIS NO.88, MOSCOW NO. 83, COPENHAGEN NO. 27, AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV NO. 5, AMMAN NO. 6, DAMASCUS NO.13, CAIRO NO.25.

LORD CARADON

SENT 1538Z 28 MAY
RECD. 1538Z 28 MAY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER/CAT A

F L A S H FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MISSION NEW YORK

TELNO 2328 28 MAY 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 2328 OF 28 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, COPENHAGEN, OTTAWA, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, CAIRO.
MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.
I WOULD STILL HOPE FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, BIT I UNDERSTAND THAT THE CONSIDERATIONS IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1121, PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4 MEANS THAT IT WILL HAVE TO BE DEFERRED UNTIL MONDAY, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS HAS NOW BEEN ARRANGED.

2. SUBJECT TO THE OUTCOME OF YOUR CONSULTATIONS WITH COUNCIL MEMBERS TODAY, I ACCEPT THAT A HOLDING RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF THE DRAFT IN YOUR TELNO 1122 IS LIKELY IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE THE BEST ACHIEVABLE STARTING POINT. BUT I THINK THAT IT IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT IT SHOULD ONLY BE REGARDED AS A PRELUDE TO FURTHER ACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS AS STATED IN PARA 2 OF THE RESOLUTION. I THINK IT IS MOST IMPORTANT ALSO THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD STAY IN SESSION (OR ON CALL WHILE THE COUNCIL MEMBERS HAVE PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS) AND SHOULD NOT TAMELY BREAK UP AFTER PASSING ITS HOLDING RESOLUTION.

3. THE PRECISE TACTICS THAT YOU USE WOULD HAVE TO DEPEND ON THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION IN THE COUNCIL, BUT I WOULD WISH YOU IN YOUR INTERVENTION TO STATE FIRMLY OUR VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA. YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE REGARD QUOTE BELLIGERENCE UNQUOTE AS APPLYING TO ACTION IN THE GULF OF AQABA, AND I AM GLAD TO LEARN THAT MR. GOLDBERG INTENDS TO TAKE THE SAME LINE. FOLLOWING UP THE GENERAL LINE OF YOUR SPEECH ON 24 MAY YOU SHOULD CONCENTRATE ABOVE ALL
UPON THE VITAL NEED FOR A SOLUTION TO BE FOUND FOR THE CRITICAL PROBLEMS IN THE GULF OF AQABA. THIS MUST TAKE ACCOUNT NOT ONLY OF THE NORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATES BORDERING ON THE GULF, BUT OF THOSE OF ALL MARITIME STATES. THIS IS H.M.G.'S ESSENTIAL INTEREST AS A MARITIME AND TRADING POWER. YOUR SHOULD RECALL

/PARA.

PARA. 1Ø OF U THANT'S REPORT ECHOING IN STRONG TERMS HIS CONCERN AT THE DANGER OF RESTRICTING INNOCENT PASSAGE OF SHIPS THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN.

4. YOU SHOULD THEN GO ON TO SUGGEST THE DESIRABILITY OF AN URGENT STUDY OF WAYS AND MEANS BY WHICH THE U.N. MIGHT NOW BE ABLE TO PLAY ITS PROPER ROLE BOTH IN DAMPENING DOWN IMMEDIATE TENSION AND IN KEEPING THE PEACE IN THE AREA FOR THE FUTURE. U THANT MADE CERTAIN SUGGESTIONS IN HIS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF 18 MAY AND IN PARAGRAPHS 15 TO 17 OF HIS REPORT AFTER VISITING CAIRO. THESE SHOULD BE STUDIED AS A MATTER OF URGENCY AND URGENT CONSIDERATION SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME U.N. PRESENCE IN THE AREA.

5. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS ON LOBBYING IN APPROPRIATE CAPITALS ON THE POINTS REFERRED TO IN PARAS. 2 3 AND 4 ABOVE.

6 YOU SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ANY REFERENCE TO THE CRITICISMS OF ISRAELI POLICY IN THE U.A.R.'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1117). BUT YOU SHOULD ENCOURAGE YOUR ISRAELI COLLEAGUE TO REBUT THE U.A.R.'S ARGUMENTS: I HAVE MADE THIS POINT TO THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HERE, WHO TOLD ME THAT EBAN WAS INCLINED NOT TO ARGUE THEIR HISTORICAL CASE.

7. I HOPE THAT TABOR CAN BE TACTFULLY RIDDEN OFF HIS SUGGESTION (YOUR TELNO 1118) OF A PERSONAL MISSION ROUND MIDDLE EASTERN CAPITALS ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL. AS YOU SAY, THE IDEA SEEMS UNLIKELY TO GET OFF THE GROUND. I WOULD HOWEVER WELCOME THE IDEA OF A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL PLAYING SOME MEDIATORY ROLE AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME. THE DIFFICULTY WILL BE TO FIND THE RIGHT MAN.

SOSFA SENT 1935Z 28 MAY

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U K MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO.1128 DATED 28 MAY 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.1128 OF 28 MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, COPEN-
HAGEN, OTTAWA, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, DAMASCUS. CAIRO.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.2328: MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

AS YOU KNOW (MY TELEGRAM NO.1125) THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS NOW TO MEET AT 3 PM TOMORROW (MONDAY).

2. IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH GOLDBERG AND OTHERS WE THOUGHT THAT WE SHOULD ONLY GO FOR A HOLDING RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF THE DRAFT IN MY TELEGRAM NO.1122 IF WE WERE SURE OF BROAD SUPPORT AND IN ANY EVENT CERTAIN OF NINE VOTES. FRANCE'S DECISION WAS VERY IMPORTANT SINCE IF BOTH FRANCE AND RUSSIA WOULD NOT SUPPORT A HOLDING RESOLUTION THIS WOULD EMPHASISE DIVISION BETWEEN THE FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS AND THIS WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE A BAD START.

3. BUT AFTER ANOTHER MEETING BETWEEN GOLDBERG AND SEYDOUX (FRANCE) THIS EVENING SEYDOUX, AFTER SOME HESITATION, CONFIRMED THAT HE WILL SUPPORT THE HOLDING RESOLUTION. HE SAID, HOWEVER, AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE FRENCH ATTITUDE WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE AMERICANS ON UAR RIGHTS AS A BELLIGERENT.

4. WE THINK THAT THE LATIN AMERICANS CAN BE RELIED UPON TO SUPPORT A HOLDING RESOLUTION SO THAT WITH CANADA, DENMARK, JAPAN AND (HOPEFULLY) CHINA, THE AMERICANS BELIEVE WE HAVE NINE VOTES. NEVERTHELESS, TO BE ON THE SAFE SIDE, THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN LOBBYING ETHIOPIA AND NIGERIA THOUGH NOT SO FAR RECEIVING A REPLY.

5. WE DOUBT THEREFORE WHETHER ADDITIONAL LOBBYING IS REQUIRED ON THE HOLDING RESOLUTION. BUT ON THE QUESTIONS IN PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4 OF YOUR TELEGRAM IT MAY BE WELL TO LOBBY WHEN WE KNOW HOW TOMORROW HAS GONE.

6. ALTHOUGH THEREFORE WE BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE THE NECESSARY

/VOTES

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UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1128 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-2-

VOTES THERE ARE STILL SOME UNCERTAINTIES (SEE PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM), MOREOVER WE MIGHT WANT TO THINK AGAIN IF A RUSSIAN VETO SEEMED PROBABLE.

THINK THEREFORE THAT WE SHOULD HOLD OVER A FINAL DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO GO FOR A HOLDING RESOLUTION UNTIL WE CAN REVIEW THE SITUATION AND HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS HERE TOMORROW.

7. I ENTIRELY AGREE THAT WHETHER WE GO FOR A HOLDING RESOLUTION OR NOT THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION OF ALLOWING THE COUNCIL TO GIVE UP ITS EFFORTS (THOUGH THE USUAL PRACTICE OF BREAKS FOR CONSULTATIONS WILL NO DOUBT BE FOLLOWED).

8. WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF YOUR TELEGRAM, I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD RIDE OFF TABOR FROM HIS IDEA OF A PERSONAL MISSION (I CONFIRM THAT I DO NOT EXPECT THIS TO GET SUPPORT). I ALSO AGREE THAT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS IDEA THAT HE MIGHT APPOINT A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO CARRY OUT SOME MEDIATORY ROLE. WHEN I MENTIONED THIS TO GOLDBERG TODAY HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT AT FIRST SIGHT LIKE THE IDEA OF A COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL GOING TO THE MIDDLE EAST. HE THOUGHT THAT WE SHOULD THINK IN TERMS OF A WORLD STATESMAN (FOR INSTANCE A SCANDINAVIAN PRIME MINISTER).

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS PARIS NO.89, MOSCOW NO.84, COPENHAGEN NO.28 TEL AVIV NO.91, AMMAN NO.78, CAIRO NO.61 AND DAMASCUS NO.84.

LORD CARADON

TOD 29/0137Z

TOR 29/0137Z

[REPETITION TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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SECRET

Note of a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary in the Cabinet Room on Sunday, May 28, 1967, at 7.45 p.m.

The following were also present:-

Sir Burke Trend
Mr. Halls
Mr. Lloyd-Hughes
Mr. Palliser

The Foreign Secretary reported on the latest situation in the light of a telephone conversation with H.M. Ambassador in Tel Aviv and the instructions that he had sent to Lord Caradon to ensure that a debate began as soon as possible in the Security Council and that the Council should be, if possible, kept in Session.

In discussion the following points were agreed:-

(1) unless there had been some startling development by the following morning (and in the light of the report from Tel Aviv this seemed unlikely), there need be no meeting of the Cabinet on May 29. The Cabinet should meet as already arranged on the morning of May 30.

(2) The Foreign Secretary would submit to the Prime Minister by 10 a.m. on May 29, for his concurrence, a paper by officials together with a covering paper based on a draft by Mr. George Thomson. They would then jointly decide whether the two papers should be submitted to

Cabinet; whether only the covering paper should be so submitted; or whether nothing should be submitted to Cabinet in writing, in which case the Foreign Secretary would use the draft covering paper as speaking notes for Cabinet. In considering the desirability and the possible content of these papers, the Prime Minister agreed with the Foreign Secretary that we must seek to uphold the freedom of ~~free~~ passage through the Tiran Straits. They also agreed that they should not seek in principle to co-ordinate any tripartite (Anglo-U.S.-French) approach. The Prime Minister said that he was strongly opposed to Britain "going it alone". The Foreign Secretary asked whether in the event that no one else would go, we should not go. The Prime Minister said that we should know within the next few days of the prospects there were either for some kind of U.N. naval force or, failing U.N. action, for a concerted approach by a group of maritime powers. As things were at present, in the light both of the likely views of the Cabinet and of his own approach, he did not think that we should be able to look beyond that point and certainly not envisage action by the U.K. alone. Indeed, he himself would be most concerned if there were to be any question of action by Britain and the U.S. alone.

(3) The Prime Minister drew the Foreign Secretary's attention to a minute he had written that day about action to be taken if Kuwait and other Arab States took measures against the British oil supplies or installations

and the Foreign Secretary expressed himself in support of the Prime Minister's views. Sir Burke Trend was asked to establish urgently a working group under Cabinet Office chairmanship to prepare a paper which would be available for the Cabinet meeting on May 30.

(4) It was agreed that, subject to the views that were expected from the U.S. Government, who had already replied to Mr. Kosygin's message of May 28 to President Johnson, it would probably be unnecessary for the Prime Minister to send any reply to the identical message he had received from Mr. Kosygin, since this had crossed with the Prime Minister's own message to the Soviet Premier. But H.M. Ambassador in Paris should be asked to inquire whether the French Government had yet received any communication from the Soviet Government, particularly since a reply was still outstanding to their proposal for Four Power talks. The Prime Minister said that he did not accept the view expressed by Dean Rusk to Sir Patrick Dean that we should not be in touch with the French about Mr. Kosygin's messages. It was not essential at this stage to inform them that we and the Americans had received such messages. But equally he considered that we should do what we could to keep alive the prospect of a Four Power meeting, whether in the U.N. or elsewhere, despite the U.S. objections to this and the probability that the Russians would also be against it. We had considerations of European policy to take into account; and the fact that the Americans disliked the idea of

Four Power talks for fear of Vietnam being included in any eventual Agenda was not in itself a reason why we should be opposed. Even if the idea did not make headway at present, we might ourselves wish to revive it at some appropriate moment in the future.

(5) The Foreign Secretary reported, and the Prime Minister approved this, that he had authorised that day the despatch to Israel of a further 2,000 rounds of tank ammunition.

Copies to:-
Foreign Secretary.
Sir B. Trend.

29/5

May 29, 1967

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SECRET

Foreign Office
S.W.1

28 May, 1967.

Dear Michael,

I enclose the two papers on the Middle East crisis which the Prime Minister spoke about to the Foreign Secretary this evening. The bigger of the two papers is by Foreign Office officials (with some help from other Departments). The shorter covering paper is by the Foreign Secretary.

Since he saw the Prime Minister the Foreign Secretary has given further thought to whether it would be advisable to circulate these papers to Cabinet. On reconsideration, and in the light of substantial amendment of the officials' paper, the Foreign Secretary now feels strongly that it would be right to circulate both. Tactics apart, he feels that it would be only right that his colleagues should have the facts set out for them fully before being asked to take a decision on such important issues. On the other hand, he feels that it would be helpful for them to have the issues pulled together in a short covering note written on his own authority.

In addition to a copy for the Prime Minister, I enclose two spares for yourself and Burke Trend. This cover will be sent over to the Duty Clerk at No. 10 well before 8.30 a.m. tomorrow for despatch to Chequers.

The Foreign Secretary will be staying in Town and would like to speak to the Prime Minister about these papers when he has had time to read them. Perhaps we could get in touch about this tomorrow morning.

Finally, the Foreign Secretary has asked that the Prime Minister's attention should be drawn to paragraph 14 of the officials' paper. This is true, but if the Prime Minister decides, as we hope, to circulate this paper to Cabinet, he may feel that the presentation is unhelpfully stark. If so, it could be somewhat softened.

Yours ever,
Michael Stewart

A.M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.,
10 Downing Street.

SECRET

Memorandum by the Foreign Secretary

Middle East

The Middle East stands on the brink of war as a result of the Egyptian action in removing U.N.E.F. and threatening a blockade of Israel's sea route to the South through the Straits of Tiran. The Middle East is a region in which apart from our general interest in world peace we have great material, strategic and political interests.

2. If an Arab/Israel war broke out, and if it remained isolated, our best intelligence assessments are that the Israelis could probably win, but only after a hard battle and much destruction. Even that judgement is heavily hedged around.

3. If the Israelis stood in danger of losing the Americans have declared that "they could not stand by and see Israel driven into the sea". Equally, if the Israelis were winning, could the Soviet Union stand aside and see the countries they support suffer defeat?

4. I conclude that while it is possible that Israel might restore free passage through the Gulf by her own military action, the greater risk is of an Arab/Israel war escalating. We ought therefore to contribute what we can within our resources to international action to prevent such a war happening.

/ 5.

5. The Israelis will only be deterred from acting themselves to re-open the Straits of Tiran if they feel reasonably assured of an international settlement that keeps the Straits open for at least their oil supplies. And international action must from their point of view seem likely to be both swift and effective. Time is not on their side. Their Government is already under heavy criticism for not having reacted as soon as Egypt struck to remove the U.N. unit at the Straits and before Egypt had had time to assemble her present massive forces.

6. It was this sense of urgency that led the Cabinet to authorise contingency naval planning on an ad referendum basis with the Americans and preliminary diplomatic consultations with other maritime powers about asserting the international interest in keeping the Straits open.

7. Since then France has proposed four-power discussions on the crisis. We immediately welcomed this and I took it up directly with Mr. Kosygin in Moscow. The Prime Minister has been in personal touch during the weekend with President de Gaulle, Mr. Kosygin and President Johnson about speeding up such discussions and Lord Caradon has been pursuing the possibility of four-power discussions at the U.N.

/8.

8. It is now clear that the Soviet Union is not ready for any immediate Four Power discussions, though I would not by any means rule this out eventually. We must actively keep the option open. But for the reasons given above we cannot risk delaying the efforts to obtain the widest possible support for the idea of international action to keep the Straits open. If we are to have the best chance of Security Council authority for such a course, there should be active discussions of it now amongst friendly maritime powers. The contingency naval preparations with countries other than America ought also to proceed speedily if the possibility of multilateral escort forces is to be a credible element in a settlement. It may be that the international task force may never need to be activated. But its practicability is an essential factor in deterring both immediate war and in producing a final peaceful settlement that will not involve either Israel or Britain and other countries in a surrender of their essential interests.

9. What are these British interests and how can they be safeguarded? They are described in paragraphs 8 to 16 of the accompanying paper by Foreign Office officials. The point to which I wish to confine myself here is that there is now no course that avoids putting these interests at some risk. They were endangered from the moment President Nasser ejected the United Nations from the Straits. The real question is which course of events puts our interests

/least

least at risk for the shortest period of time. There are three main possibilities:

(a) War started by Israeli action against the blockade of the Straits;

(b) A settlement recognising free passage of the Straits; and

(c) A settlement acquiescing in the closure of the Straits.

10. Course (a) We would try to avoid being sucked in to an Arab/Israel war except as part of United Nations peace-keeping. But as the officials' paper makes clear, even if we succeeded in staying out, our interests would suffer from identification with Israel in Arab and Soviet propaganda. If the Americans became involved, we should have the agonising choice of measuring the further damage to our interests of supporting them, against the different but grave damage to our interests of parting company with the Americans on such an issue.

11. Courses (b) and (c). The main difference between (b) and (c) is that under (b) the risk to our interests of Arab retaliation is short-term and we can recover from it (as we have done since Suez). Under (c), on the other hand, the risk to our interests is delayed, but is likely to be much more permanent in the end. If Egypt is allowed to settle on the basis of blocking the Straits and retaining her diplomatic/military victory, the longer-term consequences of this appeasement are likely to include the following:

The Jordanian regime will be toppled.

The South Arabian settlement will be impossible except on Nasser's terms.

/Other

PRIME MINISTER

16. Where there is no direct knowledge etc. in sense feel.... nevertheless →

15 A. Makes Simonstown essential & makes us more defiant in S Africa

14-16.

Should be fore-going ~~7~~ any as all of these might occur if Israel) although I see I kept out. Heavily loaded might lead to cutting of Sofa-Limits, as a Nimrod downed with success might lead to further — eg. Red. blockade or threats to close canal.

Annex Macmillan statement of my reflections.

Last sentence of 39

Other regimes where our interests are concentrated (e.g. in the Persian Gulf) will be open to Nasserist/Soviet penetration. A war to destroy Israel will become inevitable.

12. There are great risks whatever we do (and in doing nothing) but I conclude that it will be wisest to persist with the course on which we are already set. This means pursuing our efforts at the United Nations for a suitable Security Council resolution and at the same time go ahead with the planning of practical ultilateral means of keeping the Straits of Tiran open.

13. It appears to follow from this judgment that it would be legitimate for the Royal Navy to escort British flag vessels through the Straits of Tiran and to resist by force any forcible attempt by the U.A.R. to prevent passage. But the threat or use of force against the U.A.R. except for the purpose of actually exercising the right of innocent passage, would be illegal.

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Paper by Foreign Office Officials

I. The Origins and Nature of the Crisis

It is the aim of this paper to deal with fundamental issues and to recommend a policy for H.M.G. It does not attempt to give any detailed account of how the present crisis arose so suddenly and unexpectedly, or speculate at any length on the motivations of the parties involved. On the face of it, it has resulted from a series of opportunist moves by President Nasser: a decision that he would have to intervene if Syrian terrorist attacks in Israel led to a large scale reprisal raid, as the Israelis were threatening; a consequent ostentatious movement of large forces into Sinai to deter an expected Israel attack on Syria; as part of this movement, a request to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to stand aside from the border; when the Commander of the Force objected, a demand for its withdrawal; and finally, when that demand was quickly accepted (perhaps to the surprise of the Egyptians) a decision to close the Straits of Tiran to Israel ships and "strategic cargoes" (mainly oil) bound for Israel.

2. It has always been an ultimate objective of the U.A.R. under President Nasser to eliminate Israel; but in recent years certain conditions have effectively guarded against the risk of a major U.A.R./Israel war. They were:

(a) the presence of the UNEF in Sinai and on the Straits of Tiran;

(b) the Egyptian belief in Israel's military superiority;

(c) the belief that the U.S. Sixth Fleet would ultimately prevent Israel being overwhelmed.

Over the past week (a) has been eliminated and (b) and (c)

/have

have been put in doubt. We still think it unlikely that the U.A.R. is so confident of success that it will attack Israel, but the closure of the Straits of Tiran, which Israel has always said would be a casus belli, indicates a willingness to risk conflict which is in contrast with Egyptian attitudes over the past ten years.

3. The effects of the two Egyptian coups - the expulsion of UNEF and reclosing of the Straits of Tiran - has been twofold: first, to bring the Middle East to the brink of war, and second, to alter drastically the balance of power in that area to the advantage of the Soviet Union and her clients among the Arab States, at the expense of the United States, ourselves, Israel and friendly Arab states.

4. This change has been achieved by methods which cut at the root of international behaviour. We have not enough information from which to judge whether or not the U.A.R. was directly stimulated by the Soviet Union, but its course of action has been facilitated by Soviet policies. The Soviet Union has for long pursued, without haste, a policy of increasing its position, and that of its ideology, in the Middle East. It started by favouring Israel against the Arabs, but in the mid-fifties changed sides, and has been able to outbid us for the favours of some Arab countries by open partisanship for the Arabs against Israel, supplying large quantities of arms, and mendacious propaganda typified by the "Pravda" statement of 24 May which gave unconditional support to the U.A.R. Government's actions. But, as elsewhere, the Soviet Union aims to avoid direct involvement in war.

5. There is a dnager that the momentum of these successful exercises in brinkmanship will cause the Egyptians to

/take

take more risks. There is disturbing evidence from all the Arab countries of the way in which the events of the past week are being celebrated as Arab victories and as a prelude to a successful campaign against the existence of Israel. Almost all Arabs, even those who are opposed to President Nasser and are threatened by the present turn of events, share the sense of national humiliation which the defeat of 1948 brought with it; and a dangerous head of steam is being built up which could get out of the control of governments and lead to an attack on Israel.

6. Our estimate, although the Israelis have expressed their conviction to the contrary, is that there is no such present intention on the part of the U.A.R. It is probably more likely that, having achieved these two successes, the Egyptians, with Russian support, will for the time being adopt the role of peaceloving guardians of the new situation whilst perhaps offering some "concessions" of no substance. Any steps taken by countries wishing to amend the situation will be represented as pro-Israel and anti-Arab - a point of great importance to us with our stake in the Arab world (see paragraphs 8 to 15) - and will be unpopular with the Afro-Asians in New York, especially if they can point to some alleged "compromise" package offered by the U.A.R. The attitude of the Security Council when faced with a real and urgent threat to the peace has been one of the more depressing aspects of this whole business.

7. The most crucial immediate danger point is the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israel shipping. The Israelis have declared since 1957 that they would treat this as a casus belli. On the one hand, they are anxious to avoid war because they know they would at best suffer heavily; they

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have postponed the need for a decision to resist, by delaying the arrival of ships at Elath; and they sent their Foreign Minister to Paris, London and Washington to look for some alternative. On the other hand, the Israel Foreign Minister has said that capitulation is impossible; and for the Israelis acquiescence in the present situation would only be a postponement of an inevitable conflict to avoid ultimate strangulation. After this experience it is all the more likely that Israel will embark on the production of nuclear weapons.

II. British Interests

A. Political

8. We are deeply involved in the Middle East, through CENTO, our commitments in the Persian Gulf and South Arabia and our traditional relationships with non-revolutionary as well as revolutionary Arab States. So long as this remains the case, we have an overriding interest in orderly rather than violent change and in preventing the spread of communism or the establishment of other forms of Soviet control over the area. We thus stand to be major losers if President Nasser's present cheap victories are acquiesced in. His enhanced prestige will enable him to intensify with greatly increased chances of success his campaign against "Arab reactionaries and Western imperialists", probably with increased Soviet support. Although all Arab nationalists will applaud him, many of those who are disposed to co-operate with the West will be deeply

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worried and discouraged if nothing is done to stop him. And our own policies of orderly disengagement in South Arabia and of modernisation in the Gulf will be made even more difficult of fulfilment. These political reverses would have economic consequences (see paragraph 11 below).

9. We also have an interest in acting in the Middle East in concert with our friends and allies, European as well as American. The days are past when we could take effective action on our own. Our national interest requires us to avoid involvement on our own in inter-Arab quarrels or in the Arab-Israel dispute but rather to give our support to international action through the United Nations and, as necessary, outside it to uphold international order.

10. We must recognise that in a crisis such as the present, even if we were to seek to stand aside entirely, we should be widely believed in the Arab world to be on Israel's side, a belief already being fostered by Soviet propaganda. We cannot therefore by inaction avoid damage to our interests and long term risks to our whole position in the area.

B. Economic

11. We have extensive economic interests in the Middle East which can be summarised as oil, trade, sterling balances held by Arab countries, and transit by sea and air. Whatever the outcome of the present situation they are likely to suffer. The consolidation of the U.A.R. victory could lead to the rapid undermining of the Arab states where our economic

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interests are concentrated and expanding. Oil supplies would no doubt continue but under more difficult terms and they would probably come under the control of basically hostile and pro-Soviet regimes. In case of war, apart from the disruption of trade and the possible general effect on sterling which would result from political uncertainty or war, we would, even though we stood aside, be regarded as pro-Israel. Action taken to support the principle of freedom of passage will be interpreted as anti-Arab. On the Arab/Israel issue, through conviction or necessity, all Arab Governments stand together. A clash with them on it incurs risks of the following consequences:-

(a) the closure of the Suez Canal to our ships;

(b) interference with oil supplies, either at source by Arab states or in transit;

(c) some sort of an Arab boycott against us;

(d) withdrawal of sterling balances e.g. by Kuwait.

But if Israel takes military action, irrespective of what we do or do not do, we may then in any case be exposed at least to some of the above consequences. This is because, even if we take no positive action, we shall be represented as pro-Israel or anti-Arab.

12. If we take positive action along with the Americans but without the French, the latter might try to represent in the Common Market context that we are dependent on the U.S. and to that extent non-European.

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13. Against this, it is an important general economic interest to defend the principle of free navigation.

C. Strategic

14. There is no direct British strategic interest in the Straits of Tiran. If they remain blocked we shall not, strategically speaking, lose anything, however unwelcome in other ways may be the precedent which will have been created.

15. Any action which arouses Arab hostility incurs the following risks. (They could also arise eventually if the U.A.R. continued its present course unchecked.)

(a) the closure to us of the Suez Canal with the consequence that any naval reinforcement East of Suez will have to proceed by way of the Cape;

(b) the loss of overflying and landing rights in all Arab countries. If these rights were lost in the Persian Gulf States, the consequences would be that we should be unable to use the CENTO route to the Middle and Far East unless Turkey and India (almost inconceivably) gave us staging rights. In these circumstances the only alternative open to us would be the more expensive and much longer Westabout route, which would be, at best, only a partial palliative. In any event we have not yet made all the preparation necessary for its regular use;

(c) there could be unwelcome repercussions which

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made our task in South Arabia harder;

(d) we should seriously jeopardise our position in Libya.

16. In addition, the following risks might be incurred in non-Arab countries:

(a) the Cyprus Government might exert pressure against the Sovereign Base Areas with the consequence that our future use of them and possibly, therefore, our ability to make a military contribution to CENTO would be impaired;

(b) we might want to withdraw naval forces from the Far East to assist at the Straits of Tiran (or elsewhere in the Middle East if the conflict had escalated) but by doing so might encourage the Chinese to seize the opportunity to intensify pressure on Hong Kong;

(c) we might, in the early stages, at least, need to withdraw temporarily our blockading force in Beira to assist at the Straits of Tiran with the consequence of opening a potentially large breach in our policy of sanctions against Rhodesia, and we should be doing this in a manner likely to draw censure from the Afro-Asian countries.

III. Possible Course of Events

(A) Resistance by Israel leading to an Arab/Israel War

17. The Israelis have apparently abandoned for the moment a plan for an air strike against the Egyptian guns and ships at the Straits of Tiran. It is just conceivable that such

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a strike might be effective. Our assessment is, however, that Egyptian prestige is too far engaged and that, even if the action began in this limited way, it would lead to a full-scale air battle over Israel and the U.A.R., and land battles in Sinai and to a lesser extent on other fronts.

18. It is still the British and American intelligence estimate that Israel could probably defeat, though at the cost of heavy damage, the U.A.R. and other Arab forces likely to be involved in fighting against her. However, the odds have shortened, and are continuing to shorten, since the Arab build up on the Israel frontiers began.

19. There is a school of opinion in Washington that the best way of meeting the present situation might be for the Israelis to put Nasser to the test on the closure of the Straits of Tiran and exercise the right of self-defence if there was interference with shipping. The Israelis could then deal with the Egyptians without western intervention except in support of international action to bring hostilities to an end. The objection to this thesis is that, unless the Israel victory was extremely rapid, there would be a very real risk of the U.S.S.R. giving military support, probably in the air, to the Arabs. At this point, the danger of a Soviet/American confrontation would be imminent. The decision in Washington appears to have gone against this course.

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20. If the battle went against Israel, the U.S. Government would be under the strongest pressure to intervene militarily to prevent Israel being overwhelmed. Here again the risk of direct U.S.S.R./U.S. confrontation would be imminent.

(B) Acceptance of the new situation by Israel

21. As time passes there is a growing chance that under American pressure and exhortations and promises of an political solution, the Israel Government, having failed to act initially, will continue to hold off.

22. If this situation continued indefinitely and no tolerable compromise was achieved internationally, this would amount to capitulation. The consequences for Israel and the West would then be very serious. The shift in the balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union would have been confirmed. The credibility of the U.S. cover to Israel would have been destroyed, the invincibility of the U.A.R. acting under cover of Russian support would have been established. The lessons of the past indicate that it would only be a matter of time before there were further attacks on Israel, on the non-revolutionary Arab states, and on western interests in the area.

(C) A compromise solution brought about by international action

23. Various possibilities are discussed below.

IV. Possible Courses of Action by Her Majesty's Government

The Lessons of History, 1938 and 1956

24. It is inevitable that the character of the events which have produced this critical situation should have suggested comparisons with 1938 and 1956; and it would be as well to

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have in mind the lessons to be drawn from those years. The lesson of 1938 is that, if a Power pursues aggressive and predatory policies amid widespread criticism and gets away with it, that Power will tend to go further and that its ambitions may well grow pari passu with its successes. There may well be no end to the process. The lesson of 1956 is that there is no sense in going to war on something which is not a legitimate casus belli (nationalisation of the Suez Canal in the terms of 1956 conditions) and in employing methods of doing so which go against established democratic and international practices - unless the nation so proceeding has overwhelming power or overwhelming backing. 1938 suffered from wholly faulty diagnosis of the purposes of those involved; it now appears that there was less faulty diagnosis in 1956, in the sense of an appreciation of Middle Eastern people and their purposes, but a totally false estimate of what, in a given situation, we should or could do. We need not make these mistakes this time.

25. Perhaps a nearer parallel than either 1938 or 1956 is the Cuba crisis of 1962, the difference in this case being that there is a double confrontation - between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and between Israel and the Arabs, and neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. can wholly control their protegés.

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Course A: In the Event of an Arab/Israel War

26. Her Majesty's Government have no obligation to intervene militarily in an Arab/Israel conflict. We regard the Tripartite Declaration (which was in any case only a declaration of intend) as inapplicable to present conditions, and the Macmillan statement of 14 May 1963 does not promise, much less commit us to, action outside the United Nations. For us to intervene in an Arab/Israel war on the Israel side could cause us to lose the whole of our economic and strategic interests in the Arab countries. Indeed, however hard we endeavoured to maintain an impartial position our national interests would be threatened. since the Russians would inevitably give full political and propaganda support to the Arabs, and we and the Americans would be identified with Israel.

27. If the Israelis had the upper hand, we would, especially in view of the danger of Russian involvement, need to use such influence as we had to restrain Israel from going too far beyond restoring the status quo ante 16 May.

28. If the Israelis were losing the battle, and the U.S. Government had to intervene militarily to prevent Israel being overwhelmed, we would be under strong pressure from the U.S. Government to join with them. We would be faced with the difficult problem of balancing the damage to our Middle East interests if we did, against the damage to our relations with the U.S. if we did not.

Course B; Acceptance of the new Situation by Israel

29. We would in this case have to face the serious consequences for our own position in the Middle East of this major change in the balance of power (see para 22 above) and for the

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world of this successful flouting of the international order.

Course C: A Compromise Solution brought about by International Action

30. There are four possibilities at present under discussion, which could be pursued separately or in combination. They would remain possible even if, in spite of our attempts to prevent it, war breaks out.

(i) East/West Co-operation

31. The French are right in saying that the problem could be settled by Quadripartite co-operation. Although there are good European reasons for welcoming this French initiative, the Foreign Secretary's talks in Moscow have shown that there is no chance of getting any help from the Russians so long as they believe that there is a chance of the U.A.R. getting away with its two victories. At best, there is no possibility of any early result from this.

(ii) Action at the United Nations

32. Unless the Israel Government takes military action against the U.A.R. in the near future, U.N. pressure is likely to mount for a compromise solution to preserve peace now at the expense of Israel. The Secretary-General has already pointed towards this in his report, which contains references to:

(a) an assurance given him by President Nasser that the U.A.R. will not initiate offensive action against Israel, and the Egyptians' aim to return to pre-1956 conditions and full observance of the Egypt/Israel armistice agreement;

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(b) the possibility of the revival of the Egypt/Israel Mixed Armistice Commission providing for a limited form of United Nations presence in the area;

(c) the need for control of activities in the Israel/Syria demilitarised zone;

(d) the existence on the one hand of legal doubts about the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, and on the other the dangerous consequences that could ensue from restricting passage;

(e) the need for a breathing spell in which to seek solutions for these problems.

33. Countries which wish to avoid taking up a political position will join with the pro-Arab group in drawing attention to doubts whether the Straits of Tiran are an international waterway. As the Annex B shows, the matter is further complicated by the question of belligerent rights. These doubts will combine with the fear of war to incline member States towards an inequitable compromise.

34. For the Israelis the essential feature of any settlement will be the degree of freedom for shipping to transit the Straits. President Nasser has declared in the most uncompromising terms his intention of blocking the passage of all Israeli ships, and ships of other nationalities bearing strategic goods (which we understand to include oil) to Elath.

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They also assert the right to stop and inspect ships in order to enforce their restrictions. If Israel were prepared to accept a compromise at all, the minimum terms it would be reasonable to press her to accept are probably the present position with an understanding that oil would not be regarded as a strategic material, and perhaps with some restricted access for Israeli shipping. But as part of such a compromise Israel and other powers would probably have to acquiesce in the position that the U.A.R. has a right to exercise some degree of control over the Straits of Tiran

(iii) Unilateral action by H.M.G. to open the Straits of Tiran

35. H.M.G. might inform the U.A.R. Government of their intention to maintain, with naval escorting vessels if necessary, the right of passage through the Straits of Tiran by British ships. We could then call on others to follow our lead. H.M.G. have a duty to protect British shipping and this action would be applauded by the British public. At the same time it would help to get the Straits open to all shipping.

36. The objections to this course are these:-

(a) President Nasser would probably accept the challenge and stop the passage of our ships unless we had a credible deterrent available. The escorting vessels, which would take time to assemble, would not themselves be able to force a passage if resisted, and we should also have to assemble forces likely to deter the U.A.R. and accept that a consequence could be full scale war with the U.A.R. It is very doubtful whether unilateral British action would deter.

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(b) By taking the lead in this way, even in a British as distinct from an Israeli interest, we would dangerously expose our interests in the Arab world, and draw on ourselves reprisals.

(c) We cannot count on others following our lead; and opinion in many countries would be prejudiced against the idea of action of this kind by us on account of Suez.

(iv) International action to open the Straits of Tiran

37. It is possible that the Israel Government could be more easily restrained from acting to open the Straits of Tiran if they were persuaded that countries supporting the principle of freedom of navigation would take effective action to open the Straits. The Israel Foreign Minister told the Prime Minister on 24 May that this was the course his Government would prefer. It would have the advantage of being action to defend a principle of international law of great importance to all maritime nations rather than action specifically to assist Israel; and a number of countries (including the U.K.) committed themselves in 1957 to support the principle of freedom of transit for all through the Straits of Tiran.

38. The Minister of State, Mr. George Thomson, has discussed such a scheme with the Americans and reached agreement ad referendum on both sides. Its essential elements are:

(a) Continued action in the United Nations to get as wide support as possible for the principle of freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran; so that even if there was a Soviet veto international support for some action could be shown.

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(b) A joint declaration by interested Governments to assert the freedom of passage through the Straits.

(c) The assembly of naval forces north of the Suez Canal in the Eastern Mediterranean as a deterrent to Egyptian interference; and the provision of escorts for shipping passing through the Straits. Further discussion would be required as to the possible role of a deterrent force in the Red Sea.

39. This plan could be presented as having wide support at the United Nations; and as genuinely international action in defence of an international principle rather than as action to assist Israel. But it would be misleading to suggest that these optimum conditions could ever be achieved. A declaration without teeth would not serve the purpose. Anything involving naval action outside the U.N. is likely to be seen as thinly disguised Anglo-American action in support of Israel. We can expect for it limited practical co-operation from one or two friendly European countries, support in principle from a few others, and reactions ranging from disapproval to hostility in the rest of the world.

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40. As against this grim picture must be set the following considerations:

(a) Soviet and U.A.R. tactics in this are based on the assumption that we and the Americans will not take forceful action and will restrain the Israelis.

(b) The revivified prestige of the U.A.R. could disappear almost as quickly as it appeared that the run of unexpected successes had been reversed. A show of determination could, therefore, change the situation very quickly, and former friendship might be resumed.

41. Such a course could not be recommended if the other possibilities were not so much more grim: viz. a full-scale Arab/Israel war within a matter of days or hours, or a major setback of western interests in an area of great importance, combined with a damaging blow to the international order.

42. The practical aspects and the time scale of this course of action are set out in Annex A. The legal aspects are discussed in Annex B.

43. Conclusion

(i) The effect of Nasser's action has been to alter drastically the balance of power in the Middle East to the advantage of the Soviet Union and her clients among the Arab States.

(ii) We should naturally look to the United Nations to redress the balance. But on present showing it is most unlikely to do so.

(iii) Action by us either alone or with our friends would

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would be interpreted as action on behalf of Israel. This would entail grave risks for our important interests in the Arab world and in particular for our Middle East oil.

(iv) On the other hand, failure to act could be even more damaging. It might lead to an Arab/Israel war with its risk of a direct confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Or, if Israel were obliged to accept the blockade of Aqaba, it would result in a Middle East effectively dominated by President Nasser under Soviet protection. All our interests there, including our oil, would then be at Soviet mercy.

(v) Whatever decision we take, therefore, even if it is to do nothing, may result in serious damage to our interests. We have to choose the course which offers the prospect of least damage.

(vi) Opinion, especially in the United Nations, seems to be moving in the direction of a compromise which would accept the withdrawal of UNEF and Egyptian control of the Straits of Tiran and include only nominal concessions to Israel. This would be tantamount to an Israeli surrender and would have the same damaging consequences (see (iv) above).

(vii) Some sort of equitable compromise is necessary if we are to avoid the dangers of war or capitulation. We have to decide what terms would be acceptable and what action we can take to achieve them.

(viii) An equitable compromise would have to provide at the very least for the passage of oil tankers through the Straits of Tiran to Elath. In return the Israelis might

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be persuaded to acquiesce in the exercise by the Egyptians of some degree of control of the Straits.

(ix) The present trend in the United Nations shows little chance of achieving such a compromise unless we and our friends demonstrate our determination to take any action, including the use of naval force, which may be necessary to assert the right of free passage through the Straits of Tiran.

(x) We should therefore press on with the proposals, worked out with the Americans, for a public declaration by the maritime powers and the provision of naval backing on an international basis.

44. Recommendations

(a) We should show our readiness to play a significant part in action with a substantially international character, inside or outside the U.N., to keep the Straits of Tiran open to international shipping including of course British shipping.

(b) We should work diplomatically and at the United Nations for an equitable compromise.

ANNEX A

INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO OPEN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN

PRACTICAL ASPECTS AND TIME SCALE

For the purposes of the calculations which follow, it has been assumed that the objective is to build up a force which could (with adequate support from units in the Eastern Mediterranean) escort merchant ships through the Straits of Tiran. It is assumed, throughout, that no British or United States units will be able to pass through the Suez Canal from North to South during the period in question.

2. Assuming that the Escort Force required would consist of 3 Escorts, 4 MCMs and 1 supporting tanker, how long would it take to assemble this Force in the Red Sea at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba?

At the very earliest an Anglo-American Escort Force could reach the area of the Straits of Tiran by 7 June. This does not take account of the period required for the assembly of a deterrent task force in the approaches to the Red Sea, if one were decided upon, but it is estimated that this could reach the area by approximately the same date. The limiting factor is the speed of the coastal minesweepers, which will arrive at Aden on 2 June. H.M.S. Hermes, accompanied by a frigate, will reach Aden on 31 May. In the event, the time factor would be dictated by the number of nations participating.

3. How long could this Escort Force remain on station, even if there were no losses requiring replacement?

If need be, the British element of the force could remain on station for two or three weeks, at the cost of some stress to the crews of the minesweepers, which are very small. This is the best guess that can be made in the absence of a detailed plan and the actual time would depend upon the intensity of activity and the availability

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of support facilities. To retain the force for a longer period would raise problems of roulement and entail bringing large forces to the area and require the provision of increased support facilities for the minesweepers. We are informed that the actual task of sweeping any mines which may already have been laid in the Straits of Tiran would only take a few hours if they were of an unsophisticated type. Other types would take longer. It is not absolutely certain that any have been laid.

4. What other naval forces of allied maritime nations are already within reasonable range?

The U.S.S. Fiske (Destroyer) is at Massawa and the U.S.S. Joseph P. Kennedy (Destroyer) is due at Aden in two days' time. A U.S. converted sea-plane tender, the Valcour, is at Jedda. In addition, there are one French coastal minesweeper and a very small French patrol vessel at Djibouti. No other allied vessels are known to be in the area south of the Canal. A number of NATO navies have considerable naval forces in the Mediterranean.

5. If there were a call for inclusion in the force of a DLG (guided missile destroyer), how long would it take to get this DLG into position?

We are told that the DLG could arrive off Aden within six days if the order were given today.

6. One of the additional measures which might be taken against the United Arab Republic might be the employment of electronic countermeasures. Would these require additional vessels or aircraft in the immediate area of the Gulf of Aqaba?

No. It is understood that these measures would be undertaken by the units taking part in active operations and would not call for

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any additional forces in the Straits of Tiran area. The most likely area of such operations would be in the Eastern Mediterranean, where they would be undertaken by forces already there.

7. To what extent, and how soon, can the United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas (S.B.A.s) in Cyprus become self-defending?

We are told that the S.B.A.s could be made self-defending against possible air and ground attack within the time-scale of the preparations of escort operations in the Gulf of Aqaba.

(a) Air Defence

A squadron of Lightning fighters is already in Cyprus. Another squadron could be flown to Cyprus well within the period of preparation (i.e. before 7 June). A section of Bloodhound air defence missiles is at present in Libya and could, together with Bloodhounds from the U.K., be deployed at the S.B.A.s in Cyprus within the same period.

(b) Land Defence

The additional ground forces necessary for the defence of the S.B.A.s could be flown from the United Kingdom within the preparatory period.

8. Additional Naval Units in the area

Apart from Portuguese naval units in the Mozambique area, there are, as far as can be reliably ascertained without making enquiries in the capitals concerned, no other NATO warships anywhere within reasonable range south of the Canal. But we believe that Ethiopia has at Massawa, in addition to the 1800 ton training ship "Ethiopia", five small coastal patrol craft and that Iran has in the Khorramshahr area one or possibly two frigates, four coastal minesweepers and one landing ship converted for use as a coastal patrol craft. Clearly none of

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these has any direct military relevance.

9. Preparations

The fact that preparations were being made would become public knowledge.

27 May, 1967

ANNEX B

Note on Legal Aspects

A. The right of innocent passage

It is well-established in international law that in time of peace:

(i) the ships of all States are entitled to a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of another state.

(ii) passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.

(iii) the coastal State must not hamper innocent passage through the territorial sea.

(iv) the coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent.

(v) subject to (vi), the coastal State may without discrimination amongst foreign ships, suspend the right of innocent passage temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security.

(vi) there shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas

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or the territorial sea of a foreign State.

(See Articles 14 to 16 of the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Territorial Sea.)

2. There would appear to be no doubt that ships to and from Eilat (and other ports in the Gulf of Aqaba) are entitled in time of peace to a right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran under these rules, and in particular that rule (vi) applies in respect of them. This is so irrespective of whether there is any area of high seas in the Gulf of Aqaba or whether it comprises only territorial waters of the coastal States.

3. In order to gain access to Eilat it is, of course, necessary to pass through Egyptian or Saudi territorial waters both in the Straits of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba itself. There may be some doubt as to whether rule (vi) applies in respect of, for instance, Egyptian or Saudi territorial waters at the northern end of the Gulf, but it is believed that an international tribunal would, in the light of the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention, be likely to treat rule (vi) as applying throughout the length of the Gulf.

4. There is, however, the question whether the U.A.R., having regard to the present state of tension between her and Israel, is entitled under the above rules to prevent the passage of ships carrying cargoes of strategic value to Israel on the grounds that such passage cannot be regarded as innocent. There is clearly room for argument

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on this point, but the better view probably is that the innocency of a passage must be judged by whether the vessel, while in the course of passage, constitutes a threat to the security of the coastal State and does not depend on the use to which its cargo may ultimately be put. It may, therefore, be argued that the free passage of a vessel carrying strategic materials or oil to Israel does not itself constitute a threat to the security of the U.A.R., that Israel is perfectly entitled to acquire the equipment necessary for her self-defence and oil for her peaceful needs, and therefore the passage of such vessels may not be interfered with in the absence of a situation entitling the U.A.R. to exercise belligerent rights. Nevertheless, having regard to the present relations between Israel and the U.A.R., the contrary view might prevail in an international tribunal such as the International Court of Justice.

B. Is the U.A.R. entitled to exercise belligerent rights against Israel?

5. The U.A.R. is not entitled to exercise belligerent rights unless she is at war with Israel. Merely to claim to exercise belligerent rights is not, in itself, sufficient to create a state of war. Therefore, in the absence of a declaration of war by either Israel or the U.A.R., it is necessary to consider the relations actually existing between the two States.

6. The relationship is a complicated one. It stems from the hostilities that broke out in 1948 and the Armistice Agreement of 1949 between Egypt and Israel.

From the legal point of view, it is complicated by the fact that Egypt does not recognise Israel as a State and that Israel no longer regards the Armistice Agreement as in force.

7. Nevertheless, before 1956, the view of Her Majesty's Government was that with the lapse of time it became increasingly difficult to maintain that there was a state of war between Egypt and Israel. Although some doubt arose as a result of the Suez crisis, the view that any state of war has been eradicated by the passage of time now seems to be the better one.

8. Even as long ago as September 1951, the Security Council (Res. 95) considered "that since the armistice regime, which has been in existence for nearly two and a half years, is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self defence."

9. On the other hand, the U.A.R. has long maintained that, in spite of the Armistice Agreement, it is in a state of war with Israel, while confirming their adherence to the Armistice Agreement.

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10. In these circumstances, while the legal position must remain open to argument, it would be perfectly respectable view to say that Egypt is not entitled to exercise belligerent rights against Israeli ships.

C. Assertion of the right of innocent passage

11. On the assumption that the U.A.R. is not entitled to interference with the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran, what action by Her Majesty's Government and other Governments, otherwise than under the authority of the United Nations, is permissible to assert the right?

12. In the Corfu Channel Case the International Court held in effect that if a State has a right which it is entitled to exercise and another State wrongly or forcibly persists in interfering with its exercise, the first State is not bound to submit to the lawless use of force by the second but may lawfully assert its right by the threat or use of force. Thus, in circumstances in which Albania was denying the right of passage through the Corfu Channel by the use of shore batteries, the Court upheld the right of the United Kingdom to send warships through the straits with the crews at action-stations prepared to use force in self-defence during the passage if attacked from the shore. On the other hand, the Court declared that subsequent action taken by the Royal Navy to remove mines from the Channel was a violation of Albanian Sovereignty.

/ 13.

DRAFT MESSAGE TO MR. KOSYGIN

The Foreign Secretary has given me a full account of his talks in Moscow and has told me of the frankness and cordiality with which they were conducted. He has also conveyed the very kind personal messages of greeting from Mr. Podgorny and yourself. I am most grateful for these and warmly reciprocate them. ~~I should be grateful if you would also convey a message of good wishes from myself to Mr. Podgorny.~~

2. I know that the Foreign Secretary's talks with Mr. Gromyko ranged over many subjects. But I believe that you and we agree that perhaps the most urgent problem confronting us today is the preservation of peace in the Middle East. My purpose here is not to discuss the rights or wrongs. I know there will be disagreement between us about them. But we are on common ground in the search for peace and all of us have a clear duty to make ~~must surely~~ ~~bend~~ every effort in our power to prevent a situation developing which could lead to a major confrontation between the great powers of the world.

3. I was heartened by what George Brown told me of your personal resolve that the crisis in the Middle East should not be allowed to escalate into such a confrontation. As he told you, we share this resolution; and I think it is clear from what has been said by other leading statesmen and particularly by President Johnson and President de Gaulle that this desire for peace to avoid conflict is common to us all.

But none of us, even if we wished, can claim to control events in such an explosive area. And it is in problems of this kind that the ~~xxixgx~~ seeds of previous world wars have grown. I believe we are confronted with a situation of great urgency and great danger.

It was for this reason that, as you will have seen, we welcomed the proposal of the French Government that the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States, France and Britain - with the special responsibilities that the world community recognises us ~~to~~ have (that the form of) - should concert their efforts to work for peace in the Middle East; and that since this matter is essentially one for the United Nations, it was appropriate that we should do this at the United Nations, by consultation between our four permanent representatives there. I understand from the French Government that they still await your reply to this proposal which has of course also been accepted by the United States Government. I urge you with all the emphasis at my command to accept this proposal and to authorize the Soviet permanent representative at the United Nations to enter into consultation with his French, United States and British colleagues. I suggest that this should be within the context of the ~~xxxxxxx~~ meeting of the Security Council for which Lord Caradon has been instructed to press as a matter of urgency and which will be considering the reports of the Secretary General.

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Many thanks for your message. I am grateful too for the very full account we have had of Eban's talks with yourself and others in Washington. I warmly welcome the insistence with which you urged caution on the Israelis. But I am addressing you now because I fear that, despite all your efforts and ours, there must be a serious likelihood that, after the Israeli Cabinet has met tomorrow to consider Eban's Report you and we will find ourselves confronted with what could amount to an Israeli ultimatum - that, if we do not give them even more categorical assurances than both of us have given so far about the right of passage through the Straits of Tiran, they will feel obliged to assert those rights by force, in whatever manner and at whatever time seem most appropriate to them.

A ~~But this~~ would open up a dramatic prospect of great power confrontation in an area where, as I said to you the other day, none of us can hope to control the local combatants, except perhaps by such direct military involvement on one side or the other as to constitute an unavoidable challenge to the other side. The potential dangers of that happening are such as to make it essential that everything is done to avoid it. I have in mind particularly the need to avoid a situation in which ~~the~~ it could seem to the world ~~could say~~ - and, even more important, ~~perhaps~~ the Soviet Union would be ~~forced to recognise~~ enabled to claim - that the United States and Britain were taking sides militarily in the Arab-Israel conflict.

In fact/

A.

George Thomson and your people made good progress this week and now the military are following this up urgently. It is clear that we should seen have a workable scheme, though I know you agree with me that it is vitally important that we should plan to develop this through the U.N., if possible, and in any case on the widest possible basis of international co-operation (even if you and we are going to have to do most of the donkey work). But I am gravely concernad at the time factor. An Israeli ultimatum (or something like it) on the lines I have suggested would open up . . . .

2.

In fact we have made it clear that our commitment is limited to keeping the Straits free and given a workable scheme this is what we should do with you and any others we can persuade to join us. But, as I said in my earlier message, we can be under no illusion that we shall easily get them to do so unless we have demonstrably exhausted the U.N. possibilities. And part of this effort at the UN must, I am convinced turn around an attempt to get the Russians involved on a four power basis. We are going into this with our eyes open, knowing full well that French and Soviet estimates of the possibilities are probably different from our own. But we believe that we must exploit the intrinsic merit ~~note~~ in the four power approach, which is to get the Russians to face up to their responsibilities to prevent a really dangerous confrontation. We may not succeed; probably we shall not. But our public opinion will not I believe understand or support what we may have to do hereafter if we cannot show convincingly that we have tried.

Accordingly, I want you to know that I have tonight sent a personal message to Kosygin urging on him the dangers of the situation and inviting him to get Federenko to join with Goldberg, Seydoux and Caradon, in the context of the present meeting of the Security Council to see whether it really is impossible for them to hammer out something which could make sense in this crazy Middle Eastern situation. One of the main reasons I have done this was becuase George Brown

has come back from Moscow convinced that the Russians are beginning to realise the gravity of the situation for which they themselves are so largely responsible and are really concerned to avoid an escalation into a major confrontation. I am not so naive as to believe that this means they will co-operate with us at New York. But I believe it is our duty to try. If we fail and if the Security Council likewise fails then I believe that there are enough countries in the world with the sense to realise that world peace is more important even than trying to go on working through an impotent United Nations, and with the guts to stand up and be counted. In those circumstances, we should I believe get the broad basis of support that we want for our declaration and for any eventual enforcement action - who knows, perhaps even France might agree?

I need not say that in addressing Kosygin I have had much in mind your own reservations about four power action outside the U.N. framework; and I have said nothing to him about any four power activity anywhere else or at any other level.

I am of course informing de Gaulle as well. We have heard today from the French that they still have no reply from the Russians. But he clearly can have no objection to my urging Kosygin to support a "French initiative".

and they seem content simply to sit tight and wait for it to turn up, as I delay were what they really wanted.

Subject.

S E C R E T COPY NO.....

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 5505 28 MAY, 1967

T144/67

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 5505 OF 28 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR LORD CARADON) AND TEL AVIV.

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. HAS BEEN SENT OVER THE USUAL CHANNEL TODAY.

BEGINS.

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE. I AM GRATEFUL TOO FOR THE VERY FULL ACCOUNT WE HAVE HAD OF EBAN'S TALKS WITH YOURSELF AND OTHERS IN WASHINGTON. I WARMLY WELCOME THE INSISTENCE WITH WHICH YOU URGED CAUTION ON THE ISRAELIS. BUT I AM ADDRESSING YOU NOW BECAUSE I FEAR THAT, DESPITE ALL YOUR EFFORTS AND OURS, THERE MUST BE A SERIOUS LIKELIHOOD THAT, AFTER THE ISRAELI CABINET HAS MET TOMORROW TO CONSIDER EBAN'S REPORT YOU AND WE WILL FIND OURSELVES CONFRONTED WITH WHAT COULD AMOUNT TO AN ISRAELI ULTIMATUM - THAT IF WE DO NOT GIVE THEM EVEN MORE CATEGORICAL ASSURANCES THAN BOTH OF US HAVE GIVEN SO FAR ABOUT THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, THEY WILL FEEL OBLIGED TO ASSERT THOSE RIGHTS BY FORCE, IN WHATEVER MANNER AND AT WHATEVER TIME SEEM MOST APPROPRIATE TO THEM. THIS IS THE VITAL ISSUE, CLOSURE OF THE STRAIT IS WHAT NASSER HAS GAINED. IT AFFECTS A VITAL ISRAELI INTEREST.

GEORGE THOMSON AND YOUR PEOPLE MADE GOOD PROGRESS THIS WEEK AND NOW THE MILITARY ARE FOLLOWING THIS UP URGENTLY. IT IS CLEAR THAT WE SHOULD SOON HAVE A WORKABLE SCHEME, THOUGH I KNOW YOU AGREE WITH ME THAT IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD PLAN TO DEVELOP THIS THROUGH THE U.N., IF POSSIBLE, AND IN ANY CASE ON THE WIDEST POSSIBLE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION (EVEN IF YOU AND WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO DO MOST OF THE DONKEY WORK). BUT I AM GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE TIME FACTOR. AN ISRAELI ULTIMATUM (OR SOMETHING /LIKE IT)

S E C R E T

LIKE IT) ON THE LINES I HAVE SUGGESTED WOULD OPEN UP A DRAMATIC PROSPECT OF GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION IN AN AREA WHERE, AS I SAID TO YOU THE OTHER DAY, NONE OF US CAN HOPE TO CONTROL THE LOCAL COMBATANTS, EXCEPT PERHAPS BY SUCH DIRECT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER AS TO CONSTITUTE AN UNAVOIDABLE CHALLENGE TO THE OTHER SIDE. THE POTENTIAL DANGERS OF THAT HAPPENING ARE SUCH AS TO MAKE IT ESSENTIAL THAT EVERYTHING IS DONE TO AVOID IT. I HAVE IN MIND PARTICULARY THE NEED TO AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH IT COULD SEEM TO THE WORLD - AND, EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE ENABLED TO CLAIM - THAT THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN WERE TAKING SIDES MILITARILY IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT. IN FACT WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT OUR COMMITMENT IS ADDRESSED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAIT AS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY. AND GIVEN A WORKABLE SCHEME THIS IS WHAT WE SHOULD DO WITH YOU AND ANY OTHERS WE CAN PERSUADE TO JOIN US. BUT, AS I SAID IN MY EARLIER MESSAGE, WE CAN BE UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT WE SHALL EASILY GET THEM TO DO SO UNLESS WE HAVE DEMONSTRABLY EXHAUSTED THE U.N. POSSIBILITIES. AND PART OF THIS EFFORT AT THE U.N. MUST, I AM CONVINCED TURN AROUND AN ATTEMPT TO GET THE RUSSIANS INVOLVED ON A FOUR POWER BASIS. WE ARE GOING INTO THIS WITH OUR EYES OPEN, KNOWING FULL WELL THAT FRENCH AND SOVIET ESTIMATES OF THE POSSIBILITIES ARE LIKELY TO BE DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT WE MUST EXPLOIT THE INTRINSIC MERIT IN THE FOUR POWER APPROACH, WHICH IS TO GET THE RUSSIANS TO FACE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO PREVENT A REALLY DANGEROUS CONFRONTATION. WE MAY NOT SUCCEED: PROBABLY WE SHALL NOT. BUT OUR PUBLIC OPINION WILL NOT I BELIEVE UNDERSTAND OR SUPPORT WHAT WE MAY HAVE TO DO HEREAFTER IF WE CANNOT SHOW CONVINCINGLY THAT WE HAVE TRIED.

ACCORDINGLY, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I HAVE TONIGHT SENT A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO KOSYGIN URGING ON HIM THE DANGERS OF THE SITUATION AND INVITING HIM TO GET FEDERENKO TO JOIN WITH GOLDBERG, SEYDOUX AND /CARADON,

CARADON, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO SEE WHETHER IT REALLY IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO HAMMER OUT SOMETHING WHICH COULD MAKE SENSE IN THIS CRAZY MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION. ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS I HAVE DONE THIS WAS BECAUSE GEORGE BROWN HAS COME BACK FROM MOSCOW CONVINCED THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE BEGINNING TO REALISE THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION FOR WHICH THEY THEMSELVES ARE SO LARGELY RESPONSIBLE AND ARE REALLY CONCERNED TO AVOID AN ESCALATION INTO A MAJOR CONFRONTATION. I AM NOT SO NAIVE AS TO BELIEVE THAT THIS MEANS THEY WILL CO-OPERATE WITH US AT NEW YORK. BUT I BELIEVE IT IS OUR DUTY TO TRY. IF WE FAIL AND IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL LIKEWISE FAILS THEN I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE ENOUGH COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD WITH THE SENSE TO REALISE THAT WORLD PEACE IS MORE IMPORTANT EVEN THAN TRYING TO GO ON WORKING THROUGH AN IMPOTENT UNITED NATIONS, AND WITH THE GUTS TO STAND UP AND BE COUNTED. IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE SHOULD I BELIEVE GET THE BROAD BASIS OF SUPPORT THAT WE WANT FOR OUR DECLARATION AND FOR ANY EVENTUAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION - WHO KNOWS, PERHAPS EVEN FRANCE MIGHT AGREE?

I NEED NOT SAY THAT IN ADDRESSING KOSYGIN I HAVE HAD MUCH IN MIND YOUR OWN RESERVATIONS ABOUT FOUR POWER ACTION OUTSIDE THE U.N. FRAMEWORK: AND I HAVE SAID NOTHING TO HIM ABOUT ANY FOUR POWER ACTIVITY ANYWHERE ELSE OR AT ANY OTHER LEVEL.

I AM OF COURSE INFORMING DE GAULLE AS WELL. WE HAVE HEARD TODAY FROM THE FRENCH THAT THEY STILL HAVE NO REPLY FROM THE RUSSIANS. AND THEY SEEM CONTENT SIMPLY TO SIT TIGHT AND WAIT FOR IT TO TURN UP, AS IF DELAY WERE WHAT THEY REALLY WANTED BUT THE FRENOCH CLEARLY CAN HAVE NO OBJECTION TO MY URGING KOSYGIN TO SUPPORT A 'FRENCH INITIATIVE'.

SINCE I WROTE THIS, WE HAVE HEARD FROM PAT DEAN OF THE RUSSIAN APPROACH TO YOU. I NOTE THAT YOU WILL BE SENDING A MESSAGE TO ESHKOL. I DO NOT THINK I NEED SEND HIM ANY FURTHER MESSAGE SINCE

/OUR

S E C R E T

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 5505 TO WASHINGTON
4.

OUR AMBASSADOR IN ISRAEL WAS INSTRUCTED THIS AFTERNOON (IN THE LIGHT OF A SOMEWHAT OMINOUS REMARK TO GEORGE THOMSON BY THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HERE) TO MAKE A FURTHER URGENT APPROACH TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT URGING THEM TO MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT POLICY OF RESTRAINT WHILE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION CONTINUE.

I THINK THIS LATEST NEWS ADDS FORCE TO THE APPROACH I HAVE MADE TO KOSYGIN AS DESCRIBED IN THIS MESSAGE.

ENDS.

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOSFA SENT 0510Z 28 MAY, 1967

PRISEC (F.O.)

S E C R E T

PRO DOCUMENT
PUT IN PLACE

- 2 FEB 1999

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OF REVIEW

(date) 17-3-97

(Signed) T. R. Green

I think these are important.

Itw.

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister.

The 3 messages.

Kosygin – No change.

de Gaulle – A verbal
declaration – no
word whether yes.

U.S.S. – Three changes
proposed by
Foreign Sec
and shown in
attached copy.
I agreed to this.

PWH
28/5

To De Gaulle.

I write to thank you for your message of today and to say how much I welcome the tone of sincerity & concern and of purpose that I found in it.

As you say, this affair is far from being ended. ~~Rock~~ Instead, I fear an uneasy awareness that a new and more violent chapter may be about to begin unless those of us who, as you say, have a special responsibility are prepared to discharge it. We indeed welcomed your proposal for Four Power consultation on New York. But I was very sorry to learn from Sir Patrick Dean of the Soviet Govt. have still vouchsafed you no reply. This is ~~not~~ a serious matter, as the Security Council begins what may well

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT DE GAULLE

prove to be a truly vital debate; and, even more, as the Russian guns in the Middle East and the danger of war, as I believe, increases.

At ~~According by K~~ Kirsanov ? wish you to hear ? have today addressed myself personally to M. Kosygin on this subject. I have sought to draw his attention to the grave dangers of a major confrontation that are inherent in the present situation: And ? have invited him most urgently to instruct the Soviet Permanent Representative at the United Nations to join with M. Seydoux, Mr Goldberg and Lord Caradon, in the context of the present meeting of the Security Council to seek some agreement which could then be ratified by the Council.

I am sure ~~that your~~ Govt. will ~~agree with me that no excessive hopes should be attached to the possibility of a truly constructive Soviet response to~~

the Arab/Israel conflict; for, make no mistake,

A.

Other approaches. ~~Before~~ I wish first ~~should~~ ~~inform you~~ that the Foreign Secretary returned from Moscow convinced that the Soviet Govt. are beginning to realize the gravity of the situation and are concerned ~~to avoid it~~ that it should not develop into a major power confrontation. Without ~~too great~~ illusions, therefore, I believe it to be our duty to support your approach, at a high level, with the Soviet Govt. ~~two great Powers~~ through ~~I do not pretend for~~

→ Let our two Govts by all means, as you suggest, keep in the closest contact in regard to this tragic situation.

I too much look forward to the pleasure of seeing you [illegible]

I hope that this approach by the two European members of the Five Power group will stimulate a favourable Soviet response. Meanwhile,

Subject.

COPY NO.....

S E C R E T

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No T143/67

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

TELNO 1432 28 MAY, 1967
SECRET
ADDSD MOSCOW TELNO. 1432 OF 28/5 RPTD FOR INFMN WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR LORD CARADON) PARIS AND
TEL AVIV.

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MR. KOSYGIN.

BEGINS.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAS GIVEN ME A FULL ACCOUNT OF HIS TALKS IN MOSCOW AND HAS TOLD ME OF THE FRANKNESS AND CORDIALITY WITH WHICH THEY WERE CONDUCTED. HE HAS ALSO CONVEYED THE VERY KIND PERSONAL MESSAGES OF GREETING FROM MR. PODGORNY AND YOURSELF. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THESE AND WARMLY RECIPROCATE THEM.

I KNOW THAT THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S TALKS WITH MR. GROMYKO RANGED OVER MANY SUBJECTS. BUT I BELIEVE THAT YOU AND WE AGREE THAT PERHAPS THE MOST URGENT PROBLEM CONFRONTING US TODAY IS THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. MY PURPOSE HERE IS NOT TO DISCUSS THE RIGHTS OR WRONGS. I KNOW THERE WILL BE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN US ABOUT THEM. BUT WE ARE ON COMMON GROUND IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND ALL OF US HAVE A CLEAR DUTY TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT IN OUR POWER TO PREVENT A SITUATION DEVELOPING WHICH COULD LEAD TO A MAJOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS OF THE WORLD.

I WAS HEARTENED BY WHAT GEORGE BROWN TOLD ME OF YOUR PERSONAL RESOLVE THAT THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ESCALATE INTO SUCH A CONFRONTATION. AS HE TOLD YOU, WE SHARE THIS RESOLUTION: AND I THINK IT IS CLEAR FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID BY OTHER LEADING STATESMEN AND PARTICULARLY BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

/AND

AND PRESIDENT DE GAULLE THAT THIS DESIRE TO AVOID CONFLICT IS COMMON TO US ALL.

BUT NONE OF US, EVEN IF WE WISHED, CAN CLAIM TO CONTROL EVENTS IN SUCH AN EXPLOSIVE AREA. AND IT IS IN PROBLEMS OF THIS KIND THAT THE SEEDS OF PREVIOUS WORLD WARS HAVE GROWN. I BELIEVE WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH A SITUATION OF GREAT URGENCY AND GREAT DANGER.

IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT, AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN, WE WELCOMED THE PROPOSAL OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE AND BRITAIN - WITH THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY RECOGNISES THAT THE FOUR OF US HAVE - SHOULD CONCERT THEIR EFFORTS TO WORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AND THAT SINCE THIS MATTER IS ESSENTIALLY ONE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, IT WAS APPROPRIATE THAT WE SHOULD DO THIS AT THE UNITED NATIONS, BY CONSULTATION BETWEEN OUR FOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES THERE. I UNDERSTAND FROM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT THAT THEY STILL AWAIT YOUR REPLY TO THIS PROPOSAL WHICH HAS OF COURSE ALSO BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. I URGE YOU WILL ALL THE EMPHASIS AT MY COMMAND TO ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL AND TO AUTHORIZE THE SOVIET PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS TO ENTER INTO CONSULTATION WITH HIS FRENCH, UNITED STATES AND BRITISH COLLEAGUES. I SUGGEST THAT THIS SHOULD BE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR WHICH LORD CARADON HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PRESS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY AND WHICH WILL BE CONSIDERING THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

I DO NOT OFTEN ADDRESS YOU PERSONALLY IN THIS WAY. BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE ARE ALL AT A GRAVE TURNING POINT IN WORLD AFFAIRS: AND THAT OUR COMMON INTEREST IN THE PEACE OF THE WORLD REQUIRES US TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER.

/I SEND

I SEND YOU MY WARM REGARDS, PENDING OUR NEXT MEETING. THE FACT THAT THE MIDDLE EAST IS AT PRESENT THE MOST URGENT OF OUR PROBLEMS DOES NOT , UNFORTUNATELY, MEAN THAT IT IS THE ONLY ONE. I FEEL IT MAY BE URGENT ALSO FOR US VERY SOON TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE CONTINUING TRAGEDY OF VIETNAM.

ENDS.

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOSFA - SENT 0633Z 28 MAY, 1967

PRISEC (F.O.)

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(date) 17-3-97

(Signed) T.R. Green

Delived to Elysée 11.15am
28/5.

Subject

COPY NO. PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No. T 145/67

S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS
TELNO 1517 28 MAY, 1967

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO PARIS TELEGRAM NO 1517 OF 28 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR LORD CARADON) AND TEL AVIV.

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DE GAULLE.

BEGINS.

I WRITE TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF TODAY AND TO SAY HOW MUCH I WELCOME THE SENSE OF COMMUNITY OF CONCERN AND OF PURPOSE THAT I FOUND IN IT.

AS YOU SAY, THIS AFFAIR IS FAR FROM BEING ENDED. INDEED I HAVE AN UNEASY AWARENESS THAT A NEW AND MORE VIOLENT CHAPTER MAY BE ABOUT TO BEGIN UNLESS THOSE OF US WHO, AS YOU SAY, HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY ARE PREPARED TO DISCHARGE IT. WE INDEED WELCOMED YOUR PROPOSAL FOR FOUR POWER CONSULTATION AT NEW YORK. BUT I WAS VERY SORRY TO LEARN FROM SIR PATRICK REILLY THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAVE STILL VOUCHSAFED YOU NO REPLY. THIS IS A SERIOUS MATTER, AS THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEGINS WHAT MAY WELL PROVE TO BE A TRULY VITAL DEBATE: AND EVEN MORE, AS THE TENSION GROWS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE DANGER OF WAR, AS I BELIEVE, INCREASES.

I WISH YOU TO KNOW THAT THE FOREIGN SECRETARY RETURNED FROM MOSCOW CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ARE BEGINNING TO REALIZE THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION AND ARE CONCERNED THAT IT SHOULD NOT DEVELOP INTO A MAJOR POWER CONFRONTATION. WITHOUT ILLUSIONS, THEREFORE BUT BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT TO BE OUR DUTY TO SUPPORT YOUR APPROACH, AT A HIGH LEVEL WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT I HAVE TODAY ADDRESSED MY SELF PERSONALLY TO MR. KOSYGIN ON THIS SUBJECT. I HAVE SOUGHT TO DRAW HIS ATTENTION TO THE GRAVE DANGERS OF A MAJOR CONFRONTATION THAT ARE INHERENT IN / THE SITUATION:

S E C R E T

THE SITUATION: AND I HAVE INVITED HIM MOST URGENTLY TO INSTRUCT THE SOVIET PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS TO JOIN WITH M. SEYDOUX, MR. GOLDBERG AND LORD CARADON, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO SEEK SOME AGREEMENT WHICH COULD THEN BE FORMALLY ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL.

I HOPE THAT THIS APPROACH BY THE TWO EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE FOUR POWER GROUP WILL STIMULATE A FAVOURABLE SOVIET RESPONSE. MEANWHILE, LET OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS BY ALL MEANS, AS YOU SUGGEST, KEEP IN THE CLOSEST CONTACT IN REGARD TO THIS TRAGIC SITUATION.

I TOO MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO THE PLEASURE OF SEEING YOU NEXT MONTH.

ENDS.

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOSFA SENT 0822Z 28 MAY, 1967

PRISEC (F.O.)

Middle East (War) Pt 2
T 146/67

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office
S.W.1

28 May, 1967.

Dear Michael,

The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires called on the Foreign Secretary this morning to deliver a message from Kosygin to the Prime Minister. I enclose the text.

After Mr. Vasev had read the text to the Foreign Secretary, subsequent discussion was brief. The Foreign Secretary drew attention to our interest in getting the Four Power consultations started and asked Mr. Vasev whether the Soviet Government had yet reached a decision. Mr. Vasev said that to the best of his knowledge they had not.

The Foreign Secretary emphasised to Mr. Vasev that the real area of danger was the Gulf of Aqaba. He asked him to impress two aspects of this issue on the Soviet Government. The first was that it was hard to see how Israel could continue to acquiesce in a measure that involved her own destruction; the second was that, as a maritime power, we had a substantial interest of our own in maintaining freedom of navigation through international waterways.

The Foreign Secretary also told Mr. Vasev of the message sent to Kosygin last night.

Yours ever,
Michael

A.M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.,
10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL URGENT

T146/67

TRANSLATION

27 May, 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

According to information reaching the Soviet Government the State of Israel is stepping up military preparations. In circumstances when the situation on the borders of Israel and Syria and the U.A.R. is extremely tense, militant Israeli groups are trying to impose on the Government and people of their country an adventurous line in order to try to solve all problems by military means. There is a danger that these groups could bring about an armed conflict which would be fraught with serious consequences to peace and international security.

We understand that under present circumstances whether Israel commits this senseless act depends a great deal on the Government of Great Britain. There can be no two opinions on this. If Israel does not feel that she is getting encouragement she would not dare to go over the limit.

Mr. Brown, the Foreign Secretary, when stating the position of your Government about the situation in this area emphasised that Great Britain was gravely concerned about the possibility of armed conflict and would take action to prevent it. The Foreign Secretary on behalf of the British Government called on the Soviet Union to exert its corresponding influence towards restraint also.

The Soviet Union is in favour of restraint. We are convinced that no matter how complicated is the situation on the borders of Israel, Syria and the U.A.R. measures could be found to prevent the present conflict from developing into a military one. Conditions are such that this could be done. A new area of conflagration in the world should not be allowed.

The Soviet Union is in favour of a restraining influence but naturally not to the detriment of the legitimate interests of the Arab States. The measures that they are taking are of a defensive nature. Moreover, they are showing restraint and, as we know, they do not want a military conflict. Certainly if the guns start to fire it could be the beginning of serious events. If Israel commits aggression and military action begins then we would render assistance to the countries which would be victims of aggression.

/Neither

The Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Neither we nor you nor the Arab countries nor the peoples of Israel want conflict. We appeal to you to take all measures so that there is no military conflict. For our part we would also take steps to the same end.

With respect,

(A. Kosygin)

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

Teleprinted to Chequers
28/5.

46

PRIME MINISTER

Note for Record.

After consulting P.M. I told Derek Day that we saw no reason why the French should be told in general terms the content of reply from Kaunda.

DJ
1/6